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EDITOR'S NOTE
It is my pleasure to present to you the second issue of Volume 19 of the Water Law Review. This
issue followed the Water Law Review's Ninth Annual Symposium, "Conflicts & Cooperation: The
Past, Present, and Future of Interstate Water Compacts," a superb forum to end a highly successful
mad exciting year for the Journal. I would like to recognize and thank Blaine Bengston, this year's
Symposium Editor and next year's Editor-in-Chief, for his hard work in organizing one of our most
highly attended symposiums. Through his vision, the Symposium was not only able to provide a
valuable forum for the discussion of legal principles and the future of water management in the
West, but also entertainment for the symposium's numerous attendees.
Like the Symposium, this Spring Issue serves to discuss timely and nuanced issues facing the water
law community because of a changing climate and constrained resources. We are honored to kick
off the Spring Issue with two feature articles by Retired Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., who has
provided our readers with the most up-to-date water law information since 1997 by drawing from his
vast experience in water and environmental law. Injustice Hobbs' Tenth update to Colorado Water
Law: An HistoricalPerspective,he excerpts recent Colorado opinions touching on water law. This
update gives our readers a valuable summary of important issues facing water rights holders today.
In the second feature article, St Jude Revisits: Commcntary on The Interplayof Ditch Rights, Prior
Appropriation Water Right, and Colorado's Disavowal of Riparian Rights, Justice Hobbs further
discusses the interplay of ditch rights and water rights within Colorado through a careful analysis of
three cases: Frees v. Tidi, St Jude's Co. v. RoaringFork Club, L.L C.; and Roaring Fork Club, LP.
v. St Jude's Company. On behalf of the Water Law Review, I would like to thank Justice Hobbs
for his guidance and support throughout this year, not only for his scholarship, but also his handson approach in helping the Journal staff as a member of the Journal's Advisory Board.
In continuing the tradition of publishing forward-looking articles related to water, I invite you to read
the four articles in this issue. First, in New Opportunitiesfor Small-Scale Hydropowerm Colorado,
Christopher Ainscough argues that the recent Colorado Supreme Court decision in Frees v. Tidd,
coupled with the development of "friendly" federal legislation, has the ability to facilitate more smallscale hydropower development within Colorado. Mr. Ainscough argues that the Frees decision
correctly applied Colorado water law in holding that water courts may decree ,junior, conditional
non-consumptive water rights that divert appropriation by senior rights holders, and apply that water
to the beneficial use of producing electric power. Mr. Ainscough also assesses the landscape for new
small-scale hydropower development, and how the Frees decision may impact this development
insofar as these projects can tap into the un-developed water power resources in the state.
Next, Professor Charles W. Howe and Dr. John D. Wiener co-authored Reconciling Water Law
and Economic Efficiency in Western Water Administration. Professor Howe and Dr. Wiener
suggest considering a holistic approach when contemplating future water policies including analyzing
agricultural potential, urban and industrial supply, and environmental benefits. Professor Howe and
Dr. Weiner assess competing interests through the concept of economic efficiency. This article
greatly contributes to the current shortcomings of existing water policy and the discussions
surrounding water policy reform.

We are excited to present Brett Miller's award-winning article, Embracing the Water-Energy
Contradiction: The Pebble Mine Conflict and Regulatoty Implications Associated with
Renewable Energy's Dependence on Non-Renewable Copper. Utilizing the Pebble Mine
conflict in the context of "the water-energy nexus," Mr. Miller's article argues that renewable
energy advocates may overlook the subsequent increases in demand and consumption of raw
materials such as copper. He asserts that these raw materials invariably supplement the
production of green technologies. He contends that policymakers fail to realize the interrelated
connection between renewable energy, increased copper mining, and water pollution. Given
the diverse regulatory challenges presented by the water-energy nexus, Mr. Miller suggests
embracing future challenges on a case-by-case basis. He acknowledges that although this
approach may lead to new conflicts, it will also promote interdisciplinary decision-making
among industry stakeholders, government agencies, and environmentalists.
To round out our featured articles, we are pleased to publish A ProperSeat at the Table: Attirming
a Broad Winters Right to GroundwaterbyDale Ratliff, a former Water Law Review Executive Board
member. Mr. Rafliffs article is as timely as it is nuanced. In his article, Mr. Ratliff discusses the
development of the doctrine of federal reserved rights to water. Specifically, Mr. Ratliff analyzes: (i)
whether tribal reserved water rights apply to groundwater, and (ii) whether tribal federal reserved
water rights can exist in a non-prior appropriation system of water law. While the doctrine of Indian
reserved rights to water has developed against the backdrop of the state prior appropriation system
of groundwater management, a federal district court in California recently heard the issue of whether
tribal reserved rights extend to groundwater in a non-appropriation based system of groundwater
management in the case of Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water
Distric In light of the persistent drought throughout the western United States and the increasing
reliance on groundwater, Mr. Ratliff argues that this case addresses one of the most important
unresolved issues.
Finally, we hope you find useful our student writing covering the recent cases, literature, and
developments in water law around the country. Of particular note is a collection of student notes
prepared in collaboration with the Stanford Environmental LawJournalthat further examine Agua
Caiente Band of Cahuifla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water District Given the importance of this
issue, we decided to focus the student-symposium on this case to further explore its potential
implications. On behalf of the Journal, I would like to thank the Stanford Environmental Law
Journalwith a special thanks to Philip Womble for his help in organizing this collaboration
Considering the scholarship in the pages that follow as well as the resounding success of our Ninth
Annual Symposium, I am optimistic and excited for the Water Law Review's twentieth year. We
have worked extensively throughout this year to lay the ground work for reaching two important
milestones next year: the twentieth issue mad the tenth symposium. The twentieth anniversary is a
perfect opportunity for the Journal to build upon past successes and ensure its place as a leading
facilitator and forum for issues concerning water law and water policy. Again, thank you for engaging
with the Water Law Review and supporting our mission through your subscription. We hope that
our work continues to serve a valuable role in the practice of water law in the water law community
for years to come.
Jennifer Najar
Editor-in-Chief
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I. INTRODUCTION

Colorado has substantial untapped hydropower resources.' Most of the
state's hydropower potential exists at sites smaller than five megawatts ("MW").2
The combination of friendly federal legislation3 and the recent Colorado Supreme Court decision in Frees v. Tidd' will enable more small-scale' hydropower development within the state. This Article analyzes the possible impact
of that legislation and the Frees decision on the development of that hydropower potential in Colorado. It also attempts, in a novel analysis,6 to estimate,
post Frees, the number and size of decreed water rights whose junior appropriators could potentially use their water as a source for hydropower development.
Electricity from renewable, resources represents a growing portion of the
energy consumption in the United States The United States Department of
Energy ("DOE") places renewable energy resources into eight different categories: hydroelectric, geothermal, solar, wind, wood biomass, ethanol, biodiesel,
and waste biomass.8 The DOE predicts that total electricity production from
renewable energy resources will increase over thirty-seven percent between
2013 and 2040.' This growth, however, does not have an even distribution
among the categories; for example, the DOE predicts that hydroelectric consumption will increase only twelve percent as compared to 2013 levels.'" A 2006
DOE report analyzed the feasibility for hydropower development of over
*Chris Ainscough holds a Bachelor of Science in engineering, mechanical specialty, from the
Colorado School of Mines, where he graduated with high scholastic honors. He holds a Masters
of Science in mechanical engineering from the University of Pennsylvania. Chris is a licensed
professional engineer working in the renewable energy industry. He is pursuing his Juris Doctor
at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, expected May 2017, with a focus on energy
and intellectual property law.
1. See JAMES E. FRANCFORT, U.S. HYDROPOWER RESOURCE ASSESSMENT FOR COLORADO
2 (1994) [hereinafter COLORADO ASSESSMENT] (finding that Colorado has an unadjusted hydropower potential of 2,346 megawatts ("MW") at 251 sites). After adjusting for land-use issues and
the presence or absence of existing development at the particular sites, the authors estimated the
Colorado's hydropower potential at 665 MW. See id.
2. Id. (showing that 188 sites of the 251 sites the report identified have hydropower potential
less than ten MW).
3. See infra Part 0 (discussing Hydropower Regulatory Efficiency Act, and Bureau of Reclamation Small Conduit Hydropower Development and Rural Jobs Act).
4. Frees v. Tidd, 349 P.3d 259, 268 (Colo. 2015) (holding that junior water right holder may
appropriate water for non-consumptive, small-scale hydropower use).
5. There is no generally accepted definition of small-scale hydropower. COLO. ENERGY
OFFICE, TH-E SMALL HYDROPOWER HANDBOOK 7 (2013); compare id. (defining "small-scale hydropower" as "development on existing infrastructure or hydropower with generating capacity of
2-megawatts or less."), with Hydropower Regulatory Efficiency Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-23,
§ 3, 127 Stat. 493 (2013) (defining "small-scale hydropower" as below ten MW of electricity). In
this Article, I define "small-scale hydropower" as sites with the potential to generate ten MW of
electricity or less.
6. The author is unaware of any similar attempt to correlate small-scale hydropower potential with effects on decreed water rights throughout the entire state of Colorado.
7. U.S. Dep't of Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration, Renewable & Alternative
Fuels, http://www.eia.gov/renewable/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
8. Id.

9. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015: WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2040 A-1 (2015) (Total Energy Supply, Disposition, and Price Summary).
10. Id.
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500,000 potential small hydropower sites in the country, and concluded that the
approximately 130,000 sites that meet feasibility criteria could increase hydroelectric generation by over 50 percent after development." However, an antiquated hydropower permitting process, developed for large-scale projects like
the Hoover Dam, also applies to small-scale hydropower sites and impedes the
development of these resources.
The Colorado Supreme Court's recent ruling in Frees may enable more
hydropower plants to come online. 3 The Court held that water courts may
decree junior, conditional non-consumptive water rights that divert appropriation by senior rights holders, and apply that water to the beneficial use of producing electric power." This decision correctly applied Colorado water law and
is consistent with the public policy of maximizing beneficial use of the state's
waters. That is, the Court's authorization for junior rights holders to apply
water to non-consumptive use provides for the maximization of water's beneficial use without harming senior appropriators' rights.
In Part I, this Article will examine the backdrop of Colorado water law in
which the dispute in Frees took place. Part II will thoroughly summarize the
Frees decision discussing the relevant facts, the procedural history, the majority's reasoning, and the dissent's warning of unintended consequences. Part III
will review the relaxed statutory landscape for new small-scale hydropower development, and how the Frees decision may affect this development. Part IV
assesses potential small-scale hydropower sites in the state and how the Frees
decision may affect water rights with diversion points near those sites. Part V
offers a brief conclusion concerning future small-scale hydropower development in Colorado.

II. THREE KEY ASPECTS OF COLORADO WATER LAW LED TO THE FREES
DECISION: PRIOR APPROPRIATION, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF
DITCH EASEMENTS, AND THE PUBLIC POLICY TO MAXIMIZE BENEFICIAL
USE OF APPROPRIATED WATER

To provide a grounding for the legal landscape in which the Frees controversy and eventual Colorado Supreme Court holding developed, the reader first
must understand: (i) the prior appropriation doctrine, (ii) the purpose and constitutional protection of ditch easements, and (iii) the maximization of the beneficial use of appropriated water. Experienced practitioners may wish to skip
to the analysis of Frees in Part II.
A. THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE

Colorado long ago abandoned the riparian doctrine in favor of the doctrine

11. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, WIND
AND HYDROPOWER
TECHNOLOGIES,
FEASIBILITY AsSESSMENT OF THE WATER ENERGY
RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES FOR NEW Low POWER AND SMALL HYDRO CLASSES OF
HYDROELECTRIC PLANTS, atv (2006) [hereinafter ASSESSMENT].
12. Gina S. Warren, Hydropower: Time for a Small Makeover, 24 IND. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 249,250 (2014) [hereinafter Hydropower].

13. See Frees v. Tidd, 349 P.3d 259, 262 (Colo. 2015).
14. Id.
15. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(1)(a).
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of prior appropriation.'" The prior appropriation doctrine, established in the
Colorado Constitution, codified a first-in-time, first-in-right system-so long as
the user puts the water to beneficial use.' 7 In fact, the right forms only once the
user puts the water to a beneficial use.'" The constitution applies a rank preference for domestic use over agricultural use, and agricultural use over manufacturing.' 9 Ownership of a water right in Colorado does not equate to ownership
of the water itself: water rights are usufructuary." However, in order for the
owner of a water right to use water for agriculture, the owner must convey the
water to her lands, which would otherwise remain barren."
B. DITCH EASEMENTS

Even prior to statehood, the Colorado Territorial Legislature recognized
the right to appropriate water and convey it to develop lands not adjacent to the
source." The state's constitution enshrined this doctrine: the constitution allows, upon just compensation, for a right-of-way across all lands for ditches and
canals to convey water for domestic, agricultural, and manufacturing uses.23 The
owner of land burdened with such an easement may not alter that easement
without first obtaining the owner's permission or obtaining a declaratory judgment that the alterations will not damage the owner's rights. 4 State statute clarifies and further defines the doctrine by allowing any owner of a water right or
conditional water right5 to obtain a right-of-way across another's land between
the point of diversion and the point of beneficial use. 6 Moreover, state statute
provides that "[n]o tract or parcel of.. . land... shall be subjected to the burden
of two or more ditches... when the same object can... be attained by uniting
and conveying all the water necessary. . . through one ditch."27 Consistent with
this policy goal, the statute authorizes multiple water rights owners to make their
diversions at the same point of a water source. "
C. MAXIMIZATION OF BENEFICIAL USE

Maximizing the beneficial use of water is a basic tenet of Colorado water
law. In Fellhauer v. People, the Colorado Supreme Court held that this policy
goal was "implicit" in the state constitution." The Colorado Legislature made

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 264. (citing Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443,447 (1882)).
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 53 (Colo. 1999).
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
Kobobel v. Colo. Dep't of Natural Res., 249 P.3d 1127, 1134 (Colo. 2011).
Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 555 (1872).
1861 Colo. Terr. Laws § 2.
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 7.
Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude's Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1239 (Colo. 2001).
A conditional water right holds a priority date in the appropriation system while the court

adjudicates the application and the appropriator puts the water to beneficial use. See Empire
Lodge Homeowners Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1147-48 (Colo. 2001).
26. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-86-102 (2015).
27. § 37-86-105.
28.

§ 37-92-305(2).

29. Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968).
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this goal explicit via statute, "it is the policy of this state to integrate the appropriation, use, and administration of... water in such a way as to maximize the
beneficial use of all of the waters of this state.""0 In 2001, the Court added three
more factors to this policy consideration, namely, that the purpose of the water
law is to "guarantee security, assure reliability, and cultivate flexibility... of this
scarce and valuable resource.'"" In a subsequent case, the Court held that promotion of entrepreneurial development, so long as it respects senior water
rights, is an acceptable use for water.12 The Court has limited this holding by
requiring that an applicant must show that the source contains sufficient water
to meet the needs of his proposed appropriation.
The applicant's proposed
appropriation may not affect the "quantity, quality, and timing" of the water delivered according to existing water and easement rights on the ditch. 4
III. FREES V. TIDD: AN ISSUE OF FIRST IMPRESSION BEFORE THE
COLORADO SUPREME COURT OPENED THE DOOR TO MORE
DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL-SCALE HYDROPOWER

One feature for easing the federal regulatory burden for a small-scale hydropower project is that the developer has all the necessary water rights." Prior
to the Frees decision,36 obtaining junior water rights in a fully-appropriated
stream could be costly or impossible." The Frees decision allows a junior appropriator, under certain conditions, to claim a right to available water in a
stream, even if the senior right holder has completely appropriated the water. 8
This decision opens the door to the development of small-scale hydropower by
enabling power project developers a clear path to claiming a junior right that
maximizes the beneficial use of water for hydropower purposes. Because the
Frees majority finds water available even in over-appropriated streams," the potential exists for an unlimited number of junior appropriators on a stream to
install hydropower facilities.
While in her dissent, Justice Mdirquez sees this decision as a topic best left
to the legislature and warns of unintended repercussions,"0 the majority's opinion is predictable in light of Colorado policy to maximize beneficial use of the
state's waters discussed in Part III supra.
This Article attempts in Part IV infra to assess the impact of Frees by crossreferencing potential hydropower sites, or places where the DOE found it could

30. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(l)(a) (2015).
31. Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1147 (Colo. 2001).
32. Mount Emmons Mining Co., v. Town of Crested Butte, 40 P.3d 1255, 1257 (Colo. 2002).
33. In re Bd. Of Cty. Comm'rs ofCty. of Arapahoe, 891 P.2d 952, 962 (Colo. 1995).
34. Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude's Co., 36 P.3d 1229,1238 (Colo. 2001).
35. See infra pp. 10-11.
36. Frees v. Tidd, 349 P.3d 259, 265 (Colo. 2015).
37. See Julia S. Walters, Safeguarding Colorado's Water Supply: The New Confluence of
Title Insurance and Water Rights Conveyances, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 496 (2006) (footnotes omitted) ("Because almost every river and stream in Colorado has been over-appropriated for years,
it has become increasingly difficult to obtain substantial and reliable new water supplies under
junior rights.").
38. Frees v. Tidd, 349 P.3d 259, 262,268 (Colo. 2015).
39. Id. at266.
40. Id. at 270-72 (Mdirquez, J., dissenting).
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be economical to install hydropower, with existing decreed water rights whose
physical water such installations could appropriate under junior priority.
A. FACTS OF THE FREES CONTROVERSY

The parties in Frees owned adjacent properties in Sagauche County, Colorado. " The Frees possessed a water right with an 1890 priority date to use 6.4
cubic feet per second ("cfs") of water diverted through the Garner Creek Ditch
No. 1 for irrigation.4 2' This ditch, for which the Frees owned an easement, diverted the whole flow of Garner Creek, and traveled across the Tidds' land to
deliver water to the Frees. 3
B.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Frees v. Tidd controversy stands as an example of the untapped, smallscale hydropower within Colorado, and the way in which hydropower in inextricably linked to water law and water rights within the state. In 2010, the water
court issued to the Tidds a non-consumptive conditional water right to divert
0.41 cfs from the Garner Creek Ditch No. 1 for small-scale hydropower purposes." The Tidds planned to pipe water 1,222 feet downhill to a turbine that
would generate 4.38 kilowatts ("kW") of electricity." The Tidds' proposed
pipeline would return all of the water to the ditch prior to the point where it
crosses into the Frees' property.
The Tidds' application initially indicated the diversion point as being on
the ditch. 7 Early in 2011, the Frees submitted a Statement of Opposition to the
Tidds' proposed water right.4' The Frees argued that the Tidds were seeking to
circumvent the Frees' senior water right." In June of 2011, the Tidds amended
their application to show the source as the headgate of Garner Creek, and thus
they would be using the same point of diversion as the Frees."
While awaiting a decree on their conditional water right application, the

Tidds moved for a declaratory judgment on whether applicants have a right to
use water in a ditch that runs across their property for purpose of hydropower.5
In ruling on the Tidds' motion, the water court cited Colorado's public policy
of maximizing the beneficial use of limited water supplies to the extent that the
user can do so without injuring senior water rights." The water court found that
the ditch contained sufficient water for the Tidds' proposed non-consumptive
use."

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 261.
Id.
Id. at262.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 263.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at265.
Id. at263.
Id.

52. Id. at 263-64.

53. Id.at263.
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Following the water court's finding, the Tidds and Frees collaborated on a
decree to assure that the Tidds' non-consumptive use would not harm the
Frees' senior priority appropriation.'" In June 2014, the water court entered a
decree granting the Tidds an appropriation in accordance with their application." The Frees appealed, leading to the instant case.
C. MAJORITY OPINION: MAXIMIZING BENEFICIAL USE OF SCARCE WATER
RESOURCES

The Frees contended that the Tidds were trying to change the Frees' senior
water right.'7 The Frees argued that the Tenth Circuit opinion in Public Service
Co. of Colorado v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission supported their position.58 That case focused on the Federal Energy Regulation Commission's
("FERC") assessment of a headwater benefits fee on Public Service for its release of additional water from a reservoir upstream of its run-of-the-river Shoshone hydropower plant.59 The Tenth Circuit, in dicta, stated that once water
entered the reservoir it is no longer public property because it has a "label" on
it.6 The Frees asserted that once they diverted water it also had a label upon it
and so the Tidds may not use it." In rejecting this argument, the Court cited
the Tenth Circuit's self-contradiction later in the case, namely, that "a water
right is a usufructuary right, and is in no sense a right of ownership in the corpus
of the water itself."' The Court then interpreted the Tenth Circuit's dicta to
mean that the FERC had a sufficient basis to assert the headwater benefits fee
pursuant to the Federal Power Act, not that a user could no longer use the water
for any purpose as the Frees asserted."3
In the Frees decision, Justice Hobbs held that the water court properly
granted the Tidds' conditional water right and that the water right was sound."
Justice Gregory Hobbs served on the Colorado Supreme Court as an associate
justice and the body's pre-eminent water law expert from 1996 until 2015. Writing for the majority, Justice Hobbs found that the Tidds appropriately sought
and obtained a decree for a conditional water right before seeking to use water
in the ditch that runs across their land.' In strong language, Justice Hobbs reinforced the policy of maximizing beneficial use of scarce water resources: "Although the Tidds intend to use... the same physical water as the Frees, this is
not merely permissible, Colorado water
law favors such multiple uses if injury
66'
to senior water rights will not occur.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at265.
58. Id.
59. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n., 754 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir.
1985).
60. Frees, 349 P.3d at 266 (quoting Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 91 F.3d at 1565).
61. Id. at 266.
62. Id. (quoting Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 754 F.2d at 1566) (further citation omitted).
63. Id. at266.
64. Id. at 265-66.
65. Id. at265.
66. Id. (citing Nichols v. McIntosh, 34 P. 278, 279 (Colo. 1893)).
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The Court discussed the two statutory circumstances under which a water
resource is "available" for an adjudicated water right: (i) "there is un-appropriated water available in a stream that is not over-appropriated;" and (ii) "when
the affected stream is over-appropriated, the decree for junior water right contains sufficient conditions to prevent injury to other adjudicated water,"67 These
two circumstances are consistent with the prior appropriation doctrine and the
policy of maximizing beneficial use."8 Further, Colorado law adds the so-called
"can and will" requirement that applicants will complete such projects "with
diligence and within a reasonable time." 9 The parties agreed that the Tidds'
junior appropriation would not harm the Frees' senior appropriation." The
Court also noted that its ruling does not require the Frees to divert water from
Garner Creek for the benefit of the Tidds' junior right, even if the Frees do not
need water."
Finally, the Court rejected the Frees' argument that the Tidds were unable
to appropriate pursuant to the Colorado Constitution. 2 The state legislature
made it a matter of state policy to maximize beneficial use of the state's waters."3
The Court noted that the Tidds applied for a conditional right of available water
from a natural stream in order to put the water to the beneficial use of hydropower."
In total, the Court completely upheld the ruling of the water court and affirmed the decree of the Tidds' conditional right for hydropower.
D.

DISSENT: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

Justice Mdrquez, joined by Justice Coats, dissented noting that because the
Tidds used water that the Frees have already appropriated and diverted, the
Tidds essentially appropriated the water out of priority." Justice Mdrquez disagreed with the majority's statement that the Tidds cannot force the Frees to
divert water when they do not need it." She argued that the Tidds necessarily
relied on the Frees' larger flow because they admitted that their appropriation
of 0.41 cfs may not be enough by itself to reach their intake pipe." Thus the
Tidds could only appropriate by "piggybacking" on the Frees' diversion.79 Further, Justice Mdrquez argued that the majority misapplied the "can and will"
requirement because case law interpreting the statute only refers to the out-ofpriority diversion explicitly adopted by the legislature like augmentation plans,

67.

68.
69.
citation
70.
71.

Id.at266.

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(l)(a).
Frees, 349 P.3d at 267-68 (quoting COLO. REv.
omitted).
Id. at 267.
Id.

72. Id. at268.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(1)(a) (2015).
Frees, 349 P.3d at 268.
Id.
Id. at 269 (Mirquez, J., dissenting).
Id. at 269 (Mdrquez, J., dissenting).
Id. at 269-70 (Mdrquez, J., dissenting).
Id. at 270 (Mdrquez, J., dissenting).

STAT.

37-92-305(9)(b) (2014)) (further
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not new appropriations."0 Justice Mdrquez succinctly summarized her opposition to the majority ruling thusly:
The syllogism evident in [the majority opinion's] statement is that, if unappropriated water is available, then the applicant's proposed new diversion will not
harm senior appropriators. Yet the majority turns this logic on its head and
effectively holds that, if a new diversion will not harm senior appropriators,
then water is available for the new appropriation.'

Justice Mdrquez concluded by warning of the ruling's unintended policy
repercussions because of the potential duty the Frees may now owe the Tidds8
She pondered about "[w]hat happens, for example, if the Frees wish to change
the point of diversion for their Garner Creek Ditch No. 1 water right at some
point in the future?.... Do the Frees now owe a duty to the Tidds not to injure
their junior water right? 4
Justice Mdrquez' warning might not have important societal implications for
users like the Tidds seeking to divert water for small-scale hydropower facilities.
But, if the Court applied the same rule to a large hydropower facility relying on
non-consumptive use of the same water as a senior appropriator who decided
to change a diversion point, the societal impact could be extensive."
IV. DISCUSSION: THE STATUTORY LANDSCAPE FOR SMALL-SCALE
HYDROPOWER
A. EASING REGULATIONS FOR SMALL-SCALE HYDROPOWER
8
While the potential for small-scale hydropower in the United States is vast,"

the permitting and regulatory scheme in place, developed by the federal government decades ago for large-scale public works projects, frustrates small-scale
hydropower development. 7 Two recently passed pieces of legislation, however,
may help alleviate this situation.
First, with the Hydropower Regulatory Efficiency Act of 2013 ("Efficiency
Act"), Congress aimed to promote small-scale hydropower in three
significant ways."9 First, Congress amended 16 U.S.C. § 2705 to increase the
small hydro- power exemption from five MW to ten MW under the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act." This amendment allows larger small-scale
hydropower projects
80. Id. at 271 (Mfrquez, J., dissenting) (citing Buffalo Park Dev. Co. v. Mountain Mut. Resevoir Co., 195 P.3d 674, 685 (Colo. 2008)).
81. Id. (Mdrquez, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
82. Id. at 272 (Mdrquez, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (Mdrquez, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (Mdrquez, J., dissenting).
85. See Section IV.C infra.
86. ASSESSMENT, supra note 11,at 23.
87. Gina S. Warren, Hydropower: It's a Small World After All, 91 NEB. L. Riv. 925, 926
(2013).
88. Hydropower Regulatory Efficiency Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-23, 127 Stat. 493 (2013)
(codified in scattered sections of title 16); Bureau of Reclamation Small Conduit Hydropower
Development and Rural Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 113-24, 127 Stat. 498 (2013).
89. See 127 Stat. 493.
90. § 3, 127 Stat. 493.
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to skip the FERC regulatory process thereby reducing the cost and lead time
for qualifying projects."
Second, Congress amended 16 U.S.C. § 823a to remove the licensing requirement for certain qualifying hydropower facilities; remove conduit projects
(without an impoundment such as a dam) under five MW from FERC jurisdiction; and increase the conduit project exemption up to forty MW. 2" Third,
Congress amended 16 U.S.C. § 798 to allow the FERC to extend preliminary
permits, and implement a streamlined two-year application process for certain
projects." This legislation is important for run-of-the-river projects such as the
Tidd's that do not have an impoundment.' Again, these changes will ease the
permitting burden for small scale projects.
Moreover, the Efficiency Act requires that a person or entity, such as the
Tidds, file a notice of intent with the FERC in order to license a conduit project." The FERC then has fifteen days to make an initial determination whether
the proposed facility meets the qualifying criteria, and, if the facility qualifies,
the FERC must publish the notice of intent.' Within forty-five days of publication of the notice of intent, the person or entity may contest whether the proposed project meets the qualifying criteria. 7 The Efficiency Act define qualifying criteria as projects that (i) are on a conduit presently operated for purposes
other than hydropower; (ii) do not contain an impoundment such as a dam; (iii)
are on a conduit not federally owned; (iv) have a capacity of five MW or less;
and (v) do not have prior licenses or exemptions."9 Note that the default action
under this Act is for the FERC to let the project through the process once it
determines that the project meets the qualifying criteria. This process, again,
should streamline permitting.
Second, in the Bureau of Reclamation Small Conduit Hydropower Development and Rural Jobs Act of 2013 ("Jobs Act"), Congress implemented similar improvements for licensing federal conduit projects." The Jobs Act requires
that the Bureau of Reclamation ("Reclamation") determine whether the proposed facility is compatible with the conduit's current use, and if the proposed
facility will avoid "any unmitigated financial or physical impacts ....The Jobs
Act further requires Reclamation to first offer the lease of the power privilege
to the conduit's users.' 2 If they decline the offer, Reclamation must offer the

91. See § 4, 127 Stat. 493; cf. Hydropower, supra note 12, at 260 (footnote omitted) ("Regardless of the size of the facility, the licensing process can take up to five-and-a-half years to
complete and can cost thousands of dollars.").

92. Id.
93. § 5, 127 Stat. 493
94. See Frees v. Tidd, 349 P.3d 259, 261-62 (Colo. 2015); see infra note 197.
95. § 4, 127 Stat. 493.

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (defining a "conduit" as a "tunnel, canal, pipeline, aqueduct, flume, ditch, or similar
manmade water conveyance").
99. Id.
100. Bureau of Reclamation Small Conduit Hydropower Development and Rural Jobs Act of
2013, Pub. L. No. 113-24, 127 Stat. 498 (2013).
101. § 2, 127 Stat. 498

102. Id.
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privilege to others.' 3°
As a backdrop to this loosening of restrictions, the FERC has encouraged
states to establish memoranda of understanding with the FERC to develop
small-scale hydropower projects. ' " In 2010, the State of Colorado signed such
an agreement with the FERC ("MOU")' °' in order to help meet the state's Renewable Portfolio Standard. °6 The MOU articulates the FERC's and Colorado's "mutual interest in streamlining and simplifying regulations for authorizing small hydropower projects."' The FERC retained the responsibility under
the Federal Power Act for issuing licenses and exemptions, and for regulatory
authority over dam safety.' 0 The State of Colorado has the responsibility to
regulate water quality; ensure ex ante that projects qualify for an exemption from
FERC regulations; and consult with appropriate federal and state agencies,
tribes, and the public.' 9 The MOU's pilot program consists of twenty installations whose purpose is to "identify and' test opportunities to simplify and streamline procedures and regulations for authorizing small scale hydropower projects"."0. The State of Colorado and the FERC may continue the pilot program
if it is successful."' Colorado's pre-screening criteria are:
1. The project will be located within an existing water delivery system;
2. The project will use existing infrastructure, including points of diversion and discharge;
3. There will be no increased stream diversions;
4. The project will be entirely contained by existing waterway structures;
5. The primary purpose of the infrastructure will remain, e.g., most
commonly municipal water supply and irrigation;
6. There will be no significant change in operation of the infrastructure;
7. The water delivery system has all necessary water rights, permits,
licenses or other approvals required by any local, state, or federal
authority;
8. The project will not adversely affect water quality;
9. The project will not adversely affect fish passage;
10. The project will not adversely affect a threatened or endangered
species;

103. Id.
104. Hydropower, supra note 12, at 264.
105. State of Colorado & Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Memorandum of Understanding
Between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and The State of Colorado through the
Governor's Energy Office to Streamline and Simplify the Authorization of Small Scale Hydropower Projects (2010) [hereinafter MOU].
106. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-124 (2015) (mandating certain percentages of renewable electrical
power generation within Colorado for different power generator types, by 2020).
107. MOU supranote 105, at2.
108. Id. at 2.
109. Id. at 2-4.
110. Id. at 2.
111. Id. at 4-5.
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11. The project will not adversely affect a cultural resource;
12. The project will not adversely affect a recreational resource; and
13. The project will meet all of the other requirements for either a conduit or a 5 MW exemption."2
The Court's decision in Frees has the potential to directly affect the seventh
of these criteria- that is, the requirement that the project obtain the necessary
water rights-because it may make it easier for hydropower project developers
to obtain junior appropriations for non-consumptive use of the same physical
water along the same conduit used by senior appropriators. ' 3 Provided, as the
Court held, that the junior appropriations will not injure the senior water right."'
B. POTENTIAL RESOURCES IN COLORADO
Between existing but under-utilized hydropower facilities, non-powered
dams, unimproved conduits, federally and non-federally owned conduits, the
untapped hydropower potential in the state is wide-ranging and complex."'
Many of these resources, however, will fit into one of the regulatory schemes
recently put in place to accelerate the development of small-scale hydropower." 6
In 2013, the State of Colorado published The Small Hydropower Handbook ("Colorado Handbook"), a set of guidelines for small-scale hydropower
development."7 While the Colorado Handbook acknowledged that there is no
established definition of "small-scale hydropower," it nonetheless defines
"small-scale hydropower" as projects producing fewer than two MW."8 The
Colorado Handbook noted that since 2005, Colorado has had sixty-two operating hydropower facilities with a combined capacity of 1,162 MW, and that
these facilities generate over one trillion watt-hours annually."' The state's largest plant is 300 MW in capacity. 2 '
Prior to the DOE's 2006 nationwide assessment of hydropower resources,'2 ' the agency commissioned a detailed state-level assessment, United
States Hydropower Resource Assessment for Colorado ("Colorado Assessment"), that identified and assessed the hydropower potential of 251 sites in
Colorado. 2 That report assigned a project environmental suitability factor
("PESF") for each project's hydropower potential.'' The PESF assessed the
112. Id. at 3. (numbering added for clarity). Note that the State of Colorado and the FERC
published the MOU three years prior to the passage of The Hydropower Regulatory Efficiency

Act, and so the MOU reflects the older exemption limits. Compare id., with Hydropower Regulatory Efficiency Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-23, 127 Stat. 493 (2013).
113. See id.; Frees v. Tidd, 349 P.3d 259, 265 (Colo. 2015).
114. Frees, 349 P.3d at 265.

115. See COLORADO

ASSESSMENT,

supra note 1, at 2.

116. See id.; see also Hydropower Regulatory Efficiency Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-23, 127
Stat. 493 (2013); Bureau of Reclamation Small Conduit Hydropower Development and Rural
Jobs Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-24, 127 Stat. 498 (2013); MOU, supranote 105, at 3; infra

Figure 4.
117. Colo. Energy Office, Colorado Small Hydropower Handbook (2013).

118. Id. at 7.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121.

ASSESSMENT, supra note 11.

122. COLORADO ASSESSMENT supra note 1, at 2.
123. Id. at 1.
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project's wild and scenic resource protection; the presence of fish and threatened/endangered species; and the cultural, geologic, historic, recreational, scenic, and wildlife value of the site.' The PESF is always a number between 0.1
and 0.9, "where 0.9 indicates the highest likelihood of development, and 0.1
indicates the lowest likelihood of development. ....

I used the PESF in the

United States Hydropower Resource Assessment for Colorado ("Colorado Assessment") to adjust the raw potential of a particular site with the likelihood that
someone might actually develop the site.'26
The Colorado Assessment classified sites in three ways: (i) sites with existing
hydropower but untapped capacity; (ii) sites with no generation, but some sort
of developed impoundment; or (iii) undeveloped sites without a diversion structure.127 Most of the sites identified the DOE had power ratings below five
MW,'28 and so would fit under the MOU's exemptions.'29 The adjusted capacity
of the sites identified and assessed was approximately 665 MW.'3 ° Ninety-one
of these sites had existing impoundments, undeveloped hydropower resources,
and a combined adjusted annual capacity of approximately 377 MW."' Because these sites have existing impoundments, they qualify under the MOU exceptions but not the Efficiency Act.' 155 of the 251 sites the DOE identified
are undeveloped and with a combined adjusted annual capacity of 209 MW,
and so may qualify under the Efficiency Act.' The total number of sites in
these two categories, that is, without hydropower development, is 246.' '
Reclamation estimated that Colorado has twenty-eight potential hydropower generation sites with a total potential annual energy capacity of over 100
MWh on Reclamation-owned conduits.'35 These sites may qualify for licensing

124. Id. at app. D at 1.
125. Id. at 1.
126. See id. For each site, I calculated a nameplate power rating in kW. Then, I multiplied
the name plate rating by the PESF to arrive at an adjusted power rating that reflects not only the
site's raw power potential, but the likelihood someone will develop that potential into an actual
power plant. For instance, appendix B of the Colorado Assessment shows the Azure site on the
Colorado River has a nameplate rating of 21,000 kW. Id. at app B at 1. The site's PESF, however, is only 0.1. Id. The adjusted capacity (PESF multiplied by name plate rating) is thus 2,100
kW. See id. This calculation reflects that although the raw potential of the site is strong, environmental and land-use factors make its development unlikely. See id. at 1. This Article relies
on the adjusted power calculation.
127. Id. at 2. Note that sites that fall under the first classifications have previously obtained
licenses to generate hydropower and so they would not qualify under FPA exemptions. See
Hydropower Regulatory Efficiency Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-23, 127 Stat. 493, § 4 (2013).
128.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
3); see

COLORADO ASSESSMENT supra note 1, at 2.

MOU, supra note 105, at 2.
COLORADO ASSESSMENT supra note 1, at 2.
Id. at app. A at 1.
See § 4, 127 Stat. 493; MOU, supra note 105, at 3.
See § 4, 127 Stat. 493; COLORADO ASSESSMENT supra note 1, at 2, 3 (Figure 2 and Figure
also infra Figure 4.

134.

COLORADO ASSESSMENT supra note 1, at app. A at 1.

135.

U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, POWER RESOURCES OFFICE,

SITE INVENTORY AND HYDROPOWER ENERGY ASSESSMENT OF RECLAMATION OWNED CONDUITS: SUPPLEMENT TO THE "HYDROPOWER RESOURCE ASSESSMENT AT EXISTING RECLAMA-

TION FACILITIES REPORT 7 (2012).
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under the Jobs Act."' The Colorado Handbook also notes that the DOE identified in Colorado an additional eleven sites at non-powered dams with the potential to produce an additional 632,000 MWh annually.'
V. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE FREES DECISION
A. METHODOLOGY

In order to estimate the potential impact of the Frees decision,3 I researched existing decreed appropriations for uses other than hydropower that
exist on the 246 conduits and non-powered dams identified by the DOE in the
Colorado Assessment.' That report identified sites by FERC number, latitude
and longitude coordinates, and a name.'4 Where possible, I matched these
data to the state's database of decreed water rights.''
I cross-referenced the latitude and longitude of the possible hydropower
sites with the land grid sections in the United States Bureau of Land Management's Statewide Geographic Coordinate Database.' 42 This database contains
the locations and the extent of the township, range, and sections from the Public
Land Survey System ("PLSS") for each state.' 3 I determined the location of
each of the 246 sites within a section of the database.'"
I accomplished this matching via a custom-developed computer program I
wrote in MATLAB '" that compared the extent of each PLSS section to check
if it contained each of the 246 sites.'" The program created a composite table
of water rights and nearby potential hydropower sites. In order to generate the
figures infra, I first filtered the composite table of water rights using different
4
county, "8 and structure type.'" I then added
variables such as water division,"'
the total flows in the water rights." Two sites the DOE identified in the Colo-

136. See Bureau of Reclamation Small Conduit Hydropower Development and Rural Jobs
Actof2013, Pub. L. No. 113-24, 127 Stat. 498, § 2 (2013).
137. Colo. Energy Office, Colorado Small Hydropower Handbook 8 (2013).
138. See discussion supra Part II.
139. See COLORADO ASSESSMENT supra note 1, at 3 (Figure 3), app. A at 1.
140. Id. atapp. D-1 to D-251.
141. See Colorado's Decision Support Systems: Water Rights, COLO. WATER CONSER(last visited Feb. 19,
VATION BD., http://cdss.state.co.us/onlineTools/Pages/WaterRights.aspx
2016) [hereinafter Support Sys.].
142. Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt., GEOCOMMUNICATOR, http://www.geocommunicator.gov/GeoComm/lsis home/home (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
143. Id.

144. See COLORADO

ASSESSMENT

supra note 1, at app. A at 1; Dep't of the Interior, supra

note 142.
145. See MATLAB, http://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab/?requestedDomain=www.
mathworks.com (last visited June 5, 2016) ("The MATLAB platform is optimized for solving
engineering and scientific problems. The matrix-based MATLAB language is the world's most
natural way to express computational mathematics.").
146. See COLORADO ASSESSMENT supra note 1, at app. A at 1.
147. See infra Figure 3.
148. See infra Table 1.
149. See infra Figure 2.
150. See infra Figures 2-4; Tables 1-2.
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rado Assessment contained incorrect coordinate information,5 and so I corrected the coordinates in order to include them in the analysis. '
Using the PLSS data shown in Figure 1 infra, I searched the Colorado Decision Support System for decreed water rights within each section containing a
potential hydropower site."2 I filtered the results to include only water rights
whose diversion structures Colorado described as "other," "ditch," "reservoir,"
"pipe," "power plant," and "minimum flow .....
I excluded unlikely sources for
hydropower development, such as ground water, wells, and pumps,'54 as well as
seeps and springs.'55
To assess the potential impact of the Frees decision,' I totaled for reservoirs the flows and storage volumes in groups by water court division, county,
and structure type. I am aware of no publicly available assessment of Colorado's hydropower potential that is more thorough than the Colorado Assessment.l'5 This assessment combined with an exhaustive search of the state's decreed water rights within proximity of a single PLSS section should indicate the
water rights with hydropower potential.''
Nonetheless, potential shortcoming of the analysis is the relatively old age
of the Colorado Assessment. ' Certainly, some pertinent details in the state's
water distribution architecture have occurred since its publication in 1994. ' It
151. See infra Figure 1 (incorporating corrected latitude and longitude coordinates for Glacier
Creek and Homestake Tunnel); compare COLORADO ASSESSMENT supra note 1, at app. D at 40
(listing Glacier Creek's latitude and longitude coordinates as 3935.00 and 11544.00), at 98 (listing
Homestake Tunnel's latitude and longitude coordinates as 7916.00 and 10623.00), with LATLONG.COM, http://www.lat-long.com/Latitude-Longitude-1 79818-Colorado-Glacier Creek.html
(last visited Mar. 19, 2016) (listing Glacier Creek's latitude and longitude coordinates as
39.283044 and -106.4380834), and LAT-LONG.COM, http://www.lat-long.com/Latitude-Longitude-179823-Colorado-Homestake Tunnel.html (listing Homestake Tunnel's latitude and longitude coordinates as 39.3119324 and -106.4514172).
152. See Support Sys.,supra note 141.
153. See id.
154. Ground water, wells, and pumps all typically require energy input to produce water. Extracting energy from these sources would be a net loss of energy due to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which states that an irreversible process is one that includes dissipative effects, or
the presence of non-quasistatic processes. Because pumping water includes dissipative effects
(e.g. friction in pump or turbine bearings) it is an irreversible process and cannot extract 100
percent of the energy available. In other words, a hydropower turbine (or any other means)
cannot completely extract the energy imparted to the water by a pump. Therefore, I excluded
these sources. For a description of the second law and irreversibility, see, e.g., YuNus A. tENGEL
&MICHAEL A. BOLES, THERMODYNAMICS, AN ENGINEERING APPROACH 257-62 (2d. ed. 1994).
155. 1 excluded seeps and springs because they are unlikely to flow with sufficient velocity for
hydropower production, and if one were to impound the water produced in order to attain sufficient potential energy or hydraulic head, the Decision Support System would include the water
in a reservoir.
156. See discussion supra in Part II.
157. Other sources are available to estimate the hydropower potential in Colorado. For instance, the Colorado Department of Agriculture published an extensive report in 2013 showing
possible locations for small-scale hydropower on pressurized irrigation systems, ditch drops, and
dams. However, the detailed site-specific information contained in the COLORADO ASSESSMENT
was not available in these other sources. See, e.g., COLO. DEP'T OF AGRIC., RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR DEVELOPING AGRICULTURAL HYDROPOWER IN COLORADO 3 (2013).
158. See id.; Figure 1 infra.
159. See COLORADO ASSESSMENT, supra note 1 (published in 1994).
160. See, e.g., Water Project Loan Program, COLORADO WATER CONSERVATION BOARD
(Mar. 22, 2016), http://cwcb.state.co.us/LoansGrants/water-project-loan-program/Documents/Ex
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is also possible that some water rights, though in the same PLSS section, are in
a different drainage than the potential hydropower site. The Colorado Assessment only reported on two sites with raw power capacity less than five kW order
of magnitude of the Tidd's project.'6' Also, the list of potential hydropower sites
identified by DOE is not exhaustive. For instance, the list did not include Garner Creek, the Tidds' proposed project source. '
B. RESULTS: THE FREES DECISION COULD SUBJECT THE WATER USED
UNDER SEVERAL HUNDRED SENIOR WATER RIGHTS WITHIN THE STATE
TO JUNIOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR HYDROPOWER USE
By cross-referencing the potential hydropower sites from the Colorado Assessment with the state's list of decreed water rights within the same land section,
the Frees decision has the potential to affect up to 315 individual water rights.' 3
These rights draw from seventy-three sources in thirty-two different Colorado
counties and seven Water Court Divisions. " The total of all affected water
rights flows is over 7,600 cfs.'63 Additionally, reservoirs hold nearly 1.3 million
acre-feet of water in proximity to the potential power plant sites.' This is a
substantial amount of water; for reference, the state's reservoirs currently hold
over 2.5 million acre feet of water appropriated for power generation in general.' 7 The largest potential source of flows (nearly 4,000 cfs) to support hydropower projects could come from ditches, as in the Frees case.' 6" The second
largest source (nearly 3,000 cfs) exists in power plant diversions. 6" The Water
Court Divisions most affected are Divisions 4 and 5.7 These divisions encompass the drainage of the Gunnison River and Colorado River.'' Two counties
in these divisions, Montrose and Mesa Counties, individually are among the
largest possible sources for hydropower flows. 2 Specifically, Montrose County

ampleProjectsFunded.pdf
161. Frees v. Tidd, 349 P.3d 259, 263 (Colo. 2015); see COLORADO ASSESSMENT, supra note
1, at app. D at 6-7 (the assessment lists McDonough 2 with a raw power potential of 3 kW, and
Blue Valley Ranch 3(2) with 5 kW).
162. See Frees v. Tidd, 349 P.3d 259,261 (Colo. 2015); COLORADO ASSESSMENT, supra note
1, at app. D at 1-251; Support Sys., supra note 141 (after inputting "Garner Creek," showing
Tidd's conditional water right at township 45 north, range 10 east, section 1).
163. See Frees, 349 P.3d at 268; COLORADO ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at app. D at 1-25 1;

Support Sys., supra note 141 (input land section).
164. See infra Figures 1-3, Tables 1-2.
165. See infra Figure 2.
166. See id.
167. See Support Sys., supra note 141 (input "power generation" for use and "reservoir: for
structure type).
168. See Frees, 349 P.3d at 265; infra Figure 2.
169. See infra Figure 2.
170. See infra Figure 3.
171. Water Division Four- Gunnison River Basin, COLO. JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://www.
courts.state.co.us/Courts/Water/Division.cfm?Water Division ID=4 (last visited Feb. 20,2016);
Water Division Five - Colorado River Basin, COLO. JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://www.courts.state.
co.us/Courts/Water/Division.cfm?Water DivisionID=5 (last visited Feb. 20, 2016).
172. See ibid.; COLORADO DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, http://www.water.state.co.us/
Home/Publishinglmages/MapCountiesAndDivs.gif (last visited Mar. 17, 2016) (showing that
Mesa County straddles Gunnison River and Colorado River Basins); see also infra Table 1.

Issue 2

NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR SMALL-SCALL HYDROPOWER

173

has the potential to produce 3,011 cfs and Mesa County 2,338 cfs.'

Of the 251 potential hydropower sites the DOE identified, 110 are in a
PLSS section containing at least one decreed water right with a diversion in the
same section, which may indicate the availability of water that a junior appropriator could use for hydropower purposes. ' The bulk of the decreed flows (approximately 6,000 cfs) coincide with existing impoundments that may qualify
for development under the MOU."' The remaining flows (approximately 1,000
cfs) are associated with unimproved sites that may qualify for development under the Efficiency Act."6 Note that most flows are associated with existing impoundments, which number the fewest sites. ' Specifically, forty existing structures account for over 6,400 cfs, and the remaining seventy-three unimproved
sites account for 1,240 cfs.' That most of the high flow water resources are at
existing sites"9 may imply that the quality of the remaining sites is less favorable
for hydropower development.
Figure 1. Colorado PLSS Sections and Potential Hydropower Sites"'
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See infra Table 1.

174.

See COLORADO ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at D 1-251; Support Sys., supra note 141.
See COLORADO ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at D 1-251; MOU, supranote 105, at 3;
infra Figure 4.
176. See Hydropower Regulatory Efficiency Actof 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-23, 127 Stat. 493,
§ 4 (2013); COLORADO ASSESSMENT, supranote 1, at D 1-251; Support Sys., supranote 141;
infra Figure 4.
177. See COLORADO ASSESSMENT, supranote 1, at D 1-251; Support Sys., supranote 141;
infra Figure 4.

175.

178. Ibid.
179. Ibid.
180. See COLORADO ASSESSMENT supra note 1; SUPPORT SYS., supra note 141; seealso supra
Part IV(A).
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Figure 2. Possibly Affected Flows by Structure Type...
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Figure 3. Possibly Affected Flows by Water Court Division...
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181. See COLORADO ASSESSMENT supra note 1; SUPPORT SYS., supra note 141.
182. See COLORADo ASSESSMENT supra note 1; SUPPORT Sys., supra note 141.
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Figure 4. Possibly Affected Flows by Site Type, and Site Count'
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Table 1. Total Flows Possibly Affected by County 4.
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183. See COLORADO ASSESSMENT supra note 1; SUPPORT SYs., supra note 141. Note that un-

developed sites may qualify under the Efficiency Act, Hydropower Regulatory Efficiency Act of
2013, Pub. L. No. 113-23, 127 Stat. 493, § 4 (2013), and existing sites may qualify for further
hydropower resource development under the MOU, MOU, supra note 105, at 3.
184. See COLORADO ASSESSMENT supra note 1; SUPPORT Sys., supra note 141.
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Table 2. Possibly Affected by Water Source...
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See COLORADO ASSESSMENT supra note 1; SUPPORT Sys., supra note 141.
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C. ESTIMATING THE SCOPE OF THE DISSENT'S UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES

In her dissent in Frees, Justice Mdrquez warned about unintended consequences of the Frees decision:
What happens, for example, if the Frees wish to change the point of diversion
for their Garner Creek Ditch No. 1 water right at some point in the future? If
doing so would impact the availability of water for the Tidds' hydroelectric
water right, is this 'injury' sufficient to preclude such a change to the Frees'
water right? In other words, what obligations do the Frees now have to avoid
injury to the Tidds (or to a future holder of the Tidds' hydroelectric power
right)? '

Should this question arise for adjudication in a Colorado court, I believe
the Colorado Supreme Court's St. Jude I decision is sufficient to resolve the
situation. ' In St. Jude's I, the Court re-affirmed a balancing test developed in
prior cases: "[T]he direction of the law in Colorado has also been toward the
accommodation doctrine, in requiring that, whenever possible, the uses must
be exercised consonantly with one another ..... The Court cited its earlier case,
Lazy Dog Ranch, to state that "both the holder of the easement and the owner
of the land burdened by the easement have rights to use the property. Consequently, the interests of both parties must be balanced in order to achieve due
and reasonable enjoyment of both the easement and the servient estate ..... This
holding suggests that Justice Mdrquez is correct: should the Frees wish to move
their diversion point they will have to take the Tidds' new water right into consideration and will be unable to unilaterally move the diversion point.' °
Given the relatively small size of most of the potential hydropower sites in
Colorado (under five MW),'' her predictions of wider socio-economic impacts
seem at first unlikely from a practical point of view.' 2 However, given the number of water rights that a junior appropriatol may wish to use foi hydiopowei
development (over three hundred),' 3 the scope of potential conflicts expands
greatly. Consider also the seventy-three water sources supplying those water
rights,""'. and the situation becomes potentially more complex than in the
Frees case, in which there were only two rights holders and a single ditch."'
In support of Justice Mdirquez's position, for instance, consider this extreme

186. Frees v. Tidd, 349 P.3d 259,272 (Colo. 2015) (Mdrquez, J., dissenting).
187. Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude's Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1235 (Colo. 2001).
188. Id. at 1235 (citing Gerrity Oil v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 927 (Colo. 1997).
189. Id. at 1235 (citing LazyDog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp., 965 P.2d 1229, 1238 (Colo.
1998)) (further citation omitted).
190. Frees, 349 P.3d at 272 (Mirquez, J., dissenting).
191. MOU, supra note 105, at 3.
192. See Frees, 349 P.3d at 272 (Mdrquez, J., dissenting).
193. See COLORADo AssESSMENT, supra note 1, at app. D at 1-251; Support Sys., supra note
141. See ibid.; supra Figures 1-3, Tables 1-2. See ibid.; supra Figures 1-3, Tables 1-2.
194. Frees, 349 P.3d at 261.
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hypothetical on the Colorado River. Relying on the Frees decision,'96 a hydropower developer using run-of-the-river generators'97 installs small five MW
plants every half mile from the headwaters of the Colorado all the way to the
state line. To paraphrase the Frees decision, so long as the developer puts the
water back where he found it and does not affect senior water rights, he is maximizing the beneficial use of the water.' Thus, the developer can obtain a whole
series of junior appropriations using water also appropriated by the multitude
of users of the Colorado River.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Frees,' coupled with an easing
of federal regulations,' paved the way for more small-scale hydropower projects
in Colorado. Such projects can tap into the under- or undeveloped water
power resources in the state."' The decision strikes an appropriate balance between Colorado's public policy of maximizing beneficial use of scarce water
resources, while protecting the integrity of the state's prior appropriation doctrine.2 ' However, given the number of water rights and the associated flows or
water storage that future hydropower projects could affect,"3 the decision may
lead to more conflicts over the beneficial use of the state's limited waters.

196.- Id. at 268.
197. Unlike a traditional dam-based generator that relies on stored water, a run-of-the-river
generator requires no impoundment or little hydraulic head. Run-of-River Power, ENERGY BC,
http://www.energybc.ca/profiles/runofriver.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2016). Instead, a run-of-

the-river generator relies on the kinetic energy of the river water flowing past it. Id.
198. Frees, 349 P.3d at 265.

199. Id. at 265.
200. See Hydropower Regulatory Efficiency Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-23, 127 Stat. 493
(2013); Bureau of Reclamation Small Conduit Hydropower Development and Rural Jobs Act,
Pub. L. No. 113-24, 127 Stat. 498 (2013); MOU, supra note 105, at 2.
201. .See COLORADO ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 1;Figure I supra.
202. See Frees, 349 P.3d at 272 (Mdrquez, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (Mdrquez, J., dissenting).
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I. Introduction ....................................................
179
II. The Water Trilogy Provisions of Colorado Water Law .......................
179
III. What is Not a Beneficial Use Right ........................180
IV. Small Hydro Use: A Burdened Landowner's Opportunity ..................
183
V . Conclusion ....................................................
184
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2015, the Colorado Supreme Court ("Court") decided two cases
involving ditch rights and water rights. On June 1, the Court's Frees v. Tidd
decision upheld issuance of a conditional water right decree for hydropower
use to the owner of land burdened by a ditch.' On June 29, the Court's St
Jude's Ildecision disallowed issuance of an absolute water right to the owner of
a ditch for flow-through aesthetic, recreation, and piscatorial uses without impoundment.! Both decisions harken back to the Court's 2001 St Jude'sIdecision involving the nature, scope, and operation of ditch rights within the design
of constitutional and statutory rights for use of the public's water resource
II. THE WATER TRILOGY PROVISIONS OF COLORADO WATER LAW
A ditch is a conveyance structure for transporting a portion of the public's
water resource, lawfully appropriated for beneficial use, to its place of use as
defined in Colorado's Constitution and statutes. The Colorado Constitution's
water trilogy provisions establish: (i) the public owns the water within Colorado
and it is subject to appropriation by governmental entities and private persons;'
*

Retired Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. earned his undergraduate degree in history from the

University of Notre Dame in 1966. In 1971, he received hisJ.D. from the University of California
at Berkeley. Justice Hobbs is currently a Distinguished Jurist in Residence and co-director of the
Environmental and Natural Resources Program at the University of Denver Stunn College of
Law. He also serves as a Senior WaterJudge assigned to mediation of water court cases.
1. Frees v. Tidd, 349 P.3d 259, 268 (Colo. 2015).
2. SLJude's Co. v. Roaring Fork Club, L.L.C., 351 P.3d 442, 451 (Colo. 2015), hereinafter

St.Jude's I.
3. Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St.Jude's Company, 36 P.3d 1229, 1231 (Colo. 2001), hereinafter St. Jude's I
4. Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 5 ("The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, mad the
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(ii) the right to divert the unappropriated waters of the natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied;5 and (iii) all persons and corporations shall have
the right to construct ditches across the lands of others for the conveyance of
water. Since the 1858 Gold Rush, Colorado has grown up through the conjunction of ditch rights and water-use rights.!
No more eloquent statement about this truth exists than a justice Rebecca
Kourlis passage in the S1. Jude's Idecision. She invokes the 1861 Territorial
Legislature's very first action, which established prior appropriation rights, disavowed riparian-based water rights, and instituted the right of ditch construction
for conveyance of water from a stream to its place of beneficial use:
Ditches are important to Colorado. They permit a landscape, economy, and
history in which fertile valleys prosper. Without them, properties adjacent to
or distant from water courses wither. Colorado is not a riparian state in which
only those lands adjacent to the streams and rivers have rights to water. Rather,
as early as the tenure of the territorial legislature, our lawmakers recognized
that our arid climate required the creation of a right to appropriate and convey
water across the land of another so the lands not immediately proximate to
water could be used and developed.8
Neighborly disputes about and along ditches resonate in Colorado's history,
and its land and water laws. If St. Jude be the patron saint of lost causes, let us
not lose the lesson the Roaring Fork - recreational versus St. Jude's - irrigation
conflict taught. Herein play the inter-workings of Colorado's constitutional and
statutory water underpinnings. Our newer economies are more dependent than
ever upon maintenance of our traditional economies.
H. WHAT IS NOT A BENEFICIAL USE RIGHT
In St.Jude's I, the Roaring Fork Club ("Club") unilaterally altered ditches
that historically ran irrigation water for St. Jude's Ranch ("Ranch") use.' The
Club "excavated within Ranch's rights-of-way, graded, and destroyed ditch
banks and portions of ditches, realigned ditch channels, diverted ditch water
flows, piped portions of ditches, constructed cabins and golf course greens
within the easements, and temporarily piped wastewater into one of the

same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter
provided").
5. Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 6 ("The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural
stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied").
6. Colorado Const. art. XVI, § 7 ("All persons and corporations shall have the right-of-way
across public, private and corporate lands for the construction of ditches, canals, and flumes for
the purpose of conveying water for domestic purposes, for the irrigation of agricultural lands, and
for mining and manufacturing purposes, and for drainage, upon payment of just compensation");
see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-86-102, (2015) ("Any person owning a water right or conditional
water right shall be entitled to a right-of-way through the lands which lie between the point of
diversion and point of use or proposed use for the purpose of transporting water for beneficial
use in accordance with said water right or conditional water right").
7. See, e.g., ROBERT R. CRIFASI, A LAND MADE FROM WATER, APPROPRIATION AND THE
EVOLUTION OF COLORADO'S LANDSCAPE, DITCHES, AND WATER INSTrrUTIONS (2015) (centering on nineteenth century settlers' construction and operation of Boulder County ditches).
8. St Jude's1, 36 P.3d at 1231-32 (citing Colorado Territorial Laws 67, Section 2 (1861)).
9. Id. at 1230.
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ditches.""
The Court rejected the Club's self-help trespass upon St. Jude's ditch easement.' It instituted ajudicial mechanism for resolving the burdened owner and
the benefitted owner's competing property interests should the parties not agree
upon a change to the easement.'" The underlying property owner seeking to
unilaterally alter the ditch easement must demonstrate that (i) "the maintenance
rights of the owner of the ditch easement" are not "adversely affected by the
change," and (ii) "the water provided to the ditch easement owner must be of
the same quantity, quality, and timing as provided under the ditch owner's water
rights and easement rights in the ditch."'"
A ditch right-of-way for the conveyance of water to its place of use is a vested
property right'" So, too, is the water use right associated with the ditch." Both
are essential to Colorado's prior appropriation system for enforcement of adjudicated beneficial uses under the State's rule of law.
In St.Jude's II,
the Court rejected the Club's claim to turn the public's
natural strean into a private artificial stream. 6 The absolute decree application
sought a flow-through diversion from the Roaring Fork River for a half-mile
length of ditch." The Club claimed the beneficial purposes encompassed "aesthetic and recreational amenity to a golf course development, as well as for fish
habitat and as a private fly-fishing stream." 8 The Club characterized its need
for ditch-fall flows as a "piscatonial use" entailing a "challenging recreational
fishing experience. " "
The Court held such purposes are not among the beneficial use purposes
allowed under Colorado's water law.' The Court's opinion, authored byJustice
Nathan B. Coats, likens such a diversion to a forbidden riparian right.' The
opinion recites how the Colorado General Assembly carefully stewarded and
restricted public agency appropriations for instream flow and recreational inchannel beneficial uses, and determines such a ditch flow-through diversion is
wasteful, not beneficial, under the law:
The Club's proposed 'uses' of the water in question, as expressed in its application, cannot be beneficial within the meaning of the Act because the only
purpose they are offered to serve is the subjective enjoyment of the Club's
private guests. The flow of water necessary to elciendy produce beauty, excitement, or fun cannot even conceptually be quantified, and therefore where
these kinds of subjective experiences are recognized by the legislature to be
valuable, it has specifically provided for their public enjoyment, scientific ad-

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See id. at 1230
Id.at 1238.
Seeid.at 1238.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See St.Jude 's
II,
351 P.3d at 445.
Id.at 446.
Id.
Id.at 451.
Id.
Id.
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ministration, and careful measurement. See, e.g., § 37-92-102 (restricting appropriation of instrean flows and in-channel diversions to particular purposes
and amounts as determined by a state agency bound by fiduciary duty, and
with public participation). Without describing a purpose for the accomplishment of which a measurable amount of water, however approximate, must be
used, the Club, by definition, fails to articulate an intent to put the specidic
amount of water it claims to a beneficial use.

Recognition of the Club's proposed uses would substantially undernine the
intent evident in the legislature's instream flow and [Recreational In-Channel
Diversions] ("RICD") provisions. The General Assembly has taken great care
to limit recreational and environmental uses of water in-chamel, largely to deal
with the potential dangers and excesses inherent in capturing the flow of the
stream. The Club would indisputably be barred from appropriating rights for
its asserted uses were the water in question to remain in the natural course of
the Roaring Fork River. See sections 37-92-102(3), -103(4). In effect, the Club
seeks to accomplish by virtue of diversion what the legislature has expressly
prohibited instreamn: By using a diversion to effectively change the path of a
natural stream or a significant portion of it, the Club seeks approval for recreating a natural stream on its private property and adjudicating the rights to
enjoy the flows therein. This appropriation is tantamount to a 'forbidden riparian right.' Because an appropriation requires actual application of a portion of the waters of the state to a beneficial use,2 the Club cannot acquire such
2
a forbidden right simply by virtue of diversion.
The Court issued Justice Allison Eid's instream flow decision in Farmers
Water v. Colorado Water ConservationBoardonly two months before it sat to
That opinion gives effect to the General Assembly's deldecide SL Jude's I'
egation of quasi-legislative authority to a public agency for the appropriation of
flow rights. " These flow rights are restricted to certain reaches of the natural
stream under parameters containing articulated limitations, and in accordance
with a public comment process preceding the Colorado Water Conservation
Board's ("CWCB") water court application. Instream flow legislation forwards
"the public's interest in the preservation of the environment."' The CWCB
makes such a flow-right appropriation in the name of the people and carries
forth "a fiduciary duty arising out of the CWCB's unique statutory duties."'
The Court's St.Jude's Iopinion resounds in the limitations against excess
diversions, set forth originally in a 1876 ditch law, still codified in Section 3784-108: "During the summer season a person shall not run through his or her
irrigating ditch any greater quantity of water than is absolutely necessary for irrgating, domestic, and stock purposes to prevent the wasting and useless discharge and running away of water." 7 As Justice Coats pointed out, the flowthrough ditch diversion the Club claimed, in absence of a specific legislative

22.
23.
(2015).
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
See Farmers Water Dev. Co. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 346 P.3d 52, 54
Id.
Id.at 58.
Id.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-84-108(1).
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authorization, contrasts markedly to the General Assembly's express authorization for a diversion impounded for recreational, fishery, or wildlife purposes
under Section 37-92-103(4)(a)."
St. Jude's I cannot be viewed as affecting or modifying, in any way, the
Court's holding in Upper Gunni'on, which approves the diversion, capture,
storage, and release of water in a specific amount followed by its subsequent
release into a reach of the stream, in order to manage and enhance fishery and
•recreational uses of the stream. In that case, the Court rejected an assertion
that such a beneficial use of the appropriated water impermissibly granted an
instream flow water right to an appropriator other than the CWCB." Rather,
St.Jude's I relies on a longstanding foundation of water law, that the mere
diversion of water of itself, does not establish a beneficial use.3 "The content
and boundaries of 'beneficial use' requires careful case-by-case factual analysis,"
even as the panoply of lawful beneficial uses continues to expand as case law
and statutory provisions plumb Colorado's changing economy and values.2
The troubling instance of a ditch being turned into a private fishing stream,
through the mere diversion of the waters of the natural steam into and through
the ditch, marks St. Jude's Has an outlier in Colorado's water jurisprudence.
Although the dissent in S. Jude's Irecites a contention in amicus briefs that
water courts have previously entered decrees for the very type of flow-through
purpose the Club claimed,'3 an examination of those individual decrees might
or might not support such an assertion. Regardless, the Court did not accept
an appeal in those cases testing the proposition. Whether or not there is a
successful collateral attack against a previously adjudicated un-appealed final
decree is a matter for further examination, if and when any person attempts to
set it aside."
IV. SMALL HYDRO USE: A BURDENED LANDOWNER'S OPPORTUNITY
The Court's Frees v. Tidddecision, also issued inJune 2015, addresses the
interplay of ditch rights and water rights as well. That decision upholds a junior
conditional water court decree for small hydropower use of water available at
the head gate of a ditch running water for the senior water rights holder's irrigation use.' There, the owner of property burdened by the ditch easement benefited from a guiding principle enunciated in St. Jude's I - that courts should
accommodate, where possible, the real property interests of both the dominant
and servient estates involved in a ditch and water rights dispute.

28.

S&Judce' II 351 P.3d at 449.

29. Bd. of Cnty Conin'ns of the Cnty of Arapahoe v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 838 P.2d 840, 849-50 (Colo. 1992).
30. 1d. at 854.
31. See Archuleta v. Gonez, 200 P.3d 333, 346 (Colo. 2009).
32. SeeVance v. Wolfe, 205 P.3d 1165, 1172 (Colo. 2009).
33. St.Jude's H, 351 P. 3d at 460.
34. San Antonio, Los Pinos mad Conjeos River Acequia Pres. Ass'n v. Special Improvement
Dist. No. 1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist., 351 P.3d 1112, 1123 (Colo. 2015).
35. Frees v. Tidd, 349 P.3d at 268; sec Christopher Ainscough, New OpporzuitiesforSmallscale Hydiopowerin Colorado,19 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 2 (Spring 2016).
36. SLJude's, 36 P.3d. 1229, 1237-38 (Colo. 2001).
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V. CONCLUSION

Beneficial use claims are not unbridled under Colorado water law. In instances involving a novel claim for an appropriative right, the state's supreme
court on direct appeal from one of the seven water courts looks to constitutional, statutory, and case law in determining whether or not the claimed use is
a legal use. Diverting water flow from a natural stream into, through, and out
of the ditch back to the river, purely for a private, aesthetic, recreational, and
challenging fly fishing experience, is a novel claim the Colorado Supreme Court
had not previously considered.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past 200 years, water coimmissions have regularly examined the
shortcomings of existing water policy. For at least the past 100 years, water
commissions have consistently recommended reforming water policy. The following three themes have repeatedly emerged in these calls for reform: (i) conforming water policy to hydrologic realities; (ii) straightening out counterproductive economic incentives; and (iii) streamlining water-management institutions. Despite regular repetition of these recommendations, powerful vested
interests and passionate political resistance continue to block significant change.
Overcoming this resistance requires new coalitions that can demonstrate how
water policy is relevant to front-page issues and coalitions that can cultivate the
political will and leadership necessary to change the historical course of water
policy reform in our country.'

II. EXAMPLES OF CONTINUING WATER LAw-ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
CONFLICT
The prior appropriation doctrine and its administration have served the
Western United States quite well over the past 125 years, providing flexibility
through the establishment of clearly defined and transferable water rights. How
can it be, then, that a system that evolved specifically to achieve flexibility, efficient use, and avoid monopoly, still exhibits numerous conflicts between the
administration of that doctrine and the most economically efficient patterns of
our use of water resources?
Part of the answer lies in the fact that the development of prior appropriation water law occurred in eras when water related technologies were still primitive and the understanding of surface water-groundwater interactions was lacking. Water management has exhibited institutional inertia while the physical
systems have been under increasing pressures from demand and supply imbalances worsened by climate change interacting with population growth. As pressure increases on water management, calls for greater flexibility are also increasing.
A. THE CURRENT CONFLICT IN WELD COUNTY, COLORADO 3

In Colorado's South Platte Basin, many surface diversions allocated for irrigation use date back to the mid-nineteenth century,4and are, thus, quite senior.

1. Janet Neuman, Are We There Yet? Weary Travelers on the LongRoadto WaterPolicy
Reform, 50 NAT. REsOURCrSJ. 139, 166 (Dec. 2010).
2. See, e.g., W. Governors Ass'n & W. States Water Council, Water Trnsfers in the Wes4

i, vi, ix (2012), http://www.westgov.org/inifiatives/water/373-water-tiansfe-s.
3. See also Charles W. Howe, Water Law and Economics:An Assessment ofRiver Calls
and the South Platte WellShut-Down, 12 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 181 (2008) (an earlier article

from which this section is adapted).
4. NEIL S. GRIGG, COLORADO's WATER: SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT, HISTORY AND
POLITICS, 58 (2003); RICHARD STENZEL & THOMAS CECH, WATER COLORADO's REAL GOLD:
A HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLORADO WATER, THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION
DOCTRINE AND THE COLORADO DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, 89-90 (2013) (Hal Simpson,
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If low stream flows prevent senior rights from diverting the water to which they
are entitled, the water commissioner can put a "call" on the river, requiring all
upstream rights "junior" to the calling senior right holder to stop diverting water
until adequate stream flow is restored.
Following World War II, well drilling exploded in the alluvial valleys of the
West, such as the Republican River Basin, based on improved pump technology, cheap energy, and the absence of regulatory frameworks over wells. ' In
Colorado's South Platte River Basin, inigators tapped into the huge aquifer tributary to the South Platte River with thousands of wells that provided a reliable
and handy water source. During the same period, developments in hydrologic
science clarified the connections between river flows and tributary aquifers, and
it was apparent that well pumping could, indeed, deplete stream flows.'
With this new knowledge of river-aquifer linkage, Colorado's 1969 General
Assembly decided that wells tapping into the tributary aquifer should be incorporated into the priority system - awarding priorities according to the date of
first use, thus making the wells very junior in priority in their respective basins.'"
The State began prohibiting tributary well use during prolonged droughts when
the huge store of groundwater would be most valuable."
To avoid this clearly uneconomic result, the Water Right Determination
and Administration Act (" 1969 Act") allowed the state engineer to approve temporary "substitute water supply plans," or augmentation plans, that would allow
junior wells to continue pumping when there was a call on the river, as long as
the well owners augmented surface flows to make up for shortages attributable
to their current and past pumping - a formidable calculation in itself.'"
During the 1970s, 1980s, and early-1990s, generous stream flows meant
that calls on the river were generally confined to July and August, requiring only
limited well augmentation.'" As the drought of the early 2000s became increasingly severe, surface water shortages led to increasingly frequent calls on the

Dick Wolfe, & justice Gregory Hobbs as contributors).
5. See COLO. DIv. WATER REs., Water Rights Dectionay, http://water.state.co.us/SUR
FACEWATER/SWRIGHTS/Pages/WaterRightsTenninologyaspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2016);
on the change in technology, seeJohn D. Wiener, Roger S. Pulwarty & David Ware, Bite without
Bark: How the Socioeconomic Context of the 1950 U.S. DroughtMininized Responses to a
Multiyear Extreme Climate Event, 11 Weather and Climate Extremes 80, at 87; see STENZEL &
CECH, supra note 4, at 411-12.
6. See, e.g., Colo. Div. of Water Res., Republican River CompactAdmiistraionGround
Water Modcl 1, 6 (2003), http://water.state.co.us/DWRIPub/Documents/rrca model.pdf (noting the increase in groundwater pumping in the Republican River basin after World War II).
7. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Coloiado's Law of "Underground Water": A Look at the
South PlatteBasin and Beyond, 59 U. COLO. L. REv. 579, 604 (1988). Colorado underground
water statutes were first enacted in 1963, and reorganized in 1965, as the Colorado Groundwater
Management Act, with substantial changes. Id. at n.3; COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-90-101-143
(2014).
8. Id.at581.
9. Id. at 582.
10. Id. at 588. The 1969 Act was a partial reorganization of Colorado water law called the
Water Right Detennination and Administration Act. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101-602
(2014).
11. Howe, supra note 3, at 182; MacDonnell, supia note 7, at 582-89.
12. MacDonnell, supra note 7, at 589.
13.

SOUTH PLATrE RIVER TASK FORCE, WELL REGULATION IN THE SOUTH PLAvT

RivER
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river, with almost continuous calls from 2002 through 2006.'" This meant that
the well users who had been operating under "substitute water supply plans"
had to provide much larger volumes of augmentation water if they were to continue pumping while scrambling for increasingly costly surface rights or leases.
Most were unsuccessful. The state engineer shut down more than four hundred
major wells in the early summer of 2006 through 2007, drying up thirty thousand acres of cropland with immediate, severe impacts on the farms and associated rural communities."
With wells shut down, farmers immediately lost seasonal farm incomes because crops had been planted but had not matured.'7 Experts estimated direct
farm income losses of approximately $390 per acre and total income losses of
approximately $690 per acre." These losses will continue into the future until
the State permits wells to operate. In addition to the direct and indirect losses
incurred by the inability to irrigate with groundwater, the groundwater table in
Weld County has risen to the point of flooding basements and making fields
unworkable'9 - an illustration of the legal system imposing a significant ineflfciency on both the farmers unable to use the water and those injured by the
high water table.
B. BARRIERS TO EFFICIENT WATER MARKETS: HIGH TRANSACTION
COSTS AND EXCESSIVE/INCONSISTENT APPLICATIONS OF THE ANTISPECULATION DOCTRINE'

One would expect active water markets to correct uneconomic results like
those noted above" because higher-valued junior users would profit from buying lower-valued senior users' water rights.' After all, Colorado has had more
BASIN OF COLORADO, 4 (June 2007), http://www.cwi.colostate.edu/SouthPlatte/files/WellRegu-

lation-SPlatteTaskForce.pdf.
14. Id. at 5.
15. Hal Simpson, State Water Engineer, State Engineer's Office Forum: History of Well
Regulation, South Platte Basin 3 (Sept. 6, 2006), http://dwrweblink.state.co.us/dwrweblink/0/doc
/2810068/Pagel .aspx.
16. Bill Jackson, Salazartries
to help faimers with South Platte wells in the new Farm Bill,
THE GREELEY TRIBUNE (Oct.31, 2007), http://www.greeleynibune.con/article/20071 101/NEW
S/1 11010116#.
17. Jerd Smith, 'Tough News'Doorns Crops - RejectedProposal Would Have Let Fatmers
Start Wells, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws,June 3,2006, at 4A.
18. Jennifer Thorvaldson & James Pritchett, EconomicImpactAnalysis ofReduced hnigated
Acreage inFourRiverBasins in Colorado,COLO.ST.U COLO. WATER INST. 1,34 (2006),http://
www.cwi.colostate.edu/old/pubs/series/completionreport/Compledon%20Repor%20207.pdf.
19. Resolution Re: Declarationof Local Disaster Emergency, BOARD OF WELD COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS (June 11, 2012), https://www.co.weld.co.us/assets/357C9Ad9Ac2b6d744A77
.pdf.
20. Adapted from Charles W. Howe, Reconciling Water Law and Economic Efficiency in
Colorado Water Admnmstration, 16 U. DENy. WATER L. REV. 37 (2012).
21. By some measures, the Colorado water market is efficient, but the scope of those
measures is narrower than that proposed here. See Matthew T. Payne et al., PriceDetermination
and EFticiency in the Market for South Platte Basin Ditch Company Shares, 50 J. AMERICAN
WATER REs. Assoc. 1488, 1499 (2004).
22. The term "water markets" can refer to anything from an individual farmer's sale ofa right
to an adjacent town to highly organized markets such as share trading in the Northern Colorado
Water Conservancy District. See Charles W. Howe & Christopher Goemans, Water Transfers
and Their Impacts: Lessons fiom Three Colorado Water Markets, 39 J. AM. WATER RES.
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than a century of active water markets and has exhibited flexible legal innovations like instream flow protections and other environmental protections.'
However, water markets depend heavily on two key conditions for efficient
functioning: (i) low transaction costs (efficient administrative procedures); and
(ii) a legal framework that creates the potential for a wide range of transactions
(sufficient market scope)." In Colorado, the water court system, through which
all water right transfers must pass, remains cumbersome and costly, thereby ruling out some otherwise desirable market transactions.' At the same time, the
"anti-speculation" doctrine can narrow market scope by preventing the useful
and transparent packaging of agricultural rights to fit urban or industrial demands for large volumes of water. As a result of these two institutional conditions, the correlation between priority dates and economic productivity of the
water supplies remains low."
1. Transaction Costs
Transaction costs of carrying out an appropriation or transfer (in dollars
per acre-foot transferred) include court costs, possible litigation, and evidentiary
showings that the courts require to establish historic consumptive use and noninjury to other water rights holders.' The burden of these costs is squarely on
the applicant." The costs per acre-foot transferred depend on: (i) the size of
the transfer because elements of fixed costs result in economies of scale through
the transfer process; and (ii) on the level of controversy surrounding the transfer, which is partially measured by the number of protests.' In addition to monetary costs, delays in administrative review can inhibit fast turn-around transfers
such as those that agriculture need during drought.'
The need to prove "no injury" to other parties not directly involved in the
transaction is a substantial and often dominant complexity and cost. Proving ex
ante the absence of injury to other parties is much more difficult than an expost
showing of damage. The burden of proof rests on the initiator of the transaction.2 In "over-appropriated" basins, any change in a water right (place and
timing of diversion, quantity, quality impacts, etcetera) is sure to have impacts
Assoc. 1055, 1055-56 (2003).
23. Sasha Charney, Decades Down The Road: An Analysis ofInstreamn low Programs i
Coloado And the Western United States, COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD. (July 2005),
htp://cwcb.state.co.us/NR/rdonlyres/140CFE4B-65FC-47C5-9A26-99CCB45A8D4,5/0/ISFCo
mpStudyFinalRpt.pdf
24. See Howe, supranote 20, at 38-39; HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS

15-16 (5th ed. 1999).
25.
26.
27.
28.

See Howe, supra note 20, at 39.
Id. at 38-39.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302 (2014).
Id.

29. Charles W. Howe et al., Transaction Costs as Determinants of Water Transfers, 61 U.
COLO. L. REV. 393, 397, 399, 401 (1990). It is also worth noting that i an applicant in Colorado
appeals the water court's decision to the Colorado Supreme CoMt, the Court will often request
arnicus briefs froin third parties to the suit regarding the proposed water right or transfer, even
further delaying and adding complexity to the review.
30. It seems possible, if not inevitable, that parties needing quick access to water might attempt to privately negotiate with other water users not to oppose their applications in order to
expedite the process.
31. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302 (2014).
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on other parties. Even though the impacts may be small, current water law
requires "no injury.""2
When the state engineer advertises a change in a water right, any party can
enter an "objection" to the change without proofof damage.' This often motivates towns to enter objections to water right changes in their basins to remain
informed parties to the transactions should concerns for damages emerge from
the transactions." Thus, the balance of power in the water market strongly favors objectors and thereby discourages transactions. Under current practice the
result is often
costly, years-long litigation over small amounts of water - so-called "teacup
changes to stream conditions"... Complicating matters for the applicant, it is
hard to propose mitigation without a clear and accepted approach to evaluate
injury. It is accordingly often easier and cheaper for applicants to simply relinquish or transfer part of their water right to the streamn or objectors than to
prove no injury.
It is also difficult to define mitigation steps where there is no "material" or "de
minimus" standard for injury.'" '
Because Colorado lacks quickly accessible, basic water rights information,
transaction costs further increase. Neither the state engineer's office nor the
water courts have publicly available, centralized databases of water right owners
by name, making it difficult to contact owners. The state records water rights
transactions and ownership at the county level like real estate transactions, 2which naturally complicates cross-boundary transfers. However, Colorado water court decrees are accessible on a case-by-case basis, and the Colorado Decision Support System is rapidly improving access to ownership and
location of diversions.' Nonetheless, there are still substantial complexities in
determining what is transferable.' Equally important, no one comprehensively
recordssale pnces with public access, which complicates the problem of "price
discovery," for example, figuring out what a reasonable offer to buy or sell might
be.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. That many municipalities routinely file for the informational value as well some possibility
of a risk is widely informally claimed, based on the authors' experience of water meetings and
water law. This was confirmed by City of Boulder Assistant Attorney Pault-Afiase, personal communication 17 March 2016; see also COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., http://cwcb.state.co.us/
public-infonnation/publications/Pages/StudiesRepots.aspx (accessed 14 Jan, 2014). Because
there has been substantial competition between municipalities for water supply, there is motivation for close monitoring; see also Banks & Nichols, supranote 35.
35. Britt Banks & Peter Nichols, A Roundtable Discussion on Colorado'sNo-Injury Rule,
44 COLO. LAW. 87, 88 (2015).
36. Id. The costs of objection are quite low. See Colorado Judicial Branch, FilingFees,Strcharges, and Costs in Colorado State Courts,JDF 1 R7/15 (2014), http://www.courts.state.co.us/
Forms/Forms_List.cfm?FormType ID= 176 (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).
37. Ditches & Diversions, WATER INFO. PROGRAM COLO. DIVISION WATER RESOURCES,
http-//www.wateiinfo.org/colorado-water/ditches-diveisions (last visited Sept. 15, 2012). The
prices are not disclosed or recorded.
38. ColoradoDecisionSupport System, COLO. DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES, http://cdss.state.
co.us/Pages/CDSSHome.aspx (last visited.July 18, 2015).
39. See id.
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When a person files an application for change of right, the water court requires the right owner's name and the nature of the changes in the application.'
The water court clerk publishes resumes of such applications monthly, but the
resumes include only limited information: the amount, priority date, location
of the intended beneficial use, and general source of the water." For a water
market to function efficiently, more information, such as the types of crops irrigated and average water applications, is useful.
In 2007, the Colorado Supreme Court appointed a committee to review
the water court process to identify possible ways to achieve efficiencies in water
court cases through rule and/or statutory changes.'2 The committee's recommendations included amendments to the rules of procedure, educational programs for attorneys and judges, the establishment of a standing water court committee, better materials to assist the public and individuals without attorneys,
and necessary funding for the courts and their staffing.' While the recommendations are steps in the right direction, the jury is still out on the effectiveness of
the 2009 changes in the rules' and forms that water applicants must use.' The
paperwork changes may have made the process even more complex and reducing transaction costs remains a challenge in Colorado. The required studies to
show that a proposed water transfer will not impose injury on other water rights
is still the major cause of transactions costs.'
2. The Scope of Water Markets: Market Size; the Beneficial Use
Requirement and the "Spook of Speculation"
Both the geographical extent of the market and the breadth of legally allowable transactions define the scope of a water market: the larger the number of
buyers and sellers, the more likely that market will function in a competitive
manner."7 The greater the scope of the market, the more effective the market
40.

See, e.g., COLO. WATER DIVISION I DIST. COURT, WATER RESUME PUBLICATION

(2012).
41. See, e.g., id.
42. Chief Justice Mary J. Mullarkey, Order Concerning the Establishment of the Water
CourtCommittee of the Colorado Supreme Cour4 COLO. S. CT. OFFICE OF THE CHIEFJUSTICE
(Dec. 4, 2007), http://wvw.courits.state.co.us/userfiles/File/Court Probation/SupremeCourt/
Committees/WaterCourLCommittee/Water_CourtCommitteeChie fusticeSigneledOrder.pdf.
43. Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Timely, Fai, and Eflkctive Water Courts: Report to the
ChiefJustice,WATER CT. COMM. OF THE COLO. S. CT. (Aug. 1, 2008), http://www.courts.state.
co.us/userfiles/File/Court-Probation/Supreme-Court/Committees/Water-CourtCoimmittee/Fina]_Report August I _2008.pdf.
44. James S. Witwer & P. Andrew Jones, Statutoryand Rule Changes to Water Court Practice, 38 COLO. LAw. 53, 53 (2009).
45. See Zach-y Willis, Water Court Forms Agan Updated by Colorado State .Judicial,
COLO. BAR ASS'N. LEGAL CONNECTION (January 12, 2012), http://cbaclelegalconnection.com
/2012/01/water-cour t-fonns-again-updated-by-colorado-state-judicial-new-denver-basiL-application-issued.
46. \W. Governors Ass'n et al., supra note 2, at 15; Banks & Nichols, supa note 35, at 88;
see COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., COLORADO'S WATER PLAN SECOND DRAVF (luly
2015), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sitcs/default/fils/FINAL-2ndDraftCean-Appendices-2
015%20Revised.pdf.
47. See ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 37 (1988); the geographic scope of potential transfers can be expanded with increasingly long distances of transfer
and hence energy costs if water is moved uphill, or by means of exchanges of water rights, which
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will be in producing advantageous transactions.' For example, a market that
can generate transactions throughout an entire river basin is more likely to identify advantageous transactions than one confined to a smaller watershed simply
because the larger number of buy-and-sell offers increases the likelihood that
mutually beneficial matches will occur. Conversely, legislative proposals to prohibit out-of-basin transfers would, if passed, also rule out some advantageous
transfers. 9
In Colorado, two closely related doctrines that lie at the heart of prior appropriation further limit the scope of water markets: beneficial use and antispeculation.' Both doctrines originated out of concerns about the monopolization of water suppliesidl The common-sense beneficial use requirements5
were intended to prevent wealthy developers or early settlers from claiming entire streams and to promote efficient use by discouraging "waste" through the
threat of forfeiture of the right.5' However, the doctrines have not kept up with
the times. As ProfessorJanet Neuman states, "the doctrinal trinity of beneficial
use, waste, and forfeiture.., is ill-equipped in its present forn to achieve the
levels of efficiency that will be necessary to meet twenty-first century western
water demands."'

may be const'ained by the availability of other water rights owners to collaborate in a plan; see
Peter D. Nichols, Megan K. Murphy and Douglas S. Kenney, Water and Growth in Colorado:
A Rewvew of Legal and Policy Issues, Natural Resource Law Center, University of Colorado
School of Law (2001); see ELLEN WOHL, VirtualRivers, (Yale U. Press 2001), passim, on historic
development of irrigation and water transfers; see Robert R. Crifasi, A Ind Made from Water:

Appropriationand the Evolution of Colorado'sLandscape,Ditches and Water Institutions, 237244, Boulder: University Press of Colorado (2015); see STENZEL & CECH, supra note 4, at 426427; COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., COLORADO'S WATER PLAN, https://www.colorado.gov/cowaterplan, at 4-1 - 4-14 and 6-15 - 6-54.(discussing constraints).

48. See id.
49. There are several benefit-cost studies out-of-basin transfers. See, e.g. Howe & Easter,
1971, Interbasin Transfers of Water, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.; Howe, 1987,

Project Benefits & Costs from National andRegional Viewpoints: Case Study of the ColoradoBig Thompson Project,Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1:1-20; See, e.g., H.B. 971286,
61st Gen. Assemb., 1st, Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1997); COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD.,
COLORADO'S WATER PLAN supranote 47, at 4-1 - 4-14 and 6-1 - 6-54; see also David C. Taussig,

The Devolution of the No-Injury Standardin Changes of WaterRJghts, 18 U. DENV. WATER L.
REv. 116 (2015) (discussing transactions costs and limitations on transfers), Banks & Nichols, supra note 35.

50. Scott A. Clark & Alix L. Joseph, Changes of WaterRights and the Anti-Speculation Doctine: 77e ContinuingImportance ofActual Bcneficial Usc, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 553,
562 (2006) (citing High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo.Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710

(Colo. 2005)).
51. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(b) (2015); see also High Plains A& M, LLC., 120 P.3d
at nn. 2-3; DAVID SCHORR, THE COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER RIGHTS, CORPORATIONS, AND
DISTRIBuTIVEJusICE ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 28, 45,48, 62 (2012).
52. Forfeiture of rights is infrequent in Colorado. The state has no forfeiture statute (which,
in other states, returns the water to public use after a specified period of time, regardless of the
water right holders' intentions). An abandonment proceeding requires a showing of intent to
abandon the water right and is required to eliminate an unused right, although abandonment is
presumed if water rights have gone unused for ten years. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(2)
(2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-402(11) (2012).
53. SCHORR, supra note 51.

54. Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste andForfeiture: The Ineficient Search for El iciency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 922 (1998).

Issue 2

RECONCILING WATER 1-A WAND ECONOMICEFFICIENCY

193

In defining beneficial use, courts have used a custom-based, lowest-common-denominator standard that fails to either motivate the highest-valued water
uses or "ratchet-up" reasonable use standards as better technologies become
available.5 For example, water-intensive flood irrigation should not qualify as a
beneficial use if economic sprinkler techniques are available and widely used,
unless there are other non-crop benefits generated by the flood technique, such
as retiming of flows or ecosystem services.' In general, the water courts may
not be well equipped to say what is - or is not - beneficial, so perhaps water
users, water managers, and water markets should make that determination.
Closely related to beneficial use is the concept of "speculation" and the antispeculation doctrine. In water law, the state has defined speculation, in relation
to a proposed filing or transfer, as the lack of a "specific plan and intent to divert,
store or otherwise capture, possess, and control a specific quantity of water for
specific beneficial uses."57 From the beginning of the change of use process,
these conditions, namely a specific plan and intent, can preclude economically
valuable transactions, such as "packaging" smaller rights to match larger users'
supply needs." When a potential buyer will not commit to buy or lease rights
until the change of use is confirmed, it creates a "chicken and egg" problem
because a definite transferee who has a clear "beneficial use" for the water must
have a specific buyer with a clear "beneficial use.
For example, in High Plains A&M, LLC v. Southeastern Colorado Water
ConservancyDistrict, High Plains acquired extensive water rights and options
on the Fort Lyon Canal in Colorado's Arkansas Basin with the intent of reserving the consumptive fractions of those rights for transfer to unspecified, but
fairly obvious, Front Range communities.' The water court denied High Plains'
change of use application for these supplies and the Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed the denial in 2005, concluding that the exchange application was speculative.'
Speculators are typically parties who invest in risky situations, banking on
superior information or better-informed anticipation of future conditions to

55.
56.

See id. at 947-48.
See Robert R. Crifasi, Reflcctions in a Stock Pond: Are Anthropogenically Derived
lFeshwaterEcosystems Natural,Ari-ficial,or SomethingElse?, 36 ENVTL. MGMT. 625,632, 635

(2005).
57. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 170 P.3d 307, 315 (Colo.
2007) (citing COLO. Rrv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3)(a)(II) (2007)). The financial definition of"speculation" is the undertaking of a risky business or financial position in the expectation of a coinmensurate gain. In the futures markets, speculators accept contracts offered by "hedgers" who
seek to avoid risk. This is a vital fmction in the allocation of risk. See VARIAN, supra note 24,
at 236-37.
58. See Howe, supra note 20, at 41.
59. Id.
60. High Plains A& M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 715-16,
721 (Colo. 2005).
61. Id. at 714. The Supreme Court explained that High Plains applied to change water rights
historically used for irrigation for use in any of twenty-eight Colorado counties. The water court
found that "there was no way to determine whether vested water rights would be injured by the
change or to determine if there would actually be a new beneficial use made of the water." The
water court found, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the proposed changes were "such a deviation from the original right" that High Plains had effectively requested a new water right altogether, which violated Colorado's anti-speculation doctrine.
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profit from spot and forward sales or purchases. 2 These risk takers are needed
to contract with risk-averse parties "hedgers" for a continuous, efficient market
like those found in the grain, oil, and electric energy markets.' It is reasonable
to assume that the High Plains group had made extensive investigations into
emerging Front Range water needs and the willingness of Arkansas Valley farmers to sell parts of their water supplies. By providing a ready market for farmers,
who wanted to sell some of their water, and an alternative source for buyers,
High Plains could have beneficially served both. However, the anti-speculation
doctrine - regarded as fundamental to the prior appropriation system, as it currently stands - prevented High Plains from doing so."
The Arkansas Valley Super Ditch is an innovative proposal in which participating farmers agree to fallow part of their irrigated land on an annually rotating basis, so they can lease part of their collective consumptive use to other
users for longer terms.' The proposed project allows water supplies to pass
temporarily from agricultural users to other users without permanent sale of the
underlying water rights.' Many protesters who filed against the Super Ditch in
Division 2 Water Court alleged that the exchange application (1OCW4) was
speculative. 7 In spite of those protests, in 2015 this innovative institutional arrangement succeeded in effecting several small transfers 8with many more likely
to follow.
Some have argued that the biggest impediment to successful water banks
and leasing programs, like the Super Ditch, is the lack of easily understandable
information available to water rights holders about how such systems would
function. " While California, Idaho, and Arizona have relatively active water
banks, Colorado lags behind."0 In 2004, the Arkansas River Basin attempted to
establish an internet-operated water bank, but the lack of understanding among
potential participants of how the internet-operated water bank would function
and the poor design for price discovery, it failed."
62. See geneiallyVARIAN, supranote 24, at 236 (discussing how and when to measure and
equalize risk).
63. COOTER AND ULEN, supra note 47, at 55-70.
64. High Plains,120 P.3d at 714.
65.

Peter D.

Nichols, DEVELOPMENT OF LAND FALLOWING-WATER LEASING IN THE

LOWER ARKANSAS VALLEY (2011); see also Super Ditch,THE WATER INFORMATION PROGRAM,
http://www.waterinfo.org/super-ditch (last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
66. Nichols, supra note 65.
67. See Chris Woodka, IrrigationRegulations DiawProtestsAcross Valley, PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN (Dec. 28, 2009,12:00 AM), http://www.chieftain.conVnews/loca/irrigation-regulations-draw
-protests-across valley/articlc_816422e6-8fa9-50d9-87c9-98a02b4d2eIe.hnil.
68. Nichols, supra note 65; see also Chris Woodka, Catlin Lease Gets State's Blessing,
PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN (Jan. 28, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.chieftain.com/special/water/3285662120/arkansas-ditch-super-valley.
69. Peggy Clifford, Clay Landry & Andrea Larsen-Hayden, Analysis of Water Banks in the
Western States 1, ii (2004), https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/publications/0411011.pdf.
70. See id. at 29-31, 38, 55, 61.
71. This is the conclusion of John Wiener, who observed (and participated in) all known
public discussions on the design and development of the Arkansas River Water Bank Pilot Project. John Wiener, Next Steps for the Arkansas River Basin Water Bank Pilot Program 1, 6, 9
(2005), http://www.coloado.edu/ibs/es/wiener/papers/WBSummExpMarO5G.pdf; see also COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., Brief History of Ark Basin Water Bank, http://cwcbstate.
co.us/loansgrants/altemative-agricultural-water-transfer-methods-grants/documents/briehistoryarkbasinwaterbankfeb21.pdf (last visited February 18, 2016); Ralph Terry ScangaJr., Update
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There is no question that the anti-speculation doctrine has discouraged participation in water banking or pilot leasing programs. Effective administration
should, instead, have the effect of injecting more information and flexibility into
water markets.72
3. The Uneven Application of the Anti-Speculation Doctrine
The State has, in effect, unevenly applied the prohibition of speculation,
and users have frequently circumvented it." The Denver Post investigative series, "Liquid Assets: Turning Water into Gold," cited cases that showed that
water brokers acquired water rights for undefined future sale, through temporary application, to specially formed water districts." The subsequent High
Plainsruling has not prevented local governments from forming additional special districts to accumulate water rights for later sale to unspecified users.

For

example, the United Water and Sanitation District consists of a one-acre patch
of land that can serve users anywhere in the state while accumulating water rights
for unspecified future sale.6 Another example is the thirty-nine-acre Elbert and

Highway 86 Commercial Metro District, which is a statewide district that intends to build a 150-mile pipeline from the Lamar Canal to Elbert County for
unspecified users." Thus, while the State attempts to take an anti-speculation
stance, highly speculative transactions have been able to proceed.
Another forn of circumvention that denies the water market access to vital
information is the frequent, secretive purchase of options to buy that are not

disclosed, and remain undisclosed along with the prices paid or future prices."8
This effectively end-runs the anti-speculation doctrine while making relevant
market information even less available.
Colorado has not considered that conditionalwater nhts (typically granted
to municipalities for future planning) are speculative even though some have
not been perfected for one hundred years." It is difficult to distinguish between

of Water Bankingin the Arkansas Presentedto the Interim Water ResourcesReview Comnmttee
(August 21, 2013), https://www.colo-ado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/13WaterResourcesUpdate
onWaterBanking.pdf. The Interim Water Resources Review Committee is a committee of the
Colorado General Assembly, the legislature, which continues work between sessions.
72. SeegenerallyClifford,Landry& Larsen-Hayden, supranote 69, at 19, 24 (discussing why
the transfer process should encourage flexibility and to whom information is provided).
73. See, e.g. David Oliiger & Chuck Plunkett, Liqmd Assets: Turning Water Into Cold,
DENV.POST, (Nov. 21, 2005), http://www.denverpost.comi/news/ci_3235495.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Id.; Karen E. Crummy, Colorado water developer 'looted"development, lawst alleges,
DENv. POST (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_21563447/coloraado-water-developer-looted-development-lawsuit-alleges.
77. Karen E. Crummy, Elbert County C(omnission Water DistrictSoon CouldReachAcross
Colorado, DENV. POST, (July 27, 2011), http://www.denverpost.com/ci-18556062.
78. See Olinger & Plunkett, supra note 73.
79. J. GregorylJ. Hobbs, Jr., Colo. S. Ct., Anti-Speculation and the Great and Growing Cities
Doctrine, 41st Annual Conference on Environmental Law for ie American Bar Association
(Mar. 23, 2012); Charles.J.P. Podolak & Martin Doyle, Conditional Water Rights in the Western
United States: IntroducingUncertaintyto PBiorAppropriation,51J. AM. WATER RES.ASS'N. 14,
17 (2015); Casey S. Funk & Daniel J. Arnold, Pagosa. The Great and Growng CitiesDoctrine
Imperiled An Objective Look from a Biased Perspective, 13 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 284,
294-96 (2010); see also Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 170 P. 3d
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urban planning needs and "speculation." Many oil shale related conditional
water rights are more than fifty years old, while some conditional irrigation rights
are over one hundred years old.8" By their mere existence, conditional rights
whose development is uncertain introduces another element of uncertainty for
all water users, especially those junior to the conditional rights.'
In a real sense, considering water prices are broadly expected to continue
increasing, every water right owner is a speculator.2 Most investment groups
that have recently invested extensively in western United States ranchland
clearly are not in business to raise cattle, but to acquire water rights."

"SpeculatorsAll""',
C. THE "No INJURY" REQUIREMENT FOR APPROPRIATIONS & CHANGES
OF USE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF EXTERNALITY THEORY

Colorado water law does not allow negative impacts to other water rights
owners when changes of use or new appropriations are made." No injury is

307, 309-10 (Colo. 2007); Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 219 P.3d
774, 777 (Colo. 2009).
80. Derek L. Turner, PagosaArea Watcr & SanitationDistict v. Trout Unlimited and an
Ant-Speculation DocrineIor a New Era of Water Supply Planning; 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 639,

643 n. 20, 670 n. 181 (2011).
81. Podolak & Doyle, supranote 79.
82. See Charles W. Howe & John S. Howe, The Performance of Water Ser ice Industry
Stock Prices and Sensitiiity to Highly Publicized ContractFailures,31 WATER INT'L 448, 448

(2006).
83. Id. at 448; Josh Zaffos, What happened to heritage tourism in small towns in south eastern CO, COLO SPRINGS INDEP. (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.csindy.com/coloradosprings/what-

happened-to-heritage-tourism-in-small-towns-in-south-eastern-co/Contentoid
84. Bruce Stark, Baltinore Times, n.d.

85.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302(2)(a) (2014).

3547515.
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perhaps the most basic tenet of appropriations doctrile.86 We can consider
such impacts as "negative externalities" imposed on other parties. It is well
known from economic theory and common practice that it usually does not pay
to totally ehninate a negative externality.87 The efficient level of externality reduction (as defined in economics) is where the marginal cost of further reduction by the initiating party rises to equality with the (falling) marginal damage to
the external party.' The figure below shows this point where Q* is the optimal
negative externality level. In most cases, this degree of reduction is less than
eliminating the externality altogether. Thus, with few exceptions, the legal requirement not to impose any cost or injury on other parties will preclude some
desirable changes and distort the scale, even though it carries a degree of fairness.
Allowing the initiating party to compensate the injured party for absorbing
some damages can overcome this inefficiency. Rational bargaining should lead
to a solution close to the efficient level. Water lawyers can use this procedure
to overcome objections to filings and changes.'

Marginal
Cost
(dollars
perunit)

Marginal
Damage
Cost

Marginal
Control
Cost

TOWag Tanon
cos T /c

0

Qwantity of
Pollution
Etrned
(Units)

90

Colorado requires the water rights transferor who seeks a change to bear
the burden of proof that other water rights will not suffer injury.9' Many potentially injured parties may be involved in a proposed transfer and they have an
incentive to hold the transferor to the high burden of proof. Such parties can
86.

David C. Taussig, The Devolution ofthe No-Injry StandardinChanges of WaterRights,

18 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 116, 118-19 (2014).
87.

VARIAN, supra note 24 at 578.

88. Id. at 578.

89. Banks &Nichols, supra note 35.
90. THOMAS TIETENBERG AND LYNNE LEwis, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES
ECONOMIcs, 8 ED., 358-62, (2009).

91. Banks &Nichols, supranote 35, at 87.
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enter objections to the transfer at a cost as low as just the filing fee. 9 Further,
towns in Colorado typically enter pro forma objections to all proposed changes
in their basin just to guarantee participation in the proceeding.93 This practice
increases costs to the transferring party even if no injury is likely. In many cases,
the costs of bearing the burden of proving no injury can exceed the potential
benefits sought through the transfer, further preventing efficient transfers that
lower costs would allow. 4 This may also particularly impact small operations
such as specialty or organic producers where agricultural water rights loans involve relatively small volumes, which have a 120-day duration, and a limitation
on use to three years out of a ten-year period."
The absolute no injury rule also hampers the goal of maximum beneficial
use.' California and Oregon lead Western efforts in striking a balance between
no injury and motivating conservation. The Oregon law provides a transferable water right9 of 75% of conserved water that proves no injury to other water
rights. The state or political subdivision retains 25% of the conserved water
(subject to determination on a case-by-case basis).' This creates a margin of
safety from injury to others and applies on a case-by-case basis rather than as a
general principle.'"
D. FAILURE TO MOTIVATE WATER SALVAGE: THE COMPLEX CASE OF
PHREATOPHY[ES

Agriculture is the largest consumer of water in the West, so modest increases in efficiency could make substantial amounts of water available."' In
addition to direct irrigation applications, vegetation along streams and ditches
consumes large volumes of water in agricultural areas.' °2 These phreatophytes
("well plants") may be native, as in the case of cottonwoods (Populusspp.), or
invasive as in the case of tamarisk (Tamaltx spp., commonly known as Saltcedar), and Russian Olive (Eleagnus angvstifoia).'" Phreatophytes consume
92. See FilingFees, supra note 36.
93. Authors' conclusion; supra note 34.
94. Banks &Nichols, supra note 35.
95.

COLO REV. STAT. § 37-83-105 (2012).

96. SCHORR, supra note 51, at 107.
97. J.K. Fischer, Muddy Waters: The Right to Conserved Water in Idaho,27 IDAHo L. REV.
303, 303-05 (1991); COMMrITEE ON W. WATER MGMT. ET AL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE
WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 82-83 (National Academies Press 1992);

W. Governors Association et al., supia note 2, at 32, 97-98, 110-11.
98. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.480 (1993).
99. Michael Hohnart, Cartots for Conservation: Oregon's Water Conservation Statute OfAtrs Incentives to Invest in Efficiency, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 827, 827-54 (1995).

100.

Id.

101. Warren E. Bergholz, Jr., Water Saved or Water Lost. The Consequences of Individual
ConservationMeasuresin the AppropriationStates, 11 LAND & WATER L. REV. 435, 435, 44557 (1976); Michael Gheleta, Water Use Efficiency and Appropriation in Colorado:Salvaging
Incentives for Maximun Beneficial Use, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 657, 657-58, 660 (1988).
102. P.L. Nagler, E.P. Glenn, C.S. Jarnevich & P.B. Shafroth, DistributionandAbundance of
Saltcedarand Russian Olive in the Western UnitedStates, 30 CRITICAL REVIEWS INPLANT SCIS.

508, 509 (2011).
103. Patrick B. Shafroth, Curtis A. Brown, & David M. Men-itt eds., BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & THE USDA FOREST SERVICE, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS REPORT

2009-5247,
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more than a half million acre-feet of water in the South Platte alone." ' In some
sites, these plant communities may provide the only bank stabilization and habitat, while in others their removal may provide opportunity for large reductions
in non-beneficial consumptive use. ' The challenge is to motivate their removal
in the non-beneficial situations.
Colorado refuses, on principle, to allow "salvage" rights (Le., the right to
use the water saved through phreatophyte eradication for other purposes, or to
allow any form of conservation credit for phreatophyte removal).' 6 New Mexico State Engineer Steve Reynolds famously said, "filf individuals salvaging public water lost to encroaching phreatophytes were permitted to create new water
rights where there is no new water, the price of saltcedar jungles would rise
sharply. And we would expect to see a thriving, if clandestine, business in saltcedar seed and phreatophyte cultivation .....
Saltcedar and Russian Olive species are "the third and fourth most frequently occurring woody riparian plants, and the second and fifth most abun-

dant species (out of 42 native and non-native species) along rivers in the western
United States.'.. Critical bank and channel stabilization, sediment retention,
water temperature control tlrough shade, and ecosystem processes such as denitrification sometimes depend on these species in large areas." Where farming is or is becoming uneconomic, and flow regulation and changed flow recession timing are present, these species dominate. "' The halophytic satcedar species may also dominate where salinity has increased due to irrigation, changes
in evaporation, or changes in flow regimes."' Changing fire dynamics also play
an increasing role."' Consequently, given the high volumes of water at stake and
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106. See Colo.Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P. 2d 1321, 1324, 132627 (Colo. 1974);J. Gregory Hobbs, Colorado Water Law: An Histoical Overvew,1 U. DENY.
WATER L. REV. 1, 23 (1997).
107. See Shelton Farms,529 P.2d at 1327.
108. Nagler etal., supra note 102.
109. Id.;
see WALTER K. DODDS AND MAT R. WHILES,FRESHWATER ECOLOGY: CONCEPTS
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Agnicultural Landscapes for Nitrogen Attenuation and Biodiversity Enhancement Opportunities
andLinitations,56 ECOLOGICAL ENGINEERING 5 (2013).
110. Nagler etal., supra note 102.
111. J.C. Stromberg et al., Legacies of lood Reduction on a DrylandRiver, 28 RIVER RES.
APPLiC. 143, 143-44, 155-56 (2012); Laura G. Peny et al., VulnerabihlyofRiparianEcosystems
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CHANGE BIOLOGY 821, 829-31 (2011); BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & THE USDA FOREST
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the ecological values that phreatophytes sometimes generate, the "salvage" definition and policy is increasingly important and complex.'13 Someone who "salvaged" water from existing uses could receive a transferable right. to it if "the
water salvaged was, prior to the institution of the conservation measures, not
otherwise available for appropriation."' The costs of making such a showing,
however, may have prevented many such efforts to conserve water."' Strict traditional interpretations of beneficial use and waste, coupled with policies not
requiring modernization or investment in efficiency,"' are "virtually institutionalizing historic patterns of waste."'
The rigid Colorado policy limits incentives for change. The Federal government made very substantial investments in phreatophyte control, though the
Natural Resources Conservation Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture
does not provide a central summary of the state-by-state allocations."' How
much water could be restored to other uses with an incentive allowing transferability is unknown, but might be quite large. It is critical to the protection of
other water rights that the transferable anounts not extend beyond the property
owner's own water rights, and the market must motivate transfers so that water
now being non-beneficially transpired can be freed for transfer to higher-valued
uses.
17

Im. THE ESSENTIALS OF WESTERN APPROPRIATIONS DOCTRINE AND
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
A. THE PRIOR APPROPIATIONS DOCTRINE
The Eastern United States generally uses a riparian system in which landowners adjacent to watercourses originally held all the water rights."9 Eastern
riparian states have transformed the system over time into various forms of "regulated riparian law."'" The essential feature of riparian water law - reasonable
accommodation for riparian water uses - was deliberately jettisoned in the

113. In Colorado, "saved" water made available from reduction of return flows has been distinguished from "conserved agricultural water" made available from reduction of a water right
owner's historic consumptive use, and "salvaged" water is that made available from a non-beneficial use. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., COLORADO WATER PLAN FINAL DRAFr, 192-93
(2015), http://coloradowaterplan.com. The distinction between saved and salvaged in the case of
riparian area phreatophytes would be harder to draw were it not for the explicit treatment of the
issue in the Shelton Fansdecision. Shelton Faims,529 P.2d at 1325.
114. Bergholz, supra note 101, at 443.
115. Gheleta, supra note 101, 663-64.
116. Neuman, supra note 54 at 922, 956-57, 961.
117. Mark Honhart, Carrotsfor Conservation: Oregon's Water Conservation Statute Offers
Incentives to Invest in Eficiency, 28 U. COLO. L. REV. 827, 832 (1995).
118. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NATURAL REs. CONSERVATION SERV., http://www.nrcs.usda.
gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/progamns/financial/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2016) (detailing areas
of federal intervention and investment concerning riparian preservation); see alsoTHE TAMARISK
COALIrrION, MISSION & VISION, http://www.tamariskcoalifion.org/about-us/our-mission (last visited Feb. 18, 2016) (representing a concerted effort by an independent coalition to curb loss of
water in riparian lands and prevent further expansion of invasive plant species.).
119. SCHORR, supra note 51, at 51-52.
120. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting Ripanian Rights to the Twenty-lirst Century, 106 W.
VA. L. REV. 536, 583-84 (2004).
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West.'2'
Water law in the Western states developed from water scarcity and the need
for cooperation.' The West adapted a model designed from the system of
water claims used in the goldfields of the Sierra Nevada Mountains in California." Prior appropriation law is named for the system recognizing that the earliest claim on a stream flow has a right prior to subsequent claims.' The prior
appropriation doctrine is most clearly developed, and straightforwardly applied
in Colorado.' 5 As David Schorr argues, avoiding monopoly or financial control
over water, and thus control over other activities, was a central goal in the prior
appropriation system evolution.'" Further, to solidify the basis for investment
in water-dependent activities, water rights are granted as a property right rather
than a permit that might be subject to government modification,'" thereby increasing uncertainty for the owner.
Western American water uses, much like European uses, began with mining and farning, followed by early municipal-industrial development that employed gravity delivery.'" The need to use water away from river-bank land
ownership led to adopting water rules based on mining practices occurring during the California Gold Rush subsequently codified as the Mining Law of
1872.'" In the Western United States, water quality regulation is largely separated from water quantity administration, reflecting that the right to use a volume of water is indeed a property right, while rights to a particular quality of
water are derived from Federal and State laws, and their administration. '
The concept of beneficial use is important in Western water law because it
limits how often a water is applied and because it is also defines a limit..on the
water right - excessive application constitutes waste. " Major changes in the
concept of beneficial use include expansions of the uses for which water rights
are granted, led by the innovation of in-stream flow ights for environmental
protection.' Groundwater regulation is another example of legal evolution.'
The physical complexity of groundwater has proven challenging all over the

121.

SCHORR, supra note 51, at 5.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 7.
124. Id.at 5
125. Id.
126. Id. at 7 (explaining that history shows that prior appropriation was concerned with "equitable distribution of water and limiting the power of corporation... a like commitnent to equal
access and the prevention of concentrated control over water").
127. J.Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. Reviving the PublicOwnership, An6-speculation andBeneficial
Use Moorings of the Pn'orAppropnation WaterLaw,84 COLO. L. REV.97, 117 (2013).
128. Scc STINZEL & CECH, supra note 4, at XIX.
129. DAVID W. GETCHES, WATER LAWIN ANUTSHEI., 74-75 (5th ed. 2012); ScHoRR, supra
note 51, at 25;JOHN R. LESI-Y,THE MINING LAw: A STUDY IN PERPErUAL MOTION, Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future (1987).
130. See Hobbs, supra note 127.
131. GETCHES, supra note 129, at 110.
132. Neuman, supra note 54, at 920.
133. GETCHrS, supra note 129, at 120.
134. Charney, supra note 23.
135. See intia section 3.
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West, likely requiring further regulatory changes.'"
B. THE CONCEPT AND IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN
NATURAL RESOURCE USE
People undertake economic activities, both public and private, with the in tent of generating certain positive results, or "benefits."' 7 Certain negative llfnpacts, referred to as "costs," are necessary to produce benefits.'" These benefits
and costs are likely to come in quite different units, but the relevant decision
maker must conduct some kind of comparison in deciding whether to undertake any given activity.'" Presumably, the decision maker's point of view guides
whether the activity's benefits exceed the costs, (i.e., if "net benefits" are positive).
Colloquially, economic efficiency means avoiding waste and getting the
greatest social good out of our limited resources, or "getting the biggest-bangfor-our-buck" from our resource use. "' In technical terms, using scarce resources over a period of time that maximizes the present value of net benefits
to society is how we achieve efficiency.' It can be applied to issues at the national level (e.g. ,in deciding among levels of federal expenditure on health,
transportation, environment, etcetera); at the regional level, (e.g., Bureau of
Reclamation multi-state projects); or at the individual project and policy change
level (e.g. deciding on the size of a flood control dam or clean water policy
rules). The cost-benefit analysis was first developed at the project level.'
Consider a proposal to build a dam on a river with the intent to produce
electric power, irrigation water, improved land values, water for cities and towns,
water-based recreation, and flood control. In physical tenns, these outputs constitute the benefits of the project. To construct and operate the dam, the public
will incur various costs some of which are obvious, and some not so obvious.
These costs may include, but are certainly not limited to: construction costs;
operation and maintenance costs; population inconvenience during construction; loss of the outputs of farmland and livelihoods taken by the reservoir; instream recreation losses; deterioration of water and air quality; and damage to
riparian ecosystems.
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See Edella Schiager, Challenges of Governing GroundwaterinUS.Western States, 14
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139. HARRY F. CAMPBELL & RIcHARD P.C. BROWN, COST-BENEFr ANALYSIS: FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL USING SPREADSHEETS 3.2 (2d ed. Roudedge, 2016).
140. JAMES BRADHELD, INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 8

(2007).
141. R.A. Young, Economic Criteriafor Water Allocation and Valuation, inCosT-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS AND WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 13 (Ray Brouwer & David Pearce eds., 2005).
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223, 227 (Ray Brouwer & David Pearce eds., 2005) ("Comparing all of the monetized gains in
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ALLAN SCHMIDT, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS: APOLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 10 (1989) ("To
judge whether proposed public spending or regulation improves aggregate welfare we need a way
to add up the costs and benefits to all individuals").
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Achieving economic efficiency in designing and operating the dam requires
addressing three questions: (i) Is the project designed (size, technology, outputs
included, location) to generate the largest net benefits?; (ii) Are the resultant net
benefits (benefits minus costs) positive?; and (iii) Is this project a good use of
resources compared to other uses?
When evaluating a project, we must start with a description of physical benefits and costs. Thus, the project evaluator must address the following issues:
(Q1) How can the physical benefits and physical costs be compared?; (Q2)
Whose benefits and costs are to be included?; and (Q3) How should future
benefits and costs be compared with today's benefits and costs? The affected
parties and how the benefits mad costs impinge on their interests will determine
the answers to each of these questions,"5but the standard practice is to use a
national accounting of benefits and costs to all affected parties." '
(Q1). Comparing Physical Outputs & Costs. The project proponent could
sinaply describe the physical outputs and costs for the decision maker's comparison. For example, a description of the outputs could include: Kilowatts of
energy produced annually; acre-feet of irrigation water produced annually; acrefeet of flood storage with resultant reduction in flood danages; natural and scenic areas created; and recreational sites created. Concerning the costs, a description could include: construction costs; anticipated lifetime operating and
maintenance costs; opportunity cost of the water evaporated; agricultural lands
and production lost; loss of stream fishing;, and damage to riparian ecosystems.
The problem is that public officials will have trouble balancing these physical
benefits and costs in the public interest. In the absence of a widely accepted
quantitative procedure for project evaluation, socially bad projects and special
interests may dominate the evaluation and ultimately waste scarce resources.
The obvious, and standard, solution for comparing outputs and costs is to
attach prices to the project inputs and outputs to see if the sum of the monetized
benefits exceeds the sum of monetized costs.' 5 Most prices are set in markets,
but some are administratively set, while indirect tests estimate others."" Available prices may or may not incorporate all the social values that should be taken
into account. The following situations can occur mi our search for appropriate
prices:
Some benefits and costs are valued using prices that result from reasonably
competitive markets or from competent administrative determination, thereby
closely reflecting social gains and losses;
Market prices may be readily available, but may contain distortions because
of unfair trade practices, monopoly market power, price controls, or failure to
account for "externalities;" nonetheless, corrections can be made in most cases.
No market price may exist, but various credible techniques can estimate the
143. See SCHMIDT, supra note 142, at 15 (explaining that: "Interdependence exists in any situation of scarcity, because one person's choice and use of a resource affects the options open to
others.").
144. See CHARLES W. HowE, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS FOR WATER SYSTEM PLANNING 16
(1971).
145. Griiffiths & Wheeler, supra note 142.
146. ROBERT A. YOUNG, DETERMINING THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WATER CONCEPTS AND
MErHODS, 161-221(2005), (synthesizing a variety of valuation methods and their application, with
particular treatment of irrigation water).
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unit value indirectly, such as using: travel cost methods for outdoor recreation;
contingent valuation for values of protecting ecosystems; and other benefit-cost
measures taken from completed benefit-cost analyses in similar situations.
Some benefits or costs simply cannot be given prices that are credible within
a given society's value system, (e.g. the loss of important species and ecosystems
or destruction of unique historical artifacts). While someone evaluating these
items may not include it in the discussion, they should describe such considerations in footnotes to the analysis. Some may include the value of a human life
in this category, but there are credible techniques to estimate values of human
life.
(Q2) Whose benefits and costs to include. The most responsible answer is
that benefits and costs apply to all parties regardless of location (local, state,
regional, national, global) or social class. The usual practice is to take into account benefits and costs within national boundaries, using a "national accounting stance" for benefits and costs." However, regional and local administrators
may find a regional or even local benefits and costs accounting more useful for
certain types of projects.
(Q3) Comparisons of benefits and costs over time. How should decision
makers compare streams of benefits and costs that are incurred over long periods of time? For example, most people would prefer to receive $100 today
rather than wait (t) amount of years simply because they can start enjoying the
use of the money today, either to satisfy consumption needs or to earn interest
over the coming (t) years." Simple financial algebra shows that if the sum B(0)
today can be invested at an interest rate (r%) per year, the value in (t) years will
be:
B(t) = B(0)(1+r) or B(0) = B(0/(1+r)Y'
B(0) is referred to as the "present value" of the future sun B(0. °
These observations suggest that a project could be evaluated by the difference between the "present value" of benefits and costs:
PVNB = [B(0)-C(0)J + E IB(t)-C(0/(l+r)'
where B(0) and C(0) are the up-front benefits and costs and B(t) and C(t)
are the annual benefits and costs.'"' Economic efficiency requires that the project is designed and evaluated using these criteria and that PVNB>0 holds.
IV. STEPS TO MITIGATE THESE INEFFICIENCIES
A. EXPANDING ROLES FOR WATER MARKETS THROUGH THE REDUCTION
OF TRANSACTION COSTS

As noted in Section 1.B, transaction costs are those costs imposed on the

147. HOWE, supa note 144.
148. See DANIELW. BROMLEY, THE HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS, 45-60,
111-138, (Cambridge, MA, Blackwell 1995).
149. Howe, supra note 144 at 65-79.
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151.
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market participants, primarily on the transaction initiator in a water market.' 2Furthermore, the bulk of these costs arise in complying with the high burden of proof for the no-injury rule.'" Other costs arise from gathering necessary
data related to the transaction mad compliance with water law, which usually
involves legal assistance as well as engineering supervision. Under current administrative procedures, the water market strongly favors objectors and discourages transactions that are not large enough to warrant the expense and delay of
elaborate engineering and legal contests in water court. This means that wellfinanced actors, like municipalities with stronger financial bases, participate in
water markets more than smaller agricultural entities, for whom small expedient
transfers would be especially beneficial late in the season, but who face disproportionately higher costs."
Data needs include searching to find partners for the desired transaction.
With market areas spanning entire river basins, gathering this information isn't
simple. While the Office of the State Engineer advertises proposed changes to
existing water rights and past transactions,'5 it does not keep or publish records
of water right. Thus, some transaction participants experience difficulty with
"price discovery," (i1e., in judging what a reasonable price might be).
Policy makers, attorneys, and interested parties have recommended several
changes to these practices. A simple step would be to allow the presumpbve
use of historical data to determine diversion, consumptive use and other paranmeters of the case. The Colorado Legislature allowed
6 for this in its attempt to
establish a water bank in the Arkansas River Basin..
A second step would be to define through legislation some range of allowable negative impacts on existing users within which protests could not be pursued. This would reduce the number of "teacup" injury protests even though
it would involve some residual loss for impacted parties. 5 Britt Banks and Peter
Nichols point out that the Colorado State Legislature has already statutorily declared that some types of water use do not enjoy no injury protection, namely
small capacity household wells, gravel pit storage, and groundwater depletions.'"
However, it is not clear that exempting these uses is warranted because smallwell use in a basin can be quite large while substantial volumes of storage in
gravel pits and a lowering water table can also certainly have negative impacts
on other users.15 Ironically, State law allows increasing the consumptive use of
a water right through increased crop consumption despite reducing return
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153.

Id.

154. Charles W. Howe, Carolyn S. Boggs & Peter Butler, 7Trasacdons Costs as Determinants
of Water Transfers, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 393, 401, 404 (1990).
155. See, e.g., COLO. WATER Div., supra note 40.
156. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80.5-101 (2014); see also OFFICE OF THE STATE ENGINEER,
COLO. Div. OF WATER REs., RULES GOVERNING ARKANSAS RIVER WATER BANK PILOT

PROGRAM (2002), http://www.sos.state.co.us/CCR/DisplayRule.do?acion=i-uleinfo&ruleld=212
1&deptlD-13&agencylD.-133&deptNamne=400%20Department%20of%20Natual%20Resourc
es&agencyNmne=402%20Division%20of%20Water%20Resources&seriesNum- 2%20CCR%20
402-12 (last visited Feb. 18, 2016); see also Scanga, supra note 71.
157. See Banks & Nichols, supranote 35, at 88.
158. Seeid. at87-89.
159. See Waskom, supra note 104.
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flows."
Various other states have suggested measures of allowable impacts within a
de miniis standard. Idaho's Court has allowed a 10% injury band of other
parties' water rights, although water users strongly contested this."' Impact frequency and duration should be included in such determinations because cumulative de ninjs
changes could have significant impacts on existing rights and
riparian ecological conditions with water quality impacts.
A final issue is where the burden of proof lies. Typically, the burden of
proof lies on applicant for a change of use. 6 Some people suggest, after initially
establishing non-injury, the burden of proof in further appeal actions should
shift to the objector." Britt Banks and Peter Nichols conclude that the current
system is too costly and rigid, and argue that shifting some legal burden onto
objectors in change proceedings would restore the balance that shifted over
time. 4
B. MODERNIZING THE ANTI-SPECULATION DOCTRINE
1. Traditional Justification for the Anti-Speculation Doctrine and Inconsistent
Application
David Schorr states that,
Itihe unofficial codes of the Colorado mining disticts.., focused primarily on
rules designed to ensure wide distribution of property. Similarly, the statutes
of the Colorado Territory, the water-ight provisions of the State constitution
of 1876 and the early judicial decisions culninating in the leading case of Coffin v.Left HandDitch Co., were mainly concerned to prevent control of water
by capitalists, and did so by breaking the common-law monopoly of riparian
owners...

The "originating principles" of Colorado prior appropriation doctrine includes public ownership, anti-speculation, and beneficial use limitations that circumscribe the amount and manner of use of each water right.'"
As noted in Section I.C, the no injury principle precluding damage to other
water users constrains both changes in water rights and initial appropriations.
To effect this restriction, Colorado's water courts need to identify potentially
damaged parties related to a transaction. Water courts gather this information
in two ways: through the transaction publication and protest process, and by
requiring applicants to identify all parties and water uses related to a proposed
160. This is the result of unwillingness to dictate crops or technology; see Neuman, supranote
1, who explores this throughout her article.
161. Jeffrey C. Fereday & Michael C. Creamer, The Maximum Use Doctrine and its Relevance to Water Rights Administration in Idaho's Lower Boise River Basin, 47 IDAHO L. REV.
67, 74 (2010); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 37.03.11.042 (2015); see Clear Spring Foods, Inc. v.
Spackman, 252 P. 3d 71 (Id. 2011).
162. COLO. Rev. STAT. § 37-92-302 (2014).
163. Banks & Nichols, supra note 35, at 88, 90.
164. See id. at 90.
165. David B. Schorr, Approprination as Agranamsm: DisibutiveJusticein the Creation of
Property Jbghts, ECOLOGY L.Q. 3 (2005).
166. See Hobbs, supra note 127, at 101-02.
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transaction at the time of application.'6
In spite of these requirements, the anti-speculation doctrine is not consistently applied, as illustrated by several water acquisition practices that are blatantly speculative. Granting conditional water rights to cities also allows holding
rights against an uncertain future need. Charles Podolak and Martin Doyle note
that it is "completely permissible in accordance with the anti-speculation doctrine to hold on to a water right for many decades... As a result, there are a
large number of bld conditional water rights in Colorado.' 68 Some of these
conditional rights have remained unperfected for over one hundred years."'
Podolak and Doyle also show that the State has allowed a large volume of conditional water rights to remain valid "until market conditions improve," for the
oil, gas, and oil shale industries."'
2. The "Chicken-and-the-Egg" Problem Restated: Modernizing AntiSpeculation.
Water law defines speculation as a "lack of a specific plan and intent to
divert, store or otherwise capture, possess and control a specific quantity of water for specific beneficial uses.""' As mentioned above, this can preclude economically valuable transactions because someone seeking to transfer his or her
water right must first find a buyer with a clear beneficial use, yet buyers are
hesitant to commit without knowing if there is a valid change of use."'
The modernization of anti-speculation as presently applied seems warranted by the adverse impacts on available public information, as noted here.
With any reasonable form of a no-injury rule, a proposed change decree or.
administrative approval of an augmentation plan or substitute water supply plan
would trigger an examination, and that would require adequate specificity to
show at least a presumption of no injury."' We suspect that the status quo,
following the elaboration of the anti-speculation doctrine in the Pagosa cases
favors those with more information over those with less."' Organizations such
as municipal water providers and those playing the role of brokers with high
levels of information, typically face irrigators (sellers) who may not have as
much infornation, or financial capacity to acquire it, as the potential buyers."'
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2007) (citing COLO. REV.STAT. § 3792-103(3)(a)(II) (2007)).
172. See Howe, supranote 20, at 41.
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175. This is implicit in the discussion of "alternative water transfer mechanisms" in COLO.
WATER CONSERVATION BD., supranote 46, at 6-111 - 6-122 (Chap. 6 Sec. 4); we argue that this
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The high transactions costs of transferring water and the concerns with information asymmetry are believed to inhibit commitments, and thus also disclosure of interest."'
Re-thinking the High Plains case, one company was seeking what would
have been in effect a license to market water rights it had acquired or water from
exercise of options it had acquired.' The inability to identify the risks of injury
indeed made the application for a change decree outside of the intent of the
current no-injury rule, as it could not be applied as presently held. '" But the
interactions with other elements of current Colorado water law are critically important. As Taussig demonstrated, the invocation of expensive and uncertain
determinations of historic consumptive uses of an irrigation water right as a "devolution" of the no-injury rule may be seen as defense of water rights, but it may
more powerfully limit willingness to participate."9 With the risk of reduction of
a water right, and relatively low information on the potential value, entering the
market in public becomes a "chicken-and-egg" problem: without better iniformation on potential final value, and with a risk from seeking the information,
the status quo is maintained and the anti-speculation doctrine defeats its own
purpose. It purports to limit speculation only by creating opportunity for purchasers of options to buy from those working with very likely poor information
about other potential sellers and about prices being paid. The results, as shown
by Olinger and Plunkett'8 °are secrecy, non-disclosure terns, and disadvantage
to those with little bargaining power. The irony includes the fact that the antispeculation doctrine was originally intended to limit the power of wealth to control irrigation water.'8'
In a similar situation, the Colorado Corn Growers Association, Aurora Water, and Ducks Unlimited tried to develop a system where farmers could amend
their water rights for other uses.' Farmers could auction their water rights in
years they were not planning to use them while cities, industry, or conservation
groups could bid for the flows. 1" Colorado water attorney, AndyJones, asserted
that the flex market is a "narrow, intentional exception to the State's anti-speculation rule," which the involved parties were hm effect "trying to create incenNonetheless, various water agencies
tives for water to stay in agriculture."''

(www.DARCA.org) in which John Wiener was participant and served as rapporteur for the Alliance; these meetings were held 02 and 09 December of 2015 and 27 January at the Colorado
Water Congress, and tour in June and July of 2014.
176. See Howe, supra note 20, at 41.
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178. High Plains, 120 P.3d at 716-17.
179. Taussig, supra note 50; COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., supra note 46, at 6-117.
180. Olinger & Plunkett, supra note 73.
181. SCHORR, supra note 51, at 5
182. Joshua Zaffos, Can leasiuginriationwater keep Colorado faims alive, HIGH COUNTRY

NEWS (June 8, 2015), http://www.hcn.org/issues/47.10/can-leasing-inigation-water-to-keep-colorado-farms-alive.

183.
184.

Id.
Id.
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helped to defeat the bill that would have authorized the market.'
In spite of these rulings, a developer recently announced plans to buy
14,600 farmland acres with connected water rights to the Fort Lyon Canal.'86
Whether this will pass the speculation test remains for the court's analysis. Perhaps unfortunately for the rural economy of this area, the court will not decide
whether the change is speculative until there is an application for a change of
diversion, place, or kind of use. Although the Fort Lyon Canal Company may
scrutinize the farmland and water shares purchase as a real estate transaction,
there is no State or public involvement without some other triggering event.
Even filing a change in ownership in water court may not invoke any scrutiny.
The Colorado Water Plan's "Colorado Water Values" urge increased collaboration by encouraging all interested parties to participate in the review process
earlier.'87
From the public or social perspective of economic efficiency, the externalities involved in long ditches call for particularly close scrutiny to determine the
full range of costs involved in a transfer, potential mitigation, and local impacts,
which may or may not elicit local or state goverment involvement.' For examnple, water courts shall impose conditions on a transfer to mitigate the impacts
on local tax bases and sometimes require revegetation and noxious weed prevention."
The key to economic efficiency may be a modernized anti-speculation policy, which encourages early disclosure of aspirations, including willingness to
bargain. Then, implementation would follow the rules and regulations optimizing use of water consistent with preservation of the priority system of water rights
(as was sought for groundwater management).'"
3. Accommodating Uncertainty in Water Administration
Section I.C argued that the no injury rule is too severe and that certain "de
minimis" standards can avoid unneeded litigation over "teacup cases." Section
III.B. 1 pointed out that conditional water rights are issued on grounds of projected water demands that are subject to broad uncertainty, although the Pagosa
rulings require tighter standards.'8 ' The Pagosarulings recognized the need for
planning.'" The legal system recognized and adapted to the tension between

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. WATER PLAN, supranote 113, at3-3
188. For a full description of considerations and contemporary ecosystem valuation sources
for additional information see ARKANSAS BASIN ROUNDTABLE, CONSIDERATIONS FOR AGRICULTURE TO URBAN WATER TRANSFERS: REPORT OF THE WATER TRANSFERS GUIDELINES
COMMITTEE (September 10, 2008) http://cwcb.state.co.us/public-information/publications/Pag
es/StudiesReports.aspx. For current methods and applications of ecosystem valuations, including

benefits for amenity, recreation and some real estate value information, see Earth Economics,
NATURE'S VALUE FROM CITIES TO FORESTS: A FRAMEWORK TO MEASURE ECOSYSTEM SERVIcES
ALONG THE URBAN-RURAL GRADIENT (2014) www.eartheconomics.org.

189. COLO REV. STAT. §37-92-305 (4.5)(a)-(c) (2015).
190. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-501(2)(e) (2015).

191. Turner, supra note 80, at661, 673.
192. Id. at661, 675-76.
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planning needs and speculation, and to the need to accept some range of uncertainty in various dimensions of water administration to have a workable system. This is manifested in modifying the "great and growing cities doctrine .....
In a similar fashion, the courts should relax the currently severe anti-speculation
doctrine when judging proposed water market transactions that are forwardlooking. The planning expertise of diverse water actors would then play a role
in efficiently distributing water supplies over time through the market and
amongst uses.
In major world markets, speculators play a vital role in allocating unavoidable risk by allowing "risk averse" parties to contract against the risks they face. '
This is true in the grains, oil, and electric energy markets.'9 Even the priority
doctrine allocates risk by differentiating between senior and junior rights that
permit water users to adjust their portfolios to the degree of risk desired.
4. Encouraging Institutional Innovation in Water Administration
The Colorado Legislature established water banks in each major basin."
hile it is clear that well-designed water banks can be quite effective in distributing water over time and among uses, it is also clear that we must follow the
lessons of past attempts, successful and failed.'97
The term "water banking" means a variety of ways of trading the use of
water.'9" The Colorado Legislature's earlier experiment with a failed pilot program in the Arkansas River Basin resulted in a non-profit brokerage mechanism
trading only stored surface water. The most significant advance may have been
the precedent-setting agreement to use presumed figures for conveyance loss
and consumptive use fractions from each major ditch, based on recent modeling and decades of data." However, the negotiations over injury and litigation

193. Id. at 639, 651.
194. See VARIAN, supia note 24, at 236-37.
195. JOSEPH P. STIGLITz, ECONOMICS, W. W. Norton & Company, 153-165 (1993).
196. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-80.5-104.5 (2015).
197. See Payne et al., supranote 21, at 1488.

198. See Clifford, Landry & Larsen-Hayden, supra note 69, at ii.
199. OFFICE OF THE STATE ENGINEER, DISION OF WATER RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, STATE OF COLORADO, RULES GOVERNING THE ARKANSAS RtvrR

WATER BANK PILOT PROGRAM (2002), codified at 2 Code of Colorado Regulations 2 CCR 40212, incorporating 2007 changes, http://www.sos.state.co.us/CCR/DisplayRule.doaction-nuleinfo
&rulld-212l&deptID = 13&agencyID=133&deptNane=400%20Depau-rnent%20of%20Natural
%20Resources&agencyName=402%20Division%20of%20Wate-%20Resurces&seies
Num=2%20CCR%20402-12.
We argue that the 2002 ruies were quite signiticant because of their acceptance of presumptive
figures for transferable consumptive use from each of the major ditches in the lower Arkansas
Valley. The claim that these were based on years of data and previous adjudications is based on
the observation and participation in all known public meetings in the rule-making.
The confidence in past engineering was related to the development of a hydrologic model with
water rights included, called the "Hydraulic-Institutional Model", which was "blessed" by acceptance for use in the U.S. Supreme Court original jurisdiction case, Kansas v. Colorado, No.
105, Orig., 514 U.S. 673 at 678-687. Hundreds of pages of detail are included in the reports of
the Special Master appointed for the case, http://www.supremecourLgov/SpecMastRpt/Spec
MastRpt.aspx; see Report Original Case 105 No. 091997 at 7-20; subsequent reports md agreemient continue to use this model.
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concerns took substantial time and effort, while neither the internet-based ilplementation system facilitated price discovery, nor did most of the potential
users trust it...
This experiment in modifying traditional prior appropriation law reduced
transactions costs and delays in water transfers, and was intended to increase
flexibility to agricultural water rights holders' benefit. Most people expected
this flexibility to become increasingly desirable during conditions of scarcity and
to foster new approaches to alternative water transfer mechanisms ("ATMs").
However, because actors in the water market widely expected to encounter immediate litigation, the Office of the State Engineer and many parties negotiated
a set of compromises, which reduced this theory with substantial appeal to an
implementation that did not allow for any practical uses. The delay in execution
was long enough to render implementation inapplicable for emergency or sudden needs, and the duration of the allowable lease-like transfer was not long
enough to meet more predictable municipal and industrial needs. ' By the time
the water bank website went operational, the season had largely passed, and the
limited outreach program had not had the opportunity to explain the website
and procedures. 2 Thus, water users made only a few offers and a few bids
resulting in no transactions (a view of the offers is available from Colorado Water Conservation Board)."
Arnong the lessons learned from the Arkansas Water Bank Pilot Project is
the critical need for clear understanding among participants. The Colorado
Water Plan and many years of public discourse somewhat meet this level of
understanding, but it likely is not fully accomplished for any of the ATMs. 4
Potential users must be able to clearly identify: what is transferable and under
what conditions (e.g., what if the water is not provided to the transferor?); the
duration of the transfer contract or performance, if initiated; the timing of calls
to perform or initiate; different prices for different timing, if desired (e.g., to
cover incurred farming costs, which would be wasted if irrigation is stopped, or
the costs of establishing a cover crop, including any needed water); how the
irrigator will cope with farming interruption problems (e.g., will there be an arrangement for payment at times suitable to employ skilled labor in alternative
tasks); how the ditch company or district will manage with the reduced flows;
and how the share-holder and ditch company will assess the water rights and
delivery, or foregone delivery.
C. SECURITY AND INVESTMENT IN THE FUTURE

There are hundreds of ways in which land ownership is divided among parties with different interests, such as direct users, easement holders, covenants
200. Scanga, supra note 71.
201. JOHN WIENER, PROBLEMS WrrH THE ARKANSAS RIVER BASIN WATER BANK PILOT
PROGRAM, http://www.colorado.edu/ibs/es/wicner/papers/One-pagerArkWBankPilotProgran.
pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).
202. See id.
203. HAL SIMPSON, STATE ENG'R, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE ON THE
ARKANSAS RIVER WATER BANK PILOT PROGRAM 2 (Nov. 1, 2005).
204. See generaly COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., COLORADO WATER PLAN SECOND
DRAFt supra note 46, at 94-266 (discussing alternative transfer mechanisms that are currently
being researched).
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for mutual benefit within an area, local land use regulations and zoning, state
and federal regulations, mortgage lenders, and investors and creditors of many
kinds. ATMs, as pilot projects, provide a great leap forward in water sharing.
Municipalities have the capacity, for example, as partners in joint ownership
of some water rights, to employ bonding capacity for very low-cost capital.
Farmers have the senior water rights and the land, but are in need of capital and
a longer planning horizon to transition from crops with very high water needs
to more diverse farming systems. Water providers can and should represent
the public's interests in conjunction with local government, regional coalitions,
and consumer groups, such as school districts that use local and regional farm
products, with frequent opportunities for public comment.
We must think of agricultural potential, urban and industrial supply,
and
environmental benefits, and consider what a desirable future would include.
Many consider this the goal of Integrated Water Resource Management. Municipalities simply thinking "just get the water" is no longer adequate for the
pressures and the problems we already face, and will face more intensely in the
coming years.

205.

COLO. REV. STAT. § § 29-14-101-110 and 29-15-101-112; see U.S. EnvironmentalPro-

tection Agency, Guidebook ofFinancialTools: Payingfor EnvironmentalSystems, Washington,
D.C.: US Environmental Protection Agency (2008), https://www.epa.gov/envirofmance (discussing relevant costs).
206. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N POLICY COMM., CASE STUDIES IN INTEGRATED WATER

RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: FROM LOCAL STEWARDSHIP TO NATIONALVISION 5 (Brenda Batemang & Raquel Rancier eds., 2012) http://www.awra.org/comniittees/AWRA-Case-Studies-IW
RM.pdf.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Humankind could be about to exchange one kind of energy crisis for another."'

Almost universally, notions of sustainability cloak renewable energy, but it
is nevertheless imperative to recognize that "renewable" refers to the energy
source's conversion into electricity.! "Renewable" does not refer to the raw materials required to build the infrastructure that does the actual conversion.3 Although renewable energy is generally less pollutant than fossil fuels,' a large-scale
transition to these emerging technologies will consume substantial quantities of
raw materials! Renewable energy advocates overlook the subsequent increases
in demand and consumption of raw materials - such as copper - that invariably
accompany the proliferation of green technologies, including solar power, wind
energy, and electric vehicles.6 As a result, policymakers fail to appreciate the
interconnected relationship between renewable energy, increased copper mining, and water pollution.7 This challenge has elicited an interesting contradiction, as "today's economic and political shift toward renewable energy creates a
strange dilemma for the environmentalists."'
Despite the perceived benefits of alternative energy, we often do not account for materials consumed along the entirety of the supply-chain, ensuring
that "Itihe circle of energy and pollution continues."9 In fact, even the renewable energy sector has expressed concern that "Inlot enough attention has been
paid to renewable energy infrastructure development critical to ensure successful project development."' Only the mining industry has genuinely taken note
of the world's declining base metal supply." The general public, as well as many
renewable energy advocates, regularly overlook the potential ranmifications of

1. Tim Radford, RenewableEnergyNeeds Huge MineralSupply,CLIMATE CENTRAL (Nov.
2, 2013), http://www.cimatecentral.org/news/renewable-energy-needs-huge-mineral-supply-1668

2.
2. See State and Local Chmate and Energy Program: Renewable Energy, U.S. EtN
PROT. AGENCY, https://www3.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/local/topics/renewable.hml
Feb. 22, 2016).
3. Radford, supra note 1.

L.

(last updated

4. Stephen C. Braverman, State Renewable PortfolioStandards andthe Commerce Clause,
25-SPG NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, 15,15 (2011).
5. Radford, supra note 1.
6. See BILL CARTER, BOOM, BusT, BOOM: A STORY ABOUT COPPER, THE METAL THAT
RUNS THE WORLD 45 (2012).
7. SeeRichard A. Kerr, The Coming Copper Peak, 343 SCIENCE 723, 724 (Feb. 14, 2014),
http://inside.mines.edu/UserFiles/File/economicsBusiness/Misc%20PDFs/Copper-Science-20
14-Kerr-722-4.pdf.
8. Id.

9. Id.
10. Conference, 21st Century Infrastructure:OpportunitiesandHurdles for Renewable EnergyDevelopmen4 10 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & POL'Y 69, 69 (2009).
11. MICHAEL T. KLARE, THE RACE FOR WHAT'S LEFr: THE GLOBAL SCRAMBLE FOR THE
WORLD'S LAST RESOURCES 151 (2012).
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diminishing copper production, particularly when coupled with its rapidly increasing demand." Because copper maintains such a vital role in our lives, society depends on the benefits of copper mining.'" This underscores an inevitable and contradictory-fueled debate about environmental tradeoffs.'4 These
trade-offs become exacerbated within the context of natural resource development, specifically in regards to energy production, sustainability, and protection
of vulnerable ecosystems.
On one hand, there is widespread acceptance that non-renewable fossil
fuels will reach eventual depletion." Yet conversely, society also fails to consider
renewable energy's reliance on non-renewable raw materials, such as the metals
that comprise the necessary infrastructure.'" Like most technologies, both fossil
fuels and renewable energy have adverse or collateral effects.'7 Rather than demonizing either of these energy sources, regulatory schemes that comprehensively understand these operations capitalize on the benefits, while further mitigating and adapting to the risks. Distinguished scientist Ugo Bahdi described
society's inadequate approach to our planet's limited supply of raw materials,
"people, industries, and governments that rely on finite resources are often loath
to take a true, hard look at just how plentiful or scarce certain resources are, not
to mention the consequences of mining or using them."'" Most alarmingly,
Bahdi reflected on the root of this concern: "We remain, as a society, reluctant
to accept natural limits[."'""
Environmentalists suggest that renewable energy should coerce society into
a new energy revolution, effectively safeguarding the world against imminent
dangers of climate change. ' Notwithstanding the perpetual debate concerning
whether or not the effects of climate change are the result of fossil fuel emissions,' regulatory approaches that focus solely on preventing or mitigating climate change will likely ignore the potential environmental consequences of a
widespread transition to renewable energy." In comparison, scientists scrutinize
the environmental impacts of liquefied natural gas ("LNG"), coal, and petroleum throughout their entire lifecycles.' Scientists analyze and the government
subsequently regulates greenhouse gas emissions ("GHG") throughout the
12. See id.
13. About COPPER MATrERS, http://www.coppeniatters.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 28,
2016).
14.

See

CARTER,

supranote 6, at 45.

15. SeeJeff Nesbit, FossilFuelsare Doomed, U.S. NEWS& WORLD REPORT (Aug. 13,2015,
10:51 AM), htqp://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/at-the-edge/2015/08/13/fossil-fuels-are-doomed.
16. See Olivier Vidal, Bruno Gofk & Nicholas Arndt, Metals for a Low-carbon Society, 6
NATURE GEOSCIENCE 894, 894 (2013).
17. Id. at 894-95.
18.

UGO BARDI, EXTRACTED: How THE QUEST FOR MINERAL WEALTH IS PLUNDERING

THE PLANET, at xv (2013).
19. Id.

20. SeegenerallyVidaletal., supra note 16
21. E.g., Paul Bedard, Carbon Dioxide Doesn't Cause Global Wanning, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (Oct. 7, 2009, 4:15 PM), http://www.usnews.comnews/blogs/washington-whispers/2009/10/07/scientist-carbon-dioxide-doesnt-cause-global-wanning.
22. See Radford, supra note 1.
23. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, David M. Schizer, 7he Shale Oil and Gas Revolution,
HydraulicFractuing,and Water Contanination:A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REv. 145,
169 n.112 (2013).
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complete process (i.e., assessed throughout upstream and downstream production), taking a comprehensive approach that aggregates the direct and indirect
effects, beginning with the extraction of fossil fuels and ending with the production and consumption of electricity." Perhaps because of the perceived benefits
of renewable energy," society does not examine or condemn the sources of renewable energy for the significant amount of copper required to fuel these technological advances. Thus, the contradiction arises through the recognition of
these contrasting regulatory approaches.
This Article exanines the extensive production of raw materials required
to advance the development of renewable energy. Most notably, renewable energy is inextricably linked to copper mining, and therefore indirectly associated
with the negative environmental effects stemming from the production of copper, such as water pollution.' Further, this Article suggests that because the
water-energy nexus presents diverse regulatory challenges, we should instead
embrace the inevitable contradictions on a case-by-case basis. Similar to an
ecosystem-based management approach, perhaps we should consider these water-energy challenges in isolation, rather than relying on guidance from overarching principles. Although this solution may lead to novel conflicts, it also
will likely promote interdisciplinary decision-making among industry stakeholders, government agencies, and environmentalists.
The proposed Pebble Mine in Alaska provides a unique example of these
principles. The Pebble deposit holds vast quantities of copper, " the metal that
is essential to renewable energy technology.' Despite the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") apparent goal of reducing carbon emissions under the
Clean Air Act, the EPA instead chose to preemptively veto the mining company's permit under the Clean Water Acts - even though the substantial copper deposit at Pebble Mine could be paramount in advancing the growth of the
renewable energy sector.' By embracing the water-energy contradiction, the
EPA, in its unlikely alliance with commercial fishermen, is in the midst of attempting to preserve an economically-valuable salmon fishery through its regulatory protection of the Bristol Bay watershed.' Nevertheless, this Article explores the ongoing legal conflict in the U.S. District Court for the District of

24. See genea/ly Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission Standards, 77 FED.REG. 49490, 49496-507 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 60-63) (discussing new rule's changes to performance standards for oil and natural
gas sources).
25. See Renewable Energy, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www3.epa.gov/statelocal climate/state/topics/renewable.html (last updated Feb. 22, 2016).
26. See Kerr, supranote 7, at 724.
27. Seejoby Warrick, Pebble Mine Debate in Alaska: EPA Become TargetbyPlanningfor
Rare 'Veto, 'WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/intemal-memos-spur-accusations-of-bias-as-epa-moves-to-block-goldinine/2015/02/15/3fflOlcO-b2ba-11 e4-854b-a38d1 3486bal_story.htuil.
28. See Copper:Renewable Energy,A 21st Century Solution, COPPER ALL Ihereinafter A
21st Century Solution], http://copperalliance.org/societal-benefits-landing-page/renewable-energy-3/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).
29. See Warrick, supra note 27.
30.

See id.;
A 21st Centuty Solution, supra note 28.

31.

See Warrick, supra note 27.
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Alaska, and its significance within the context of Arctic natural resource development and its connection to the renewable energy sector.
II. CHALLENGES INTRINSIC TO ADVANCEmENTS IN THE RENEWABLE
ENERGY SECTOR
The U.S. population is largely supportive of renewable energy, particularly
those developments in wind and solar energy." Several forces drive the proliferation of renewable energy, such as minimizing the harnful effects of GHG
emissions and reducing American dependence on foreign oil.' According to
noted economist Thomas Friedman, developing clean energy and green technology will "enable us to grow as a world economy... without exacerbating energy supply and demand issues, petrodictatorship, climate change, biodiversity
loss, and energy poverty, but while actually reducing them at the sane time. " '
These sentiments overlook the logistical reality of a large-scale transition to renewable energy, primarily because this transition to "clean" fuel will likely implicate a mosaic of unforeseen consequences. Although renewable energy may
ultimately reduce GHG emissions,' the overarching environmental costs that
will accompany this endeavor receive little attention. As renewables begin to
engulf more significant portions of the U.S. and global energy porfolios,6 it
remains in the best interest of sustainability to examine the entire supply chains
of these emerging technologies. In particular, these advancements and their
ensuing rebound effect may indirectly result in environmental consequences of
their own.
A. FACTORS INFLUENCING GROWTH IN RENEWABLE ENERGY

Several catalysts are influencing robust growth within the renewable energy
regime. These advancements are correlated with opportunities for growth
within the copper industry, especially as demand for the natural resource increases." Recent trends indicate that government mandates, federal renewable
fuel standards, and free-market forces are not only instigating, but also encouraging the transition to renewable energy.'

32. See, e.g., Large Majoiities in U.S.and Five Largest European Counties Favor More
Wind Farms andSubsidiesfor Bio-fuels, but Opinion is Sphton NuclearPower, HARRIS INTERAC'TIVE (Oct. 13, 2010), http://niedia.thehar-ispoll.com/documents/HI UK CORPARTICLE
_RenewableEnergy.pdf.
33. See Sara C. Bronin, Building-RelatedRenewable Energy andthe Caseof360 State Seev4
65 VAND. L. REV. 1875, 1877 (2012).
34.

THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN,

REVOLUTION-AND

HOT, FLAT, AND CROWDED: WHY WE NEED A GREEN

How IT CAN RENEW AMERICA 186 (2008).

35. See Renewdble Energy, supra note 25.
36. See Melissa Powers, Siallis (Stl) Beautiful:Designing U.S. Energy Policies to Increase
LocahzedRenewable Eneigy Generation,30 Wis. Int'l L. 595, 605-06 (2012); Penny Trussell,
Copper. Soling Societys Challenges, Rio TINTO: MINES-TO-MARKETS, http://m2m.riofnto.
coin/issue/3/-ticle/copper-solving-societys-challenges (last visited Mar. 25, 2016).
37. See Zolaikha Strong, Copper Use in Renewable EnergyExpected to IncreaseDamatically as U.S.Legislates Upgraded Energy Pohcies, MINING & POWER MAGAZINE, http:/www.
miningandpower-magazine.coin/index.php/features/aternative-energy/43-copper-use-in-renewable-energy-expected-to-increase-dramaically-as-u-s-legislates-upgraded-energy-policies
(last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
38. See Urna Outka, The Renewable EnergyFootprint,30 STAN. ENVTL.L. 241, 247-48
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State-mandated renewable portfolio standards ("RPSs") statutorily impose
that power utilities must derive a specified percentage of their energy from renewable sources.' States differ in how quickly they should reach this target and
what they characterize as a renewable energy source." At least thirty-seven states
and the District of Columbia currently mandate some variety of a renewable
energy target." Financial motivations, in the form of tax incentives and government subsidies, further promote the production of renewable energy. Following the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the federal government established a "production tax credit," essentially allowing wind and other renewables to be costcompetitive with electricity generated from fossil fuels." Additionally, the U.S.
Department of Energy provides a loan guarantee program for renewable energy
projects that seek to reduce GHG emissions.' In 2014, the Clean Power Plan
introduced the ambitious objective of reducing 30 percent of the power sector's
carbon emissions by year 2030."
The federal government has influenced the transition to cleaner technology
from a regulatory perspective. In an effort to reduce GHG emissions, Congress
enacted fleet-wide automobile fuel efficiency standards, referred to as Corporate Average Fuel Economy ("CAFE") standards.' In Massachusetts v. EPA,
the Supreme Court ruled that the EPA has authority to specify CAFE standards.' This Supreme Court decision incentivized the production of plug-in and
hybrid vehicles." Because there is still demand for large vehicles that do not
meet the fuel efficiency standards,' automakers must sell more of these "green"
vehicles in order to reach the fleet-wide standard of 34.1 miles per gallon by
2016 (i.e., by indirectly offsetting the much less efficient large vehicles).49
Free-market advocates suggest that clean energy initiatives will succeed if

(2011).
39. LINCOLN L. DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAw AND POLICY: ELECrRIcrY REGULATION IN
TRANSITION 484 (2015).

40. Id. at 484.
41. Id. at 140; see also Lincoln L. Davies, State Renewable Portfolio Standards:Is There a
'Race" and Is It "To the Top"?, 3 SAN DIEGOJ. CLIMATE& ENERGY L. 3 (2011-12). The
geographical prevalence of RPSs illuminates the concept of embracing a contradictory approach
to energy policy because both conservative and liberal (i.e., historically "red" and "blue") states
have adopted some form of renewable energy mandates. See Joshua P. Fershee, When I-ayer

Trumps Pohtcs: Thie Politicsand Demographicsof Renewable Portfolio Standards,35 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L& POL'Y REV. 53, 61 (2010).
42. See DAvIES Er AL., supranote 39, at 140.

43. See id.
(noting that pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Clean Energy Renewable
Bonds are available to finance renewable energy projects in the public sector).
44. Overview of the Clean PowerPlan: Cutting Carbon PollutionFrom PowerPlants, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY FACT SHEET, http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-05/docu
ments/20140602fs-overview.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).
45. DAVIES ET AL, supra note 39, at 548-49.
46. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,513-14, 528 (2007).
47. Cf id.
48. See Robert Wright, LowFuelPrices Drive USLight Truck Sales, FINANCIALTIMES (May
19, 2013, 1:53 PM), htp://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/45e4da48-bcf8-11 e2-9519-00144feab7de.html#
axzz431pqougX.
49. See DOT EPA Set Aggressive National Standards for Fuel Economy and First Ever
Greenhouse Gas Ermssion Levels for Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, NA'L HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.nhtsa-gov/PR/DOT-56-10.
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governments reform their policies." For instance, they argue that competitive

markets and performance improvements should drive cost-reductions' As a
testament to the free-market, the city of Georgetown, Texas, recently became
one of the largest municipally owned utilities in the country powered completely
by renewable energy. 2 In early 2015, the city entered long-term agreements without governmental inference - to acquire the output from a wind farm and
two solar plants in rural west Texas. 3 Although environmentalists would certainly commend the city for its transition to emissions-free electricity, economic
benefits were the primary reason for the transition to renewable power." Contrary to the argument that renewable energy is more expensive, the city indicated
that "the new renewable power contracts... [will] provide electricity at a lower
over-all cost than its previous wholesale power contracts.
Both government mandates mad free-market trends compel the broad availability of renewable energy upon the development of new and inproved technology. As we adapt to regulate this transition, it is vital to both consider and
prepare for the long-term environmental implications that may reverberate
from an expanding renewable energy sector.
B. JEVONS PARADOX & THE POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE-ENERGY
"REBOUND EFFECT"

Sigrificant increases in renewable energy development will likely have environmental benefits, but it is crucial to envision the trade-offs associated with
such a resource-intensive transition. As one author explained: "Meager alternative-energy schemes won't topple the hulking environmental concerns standing before us."" Further, the author contended that "the alternative-energy
boomerang, with all of its side effects and limitations, may make matters
worse. " " As the popularity of renewable energy enlarges, the improving "environmental" efficiency and decreasing costs may help facilitate the transition, but
will also elicit certain drawbacks.
Jevons Paradox derives from the principle that improvements in the efficiency with which one uses a natural resource, ultimately makes the resource
relatively cheaper and subsequently leads to the increased consumption of that
resource.5' The increased demand eventually depletes the resource, resulting
50. See genrally.lesse Jenkins et al., Beyond Boom & Bust Putting Clean Tech on a Path
to Subsidy Independence 7-11 (Apr. 2012), http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/BeyondBoom
and Bust.pdf (summarizing suggestions for policy reforms of U.S. clean energy sector).
51. Id. at 8.
52. Georgetown Utilityto be Powered by Solar and WindEnergyby2017,CITY OF GEORGETOWN (Mar. 18, 2015), https://geoi-getown.org/2015/03/18/georgetown-ulity-to-be-powered-bysolar-and-vind-energy-by-2017/; Daniel Gross, The Texas Town That Just Quit FossilFuels,
SLATE.COM (Mar. 23, 2015, 5:34 PM), htp://www.slate.com/articles/busiiess/the- juice/2015
/03/georgetown texas-goesienewable-why the town is droppingjfosil-fuels-for. hlnl.
53. See ibid.

54. Id.
55.

Georgetown Utility to be Powered by Solar and Wind Energy by 2017, supra note 52.

56.

OzZIE ZEHNER, GREEN ILLUSIONS: THE DIRTY SECRETS OF CLEAN ENERGY AND THE

FUJTURE OF ENTVIRONMENTALISM 177 (2012).
57. Id.
58. Richard York, EcologicalParadoxes: Wiliam StanleyJevons and the Paperless Office,
13 HUMAN ECOLOGY REVIEW 143, 143 (2006); David Owen, The Efficiency Dileina:If Our
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in negative environmental impacts. 9 Scholars primarily debate the dynamics of
increased energy efficiency within a fossil fuel context, such as coal, oil, and
natural gas." In contrast, by applying these principles to renewable energy, it is
also conceivable that improvements in the efficiency and availability of renewable energy sources will increase the infrastructure needed for the consumption
of resources by wind, solar, and hybrid vehicles." This will demand more copper and other raw materials, thus exacerbating and increasing the ecosystem
degradation associated with copper mining."
In 1865, an Englishman named William Stanley Jevons published The
Coal Question. These observations became the foundation for the Jevons Paradox, one of the most widely known phenomenon in the field of ecological
economics.' He observed that as Great Britain's coal industry improved its
efficiency, this facilitated the production of more goods per unit of coal, thus
increasing the consumption of this resource.' The improved efficiency ji
creased steam engines' popularity, while also intensifying coal's demand.' As a
result, production and consumption actually expanded because of the decreased price for the resource, despite the perceived benefits of better efficiency.
Moreover, "as efficiency increases, an energy source becomes more affordable and increasingly available to consumers."' Because economic growth will
continue to surpass gains in energy efficiency, illustrations of thejevons Paradox
appear at both micro- and macro-economic levels.' Within the context of the
1970s oil crisis, economist Len Brookes revisitedjevons' observations, referring
to the paradox as the "rebound effect."" In response to higher oil prices,
Brookes argued that by instituting ways to produce more goods with less oil, it
would only cause energy consumption to be higher than if one had exerted no
Machines Use Less Energy, Will We Just Use 77mem Moe?, NEW YORKER (Dec. 20, 2010),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/12/20/the-efficiency-dilenma.
59. ZEHNER, supra note 56, at 174.
60. See generally DAVID OwEN, THE CONUNDRUM: How SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION,
INCREASED EFFICIENCY, AND GOOD INTENTIONS CAN MAKE OUR ENERGY AND CLIMATE
PROBLEMS WORSE 33-37 (2011); Blake Alcott, Jevons' Paradox, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 9

(2005) (surveying scholarly debate on technological efficiency gains), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/
viewdoc/dowloaddoi-10. 1.1.233.1718&rep-rep1&type=pdf.
. 61. See, e.g., ZEHNER, supra note 56, at 43-46 (discussing wind power's and solar power's
impact on electrical grid).
62. See CARTER, supra at note 6,at 45.
63. See Brett Clark &John Bellamy Foster, William Stanleyjevons and the Coal Question:
An introductionto Jevons "s"Ofthe Economy ofFuel,"14 ORG. & ENV'T 93, 95 (2001).
64. Id. at 95 (quoting WILLIAM S.JEVONS, THE COAL QUESTION: AN INQUIRY CONCERNING
THE PROCRESS OF THE NATION, AND THE PROBABLE EXHAUSTION OF OUR COAL-MINES 140

(3d ed., rev. 1906)) ("It is wholly a confusion of ideas to suppose that the economical use of fuel
is equivalent to a diminished consumption. The very contrary is the truth.").
65. ZEHNER, supra note 56, at 174.
66. Eric Bonds & Liam Downey, "Green" Technology and Ecologically UnequalExchange:
The Environmentaland SocialConsequences ofEcologicalModernization in the World-System,
18J. OF WORLD-SYS. RES. 167, 170 (2012) (citation omitted).
67. See Michael M'Gonigle & Louise Takeda, The LiberalLimits ofEnwijonmental Law: A
Green Legal Cn~ique, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1005, 1082 (2013).
68. See Steve Son ell, Jevons'ParadoxRevisited: The Evidence for Backfire from Improved
Energy Efficiency, 37 ENERGY POL'Y 1456, 1456, 1461-63 (2009), http://www.sciencedirect.
com/science/article/pii/S0301421508007428.
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effort to increase efficiency." As Brookes explained, "if you increase the
productivity of anything, you have the effect of reducing its implicit price, because you''7get more return for the same money - which means the demand
goes up.
More recently, Harry D. Saunders suggested that "energy efficiency gains
will increase energy consumption above where it would be without these
gains."' This phenomenon suggests that "increased efficiency leadis] to a reduction in the price of the services, leading in turn to increased consumption of
services[.] " " The rebound effect is paradoxical because it "offsets the benefits
of the initial improvements in efficiency." 3 In fact, scholars suggest that "efficiency gains actually fuel macro-economic growth[.] . 7 For example, since 1975
the efficiency of fuel consumption in the aviation industry has increased by over
40 percent.7 Yet, with more passenger flights, the resulting increases in efficiency corresponded with a 50 percent increase in fuel consumption.7 6 Similarly, as renewable energy becomes more efficient and widespread, an intensified demand for copper - as well as the increased consumption and depletion
of this natural resource - will likely accompany any future growth in the "clean"
energy sector.
From a macro-economic perspective, efficiency savings actually increase energy consumption, "leaving overall energy footprints unchanged or even
larger."" The relationship between consumption and production becomes a
positive feedback, leading to the overexploitation of natural resources. This
intensifies the environmental consequences of pollution and resource depletion
across the globe. In regards to renewable energy's dependence on copper, the
world's largest copper mines are overexploited, and many have already reached
8
the peak level of resource output."
The ramifications are immense, particularly
because "global consumption of copper has soared in recent years... and every
leading producer has struggled to keep up with demand."" Resounding regulatory implications will likely become more apparent, as mining companies must
resort to seeking profits in politically-volatile and environmentally-sensitive areas of the world."

m.

COPPER IN RENEWABLE ENERGY

Copper is vital to the proliferation of renewable energy regimes. In comparison to traditional fossil fuels, renewable energy technologies use much more
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 1461.
Owen, suprm note 60, at 112.
Id. (citation omitted).
Bronin, supra note 33, at 1887 n.47.
Id. (emphasis added).
M'Gonigle & Takeda, supra note 67, at 1083.

75. Id

76. Id
77.
energy
effects
78.
79.
80.

ZEHNER, supra note 56, at 175; see also id. at 173 (explaining that "increasing alternativeproduction will not displace fossil-fuel side effects but will instead simply add more side
to the mix").
See KLARE, supra note 11, at 10.
Id.
datlo-11.

WATEL A WREVIEW

Volume 19

copper.8' "The use of copper helps reduce CO emissions and lowers the
amount of energy needed to produce electricity[.]" 82 Industry-wide attempts to
promote energy efficiency will also implicate copper because of its cost-effectiveness and conductivity, "8 The interconnected relationship intertwined in copper mining, renewable energy, and environmental law further emphasizes the
contradictory nature of the water-energy nexus. Despite the benefits of copper
within the realm of solar, wind, and other "green" technologies,' it is important
to recognize the environmental tradeoffs associated with this transition. This
reality presents formidable challenges: "Humankind faces a vicious circle: a shift
to renewable energy will replace one non-renewable resource (fossil fuel) with
another (metals and minerals). " '
According to a mining company executive, "increasing environmental
awareness is another emerging demand driver for copper,"' This occurs because the industry believes that increasing renewable energy production "presents an upside for copper demand[. " " As the capacity for renewable energy
production increases, so too will an additional global demand for raw materials,
and often in significant quantities. In fact, over the next forty years, researchers
acknowledge an impending five to eighteen percent annual increase of the
global production of copper and steel. As the exponential demand for these
base metals continues, scientists warn that "if this trend continues, the quantity
of metal production for the next 15 years will need to match that from the start
of humanity to 2013."9 To match the present capacity of fossil fuels, solar and
wind facilities will require up to fifty times more Iron, copper, and glass, as well
as ninety times more aluminum.'
Although copper is technically recyclable, it is not inherently recyclable
when it is sequestered over the lifespan of renewable energy infrastructure.'
The construction and continuous maintenance of renewable energy infrastructure requires large quantities of raw materials." From an economic perspective,
these base metals have no substitutes." Before considering the potential ramifications of increased copper production, it is imperative to recognize the relationship between copper and renewable energy.
A. ELECTRIC & HYBRID VEHICLES
Recent market trends suggest that sales of electric and hybrid vehicles will

81. See Bobby Magill, Study: Renewables as Green as You'd Expect, CLIMATE CENTRAL
(Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.climatecena-al.org/news/study-renewables-as-green-as-youd-expect-18
146.
82. A 21st Centzuy Solution, supranote 28.

83. Id.
84. See Magill, supra note 81.
85. Vidal et al., supra note 16, at 894.

86. Trussell, supra note 36.
87. Id.
88. See Vidal et al., supra note 16, at 896 (Figure 2).
89. Id.

90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Id.
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continue to increase, both in the United States and abroad." In comparison to
traditional fuel-burning vehicles, each hybrid car contains approximately twice
as much copper." Hybrid vehicles, primarily within their electrical cables and
motor, may require up to one hundred pounds of copper.' Copper's robust
conductivity will likely ensure that it remains an integral part of the electric vehicle industry, especially in comparison to suggested alternatives like aluminum." As the market for "green" vehicles advances to maintain a larger role in
the automotive industry, additional increases in copper demand and extraction
of these raw materials will assuredly flank any supposed environmental gains.
Martin Eberhard, co-founder of Tesla Motors, "8 championed the relationship between copper and electric vehicles: "The electric car is a key to our energy independence and our future. We expect copper to continue to lead the
way for our high-performance electric automobiles."" Through 2014, U.S. consumers have purchased over a quarter million "plug-in" electric vehicles." Even
alternative forms of mass transportation demand substantial quanties of copper. The average electric trolley, bus, or subway car contains over 2,000 pounds
of copper.'0 ' In addition, China may be a "sleeping giant" in the electric vehicle
market.' 2 This trend is likely to implicate copper production, particularly as
China expects to have more vehicles on the road than the United States within
the next decade."' As regulations that seek to reduce carbon emissions continue
to permeate the energy'"' and automobile sectors,'5 the stage may be set for a
showdown between those advocating for an increase in electric vehicles, and
those protesting the environmental impacts of copper mining.

94. See Ben Geier, Electric Vehicle Sales ChargedUp in 2014,FORTUNE.COM (Jan. 8, 2015),
hltp://fortune.com/2015/01/08/electric-vehicle-sales-2014/; Zachary Shahan, Electic CarSales in
EUncrease77%, CLEAN TECHNICA (Aug. 8, 2014) (showing robust electric car sales robust in
the European Union, particularly in France, Germany, and Norway), http://cleantechnica
con/2014/08/08/elect-ic-ca -sales-eu-increase-77/.
95. Harpreet Bhal, Glimer of Hope for Copper from Europe Green Energy Targe
REUTERS (Aug. 29, 2012) (citation omitted), htp://in.reuters.com/assets/piint?aid-INL6E8JL7
QP20120829 ("Each hybrid car contains roughly 34 kg 175 lbs.] of copper versus 19 kg 142 lbs.]
in the average fuel-burning car.1").
96. See Patrick Michaels, 77e Environmental ProtectionAgency Comes-a-Copper,FORBES
(May 12, 2011) http://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickmichaels/2011/05/12/the-environinental-piro
tection-agency-comes-a-copper/pint!.
97. Id.
98. Chuck Squatriglia, Tesla's Founder Sues Tesla's CEO,WIRED (June 11, 2009), http://
www.wired.com/2009/06/eberhard/.
99. Tesla Eleceic Roadster- Powered by Copper, COPPER DEv. ASS'N (2007), http:/www.co
pper.org/publicaions/newsletters/discover/2007/winter/article.html.
100. Jeff Cobb, Global Plug-in Car Sales Now Over 600,000, HYBRIDCARS (Oct. 22, 2014),
http://www.hybridcars.com/global-plug-in-car-sales-now-over-600000/.
101. See Copperin Your Car- Even Hybrids, COPPER MATTERS, http://coppcrmattcrs.org/
copper-powers-electric-cars/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2016).
102. Jim Motavalli, Forthe Electric Ca; A Slow Road to Success, YALE ENV'T 360 (lan. 26,
2012), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/for the electric car a slow-road to success/2488/.
103. Id.
104. See Clean Power Plan, Regulatory Actions, U.S. ENVYL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.
epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/regulatory-actions (last updated Feb. 11, 2016).
105. See Tansportationand Ai- Quality, Regulatory Actions, U.S. ENVTL.PROT. AGENCY,
https://www3.epa.gov/fueleconomy/regulations.htm (last updated Feb. 23, 2016).
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B. WIND FARMS & SOLAR INSTALLATIONS
Wind farms, consisting of multiple turbines across vast expanses, require
enonnous amounts of copper."' One scholar summarized this aberration as
follows: "Wind is renewable. Turbines are not."' ° In fact, a single wind turbine
requires approximately two tons of total copper within its generator and transformer." Since 1980, wind energy's cost has fallen eighty percent, a decline
that has continued as wind energy technology becomes more efficient." From
a policy perspective, it is important to consider the implications of escalating
copper production that will accompany these advances in wind technology.
According to one study that examined copper usage intensity in the U.S.
renewable energy sector, "land-based wind 'farms'... require between 5,600
and 14,900 pounds of copper per megawatt (lb/MW)..... Similarly, the infrastructure required to facilitate photovoltaic solar installations also requires significant quantities of copper."' In comparison, the copper usage intensity of
electricity generation from renewable energy sources may be four to six times
higher than that of fossil fuels."' To generate and distribute electricity, wind and
solar farms require electrical conduits in the form of copper wiring that often
stretches over vast distances."' The basic schematics of wind farms are indicative of further increases in the demand for copper. For instance, a wind farm
in Sweetwater, Texas, consumes over one hundred miles of copper wire to
maintain and generate electricity from its sixty-one turbines."'
Wind farms have two obvious requirements: a sufficient supply of moving
air, and expansive areas necessary to sustain a large number of these massive
turbines." Because turbines must be sufficient distances apart from one another, these wind farms can spread across expanses up to fifty square miles."6
Almost every feature in a wind farm implicates copper. The turbine for the
Sweetwater wind farm has a copper-wound transformer that uses at least 47,500

106. See Copper Dev. Ass'n, Coppers Role in Wind Generation,COPPER ALL, http://www.
copper.org/environment/sustainable-energy/pdF/CDA-Wind-Infographic.pdf (last visited Mar.
26, 2016).
107.
108.

ZEHNER, supra note 56, at 42.
See supra note 106.

109.

See Copperand Wnd Energy Partnersfor a Clean EnvironmentAustin UtilityEmpha2 Iherinafter Copperand WindEnergyi,

sizes Alternative Energy Sources, COPPER DEv. ASS'N,

http://www.copper.org/environment/sustainable-energy/renewables/wind/case-studies/a6101/
windenergya6101.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2016).
110. BBF Associates & Konrad J.A. Kundig, Market Study: Currentand Projected Wind and

Solar Renewable Electiic GeneratingCapacity and Resulting Copper-Demand(July 20, 2011),
http://www.copper.org/environment/sustainable-energy/renewables/educafion/Projected-windsolar-copper-demand.pdf.
11]. Id. (footnote omitted) (noting intensity for solar installations is between 5,400 to 15,432

lb/MW).
112. Copper: Essentil in PV Solar Power Growth, COPPER DEV. ASS'N, http://www.copper.
org/environment/sustainable-energy/pdf/CDA-Solar-Infographic.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2016).
113. See CARrER, supra note 6, at 45.
114. Id.
115. See Copperand Wind Energy, supra note 109, at 2.
116. Id. at 2; see id. ("To minimize aerodynamic interference, individual turbines can be
spaced as widely as five to nine rotor diameters apart in the prevailing wind direction and three
to five diameters apart in the perpendicular direction.").
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linear feet of copper cable.' 7 Moreover, that same turbine also has a grounding
system and conductors bonded to its tower that use an additional 30,000 linear
feet. '8 Astonishingly, the Sweetwater wind farm utilizes "more than 35miles of
copper low-voltage and grounding cable and more than 67 miles of copper in
the neutral conductors of high-voltage power cable."".. These substantial figures
do not even account for the copper sequestered by the turbines and transformers.120

The Copper Development Association also suggests that the metal is a "key
component of solar energy systems, increasing the efficiency, reliability and performance of photovoltaic cells and modules ."" Often covering expansive
fields, solar panel installations also require substantial amounts of copper cabling to comect the modules and arrays with the system.'" The demand for
copper will likely increase with recent advances in wholesale distributed generation, a concept that functions to connect large-scale solar projects with the energy-distribution grid.'"
C. "SMART" GRIDS & ENERGY-STORAGE TECHNOLOGY

Copper supports the integration, storage, and distribution of renewable energy. ' As the technology for grid-storage applications evolves, this may address
challenges with intermittency." In other words, energy storage is vital to the
"smart" electricity grid, particularly because it is essential to the transmission
and distribution of electricity derived from renewable energy.' 6 Energy-storage
schemes also address the challenge of coordinating an off-peak energy supply,
derived from wind and solar energy, with an on-peak energy demand.' To
connect energy-storage applications with the electric grid, these installations require an array of copper-dependent equipment. ' The copper demand of these
energy storage installations varies based on size and configuration.'" Although
the exact copper content fluctuates among various power transformers, breakers, generators, inverters, grounding wires, and monitoring systems - it is important to consider that, in the aggregate, extensive energy-storage applications
will require significant quantities of copper.'"0

117. Id. at 3.

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Copper: Essentialin PVSolar Power Growth, supra note 112.
122. See id.
123. See KEMA,INC., Market Evaluation for Energy Storage in the United States, COPPER

DEV.ASS'N, at 5-6, 6-4 (Jan. 2012), http://www.copper.ofg/about/pressreleases/pdfs/kema re
porLpdf.
124. See id. at 1-6, 6-4.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id., at 2-1, 2-7.
Id., at2-7.
Id., at 1-4, 1-5.
See id.
at 3-4.
See id. at 3-4, 3-5.
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IV. COPPER'S UTILITY & DESTRUCTION
A. THE UBIQUITOUS HISTORY OF COPPER
Predating written history, the story of copper is one of ubiquity throughout
the history of mankind. In fact, human civilizations first used copper almost
eight thousand years before the events in the Bible.' 3' The Egyptians, Greeks,
and Romans all mined for copper, as did the Incas.'32 Even the Native Indians
of North America recognized the benefits of copper, as they began utilizing the
metal as early as 6000 BCE' Described as the "perfect metal," copper is conductive, malleable, recyclable (to a limited extent), and does not decay or rust"
Because of copper's low price, coupled with its high electrical and thermal
conductivity, the metal continues to maintain a fundamental role in the modem
era." Today, copper is vital to the transport of electrical current, a utility that
represents a majority of the metal's yearly demand. Electrical applications of
copper includes wiring in buildings, vehicle motors, and appliances, as well as
industrial and utility power cables, transmission lines, and transformers.'37 Even
the human body depends on balancing the proper amount of copper within our
blood and circulatory system.'38 As we seek to embrace the contradiction within
the water-energy nexus, maybe the human body best illustrates a framework for
sustainability - the body dies without copper, yet the body also dies with too
much copper."

As civilization progresses, technological advancements will require vast
quantities of raw materials derived from copper mining.'" This transition to
renewable energy will implicate an extensive supply of copper and other minerals."' The planet's rapidly increasing population only compounds this challenge. "' As the nation's energy landscape embarks on this transition, "Itihe
switch from the finite store of fossil fuels to renewable sources could involve a
huge additional demand for the world's equally finite store of metals and minerals."'*3

131. See CARTER, supia note 6, at 34; see also id. ("[Tihe Bible has twenty-seven references
to copper, most of which depict God encouraging his people to live a better life in the pursuit of
the ore." "Urudu, the Sumerian word for the Euphrates, literally translates as 'copper river.'").

132.
133.

Id.
See id.

134. Id at 32-33 (noting copper's malleability allows people to work copper into its desired
shape without ever losing its chemical integrity).
135. See Rui Namorado Rosa, Copper: The Near-Peak Workhorse 97, in BARDI, supranote
18, at97.
136. See id.; Trussell, supra note 36.
137. See Trussell, supra note 36.
138. CARTER, supra note 6, at 35. Copper also helps the absorption ofiron, the nervous and
circulatory systems, and the development of muscle and bone. Id.
139. See id.
140. Id.at 46.
141. See id. (discussing need for zinc, cobalt, and iron).
142. See Dennis Dimick, As World's PopulationBooms, wil its Resources be Enough for
Us, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 21, 2014), http://news.ntionalgeographic.com/news/2014/09/
140920-populafion-1lbillion-demographics-anthropocene/ (projecting world population will be
9.6 billion by 2050).
143. Radford, supra note 1.
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B. "PEAK" COPPER
Despite extracting prodigious amnounts of copper throughout the amals of
civilization, copper production continues to increase, and we are currently producing more than ever.' Between 1956 and 2012, estimated global usage of
refined copper has increased from approximately four to twenty-one million
metric tons per year." Scientists emphasize that ime global production of copper, the "Near-Peak Workhorse,"'" "will increase until demand cannot be met
from much-depleted deposits[,] land] [a]t that point, production rwilpeak and
eventuallygo into dechne."7 This had previously occurred with U.S. oil production in the beginning of the 1970s."" Driven by economics, geology, and
technology, one copper model projects that production of the finite resource
will peak by the year 2040.' '
As a non-renewable mineral resource, copper ores are inherently finite and
exist in limited quantities.'" During the last half-century, copper production has
substantially increased at an annual rate of 2.3 percent ' 5' In fact, the global
copper market has expanded by thirty percent in the last decade.' Although
one may recycle copper, "the amount of copper that can be recycled at a certain
moment depends on the amount of copper that was put into use decades
ago[.1"'" Researchers predict that recycled copper will only have a minor impact
within the growing world economy, suggesting that the mining industry will seek
to develop new deposits to meet increasing demand. '
Despite increases in production, there are signs of copper's eventual depletion. l5 Most notably, the rate of copper extraction has exceeded the rate of new
copper discoveries over the past two decades.' 6 Not only have new important
copper discoveries been limited, but only a fraction of the world's largest copper
mines possess the capability for expansion."' Further complicating matters is
the fact that copper nining is also becoming more expensive and less profitable

144. See Rosa, supra note 135, at 97.
145. Int'l Copper Study Grp., The World CopperFactbook2014, at 39 (2014), http:/copper
alliance.org/wordpress/Ap-content/uploads/2012/01/ICSG-Facthook-2014.pdf.
146. Rosa, supra note 135, at 97.
147. Kerr, supra note 7, at 723 (emphasis added).
148. Id.
149. Id.; see also id. 723-24 (projecting that increasing copper production fifty percent would
push the peak to 2045 while quadrupling production would push the peak to 2075); see also
Tommy Humphreys, Peak Copper, MLNING.COM (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.mining.com/
web/peak-copper/ (discussing model's projections and its implications for mining projects).
150. See Rosa, supra note 135, at 97.

151.

Id.

152. Trussell, supra note 36.
153. J.H.M. Harmsen, A.L. Roes & M.K. Patel. 77e Impact of CopperScarcity on the Elhiciency of2050 Global Renewable EneargyScenanos, 50 ENERGY 62, 72-73 (2013); see also id at
67 (explaining copper recycling).

154. See id. at 72-73.
155. See Rosa, supra note 135, at 98.
156. Id.
157. Id. (footnote omitted) ("[Wihile the search for new resources has led to a remarkable
growth of the known reserves, the reserves-to-production (R/P) ratio has remained close to 30
years of supply.").
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primarily because of the declining mineral grades of extractable copper. ' The
copper reserves in many countries have either reached (or are close to reaching)
peak production, including those in the United States, Canada, Russia, Zambia,
and Zaire. "'
C. SURFACE WATER CONTAMINATION FROM COPPER MINING
The mining industry has powered our nation's economy, while also dramatically transforming our landscape. Because renewable energy requires substantial amounts of copper, the increased copper demand will result in more
open-pit mines, both domestically and internationally." In effect, these mining
processes will also instigate a myriad of destructive effects on the environment.''
Copper mining depletes the non-renewable resource, degrades ecosystems, and
yields vast carbon emissions."' Although mining technology has improved,
"[any process intended to extract a kilogram of metal locked in a ton of rock
buried hundreds of meters down inevitably raises issues of energy and water
consumption, land] pollution[.]" 1
The production of raw materials by the mining industry consumes ahnost
ten percent of the global energy budget."' Each stage of the mining process
requires energy, including the extraction, beneficiation, smelting, and refining
stages." As copper demand intensifies, so too will global mining efforts, increasing both energy expenditures and carbon emissions. l The problem becomes magnified if the mining industry seeks to augment production by extracting lower-grade ore." As the higher-quality, more accessible metals become
depleted, this will lead to an increasing energy requirement for production. 6"
Lower-graded mineral deposits require more energy to extract.6 In an econoric context, lower-graded minerals have a comparatively-high energy requirement, and a lower energy-return-on-investment ("EROI"). l'' Copper scarcity exacerbates these dynamrics by lowering ERGI values - cdmplicating the
ability for copper-dependent industries to form long-tenn strategies based on a
predictable mineral availability.''
The amount of toxic waste generated across the various stages of the copper
mining process is staggering. "' In comparison to other heavy metals, copper is
158. Id.
159. See id. at 100 (noting that Chile, Peru, Australia, Mexico, and Poland appear to not be
close to reaching peak copper production).
160.

See CARTER, supra note 6, at 45.
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among the most toxic in its effect on freshwater and marine species. 7' Each
stage in the aforementioned mining process also produces waste." For instance, the mining industry must extract almost three billion tons of total rock
and waste to produce fifteen million tons of copper."' Surface-mining is a process that removes rock and minerals from an open-pit until the mineral resource
is exhausted.'6 As one author explains, "[when they begin to strip the earth...
luitter destruction of what was there is the only possible outcome ..... In terns
of surface degradation, 156 hard-rock mining "Superfund" sites existed in the
United States in 2012. ' In Dr. D. Kirk Nordstrom's succinct fonnulation,
"[deaths of fish, rodents, livestock, and crops have resulted from mining activiies... since the days of the Greek and Roman civilizations..'.' An expert hydrologist in the field of mine water geochemistry, he described the challenges
associated with the Superfund designation: "[Riernediation of large inactive
mine sites... has proven to be extraordinarily difficult, complex, and expensive,
not to mention litigious."''

Environmental groups actively oppose large-scale mining projects because
of pollution to both surface water and groundwater supplies.'8 ' At the same
tine, these groups often support a reduction in carbon emissions in an effort to
mitigate climate change.' This conflict has become more aggravated because
"I M's]id and solar energy require massive amounts of copper, wtch means
more open-pit rmnes.
D. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RAMIFICATIONS OF RISING COPPER
DEMAND
International copper demand will likely increase, as countries like China
and India continue to industrialize, expand their respective power grids, and
develop massive infrastructure projects. '" In addition, societal and technological improvements within countries in the periphery further influence the global
demand for copper.' As third-world countries industrialize and become moredeveloped, corresponding infrastructure developments will implicate significant
quantities of copper.'6 Nevertheless, renewable energy technologies require an
173. David A. Wilkinson, UsingSection 404(c) of the Clean WaterAct to Prohibit the Unacceptable EnvironmentalImpactsofthe ProposedPebbleMne, 2 SEATTLEJ. ENVYL. L. 181, 188
(2012).
174. See BARDI, supra note 18, at 178.
175. See id.at 176.
176. See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1291 (28)(A) (2012) (defining "surface coal mining operations" under the act).
177. CARlTER, supra note 6, at 45.
178. Id. at 44.
179. D. Kirk Nordstrom & Charles N. Alpers, Negative pH, Efflorescent Mineralogy,and
Consequences foi Envronmental Restorationat the Iron Mountain Superfund Site, Cahfonia,
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extensive copper supply,'87 which "may also produce further environmental degradation, violence, and social disruption" in these less-developed countries. l"
Globally, mining for copper and other metals has resulted in significant environmental degradation, in both developed'89 and developing countries.'90 For
example, in West Papau, Indonesia, the Grasberg gold and copper mine contributes prodigious quantities of water pollutants into local rivers.'"' As the pollution flows into sensitive wetlands and estuaries, the mine waste is correlated
with extensive fish mortalities.'
Large-scale mining operations, particularly in less-developed countries, often implicate violence and human rights violations because of conflicts derived
from extreme divisions of wealth.' 7 Even more atrocious, in an effort to protect
mining production at the Grasberg mine, the Indonesian military "has been accused of rapes, extrajudicial killings, and other human rights abuses to suppress
the resistance of communities living near the mine."' 4 In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the government and a mining company allegedly orchestrated
arrests, tortures, and massacres of over one hundred individuals involved in an
anti-mining uprising in the city of Kilwa.9" Similarly, the Peruvian government
used violence to forcibly remove citizens from land on the site of the Tintaya
copper mine.
Most alarmingly, these water pollution disasters have taken place closer to
U.S. borders. More recently, defective "tailings" ponds at the Buenavista del
Cobre copper mine in Sonora, Mexico, released over ten million gallons of
toxic chemicals into the Bacanuchi River, a tributary of the Sonora River. "' This
2014 event left approximately twenty-five thousand people without clean water,
ruining crops, and contaminating the aquatic ecosystem with extensive heavy
metals.'
Although it is certainly inferential to suggest that more renewable energy
will directly result in these atrocities - something which this paper does not
purport to do - one should not ignore the potential for an increased copper
demand to exacerbate violence and ecosystem destruction, particularly in regards to energy regulatory schemes.

187. See CARTER, supra at note 6, at 45.
188. Bonds & Downey,supra note 66, at 168.
189. See Ken-, supia note 7, at 724.
190. See Bonds & Downey, supra note 66, at 180-81.
191. Id. at 177.
192. Id.
193. Seeid.at 180-81.
194. See id. at 177 (citation omitted).
195. Seeid.at 178.
196. See id. at 177-78.
197. Nathaniel Pawish Flannery, Mexican Mining GiantFaces Criticism After ChemicalSpill
Near US.Border,FORBES (Sep. 29, 2014, 7:46 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielpar
ishlannmery/2014/09/29/mexican-mining-giant-faces-criticism-after-chemical-spil-near-u-s-border/ (noting mine is located along the Mexico-Arizona border).
198. See id.

Issue 2

EMBRA CING THE WA TEl? ENERGY CONTIA4DICTION

V. PEBBLE MINE, ALASKA: THE REGULATORY INTERSECTION OF
RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
As renewable energy solidifies its role in the U.S. energy portfolio," ' it is
necessary to question where all this copper will come from and whether there
will be enough. Illustrating this conundrum, the Pebble Mine conflict perfectly
symbolizes the need to embrace contradictions in an effort to solve challenges
along the water-energy nexus. Located in southwest Alaska, the controversial
Pebble deposit lies adjacent to Bristol Bay, the world's largest sockeye-salmon
fishery.'
Described as "the largest known untapped copper deposit in the
world," Pebble Mine's potential impacts on the surrounding ecosystem demonstrates a "classic resource war."' As the renewable energy sector expands, Pebble Mine entails a certain dilemma for environmentalists who must determine
whether mining this copper deposit is worth the potential damage to a productive (and definitively sustainable) commercial salmon fishery. And if the tradeoff is not palatable, can we administer a solution that meets our future energy
demands without devastating these economically valuable ecosystems that many
claim to protect?
A. PEBBLE MINE'S SUBSTANTIAL COPPER DEPOSIT
For the past decade, Northern Dynasty Minerals Ltd. has planned to eventually seek permits that propose the development of Pebble Mine, one of the
world's largest deposits of copper, gold, and molybdenum."° After years of exploration and feasibility studies, the mining operation, known as the Pebble
Partnership ("PLP"), has initiated the long process of obtaining the applicable
state and federal permits for the project." The deposit contains an estimated
80.6 billion pounds of copper, 5.6 billion pounds of molybdenum, and 107.4
million ounces of gold."4 The total value of the deposit ranges from $100 billion
to $500 billion."5
According to PLP, development of Pebble Mine "could help power our
nation's green energy initiatives."'
As justification for its intent to mine the
Pebble deposit, and despite the region's ecosystem-sensitivity, ' PLP references
the important role of copper within wind fans, solar panels, and electric cars
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as a benefit of mining the Pebble deposit.' Moreover, PLP argues that this
domestic mining operation "has the potential to meet approximately 33% of
U.S. amual copper needs for many years. " "° PLP asserts that this operation
would promote resource independence, while also reducing the financial and
environmental costs of transporting raw materials from foreign sources." ' According to PLP, any projected growth in the renewable energy sector will also
demand an increase in copper production.!" Without the extraction of additional raw materials, PLP noted that an escalating copper price could detract
In addiion to
from the cost-effectiveness of wind energy or electric vehicles."'
potentially decreasing the carbon footprint, PLP believes that developing Pebble Mine would also provide many jobs and wealth to local communities."'
From a logistical perspective, operations at Pebble Mine will likely require
an extensive open-pit mine in the east reaches of the deposit complemented by
an equally substantial underground mine on the deposit's eastern edge. "' The
open-pit mine may reach depths of two thousand feet and cover expanses of
almost two square miles. ' The underground mine could extract minerals from
depths of up to five thousand feet."6 Extracting ore from Pebble Mine will require considerable infrastructure during the mine's lifespan of at least twentyfive years."7 The operation will likely need multiple dans to store toxic mine
"tailings," with each embankment attaining heights over seven hundred feet and
stretching three linear miles. ' Additional infrastructure requirements will likely
include pipelines, deep-water ports, roads, power plants, mills, various stream
diversions, and transmission lines. 9 As a porphyry copper deposit, the extracted ore will contain less than one percent copper by volume." This compounds the environmental hinplications because the mining process at Pebble
Mine will likely yield an estimated ten billion tons of excess rock and waste in
the massive "tailings" reservoirs."'
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B. POTENTIAL DEVASTATION TO SALMON SPAWNING TRIBUTARIES
Given its proximity to Bristol Bay, the potential ecological impact of an extensive mining operation has elicited headlines such as "Is Alaska's Pebble
Mine the Next Keystone XL?"" Perhaps the headline should instead read: "Is
Alaska's Pebble Mine the Renewable Eneigy Version of the Keystone XL7"2'
The proposed Pebble Mine's location is in close proximity to the Kvichak and
Nushagak rivers' major salmon spawning tributaries, an alarming location because of the region's hydrologic connectivity. 4 The Bristol Bay watershed
maintains the largest commercial sockeye salmon fishery in the world.' This
commercial salmon fishery yields an estimated $120 million in annual revenues,
an economic benefit that if managed correctly, will generate considerable income in perpetuity. 6 The large-scale mining endeavor has potential to leach
toxic metals into ground and surface waters, threatening this sustainable resource. 227
Because of its incredible genetic biodiversity, the sockeye salmon population in this region maintains its commercial productivity.' Sockeye salmon are
anadromous, meaning they are born hifreshwater rivers before spending a majority of life at sea, at which point they then return to their freshwater origins to
spawn and die.21 The genetic biodiversity of the population reduces the yearto-year variability of the number of salmon returning to freshwater, thus ensuring that the ecosystem retains its vitality." The watershed also has cultural significance, providing native villages with subsistence resources, while also supporting remarkable opportunities for recreational hunting and fishing."
Another cause for concern is the seismically-active nature of the region and the
potentially destructive effects of an earthquake to the embankments."
The Pebble Mine conflict has divided Alaskans along unusual party lines.
In 2010, an unlikely alliance of commercial fishermen, native tribes, environmentalists, "Redneck Republicans," and worried Alaskans, embraced their
sometimes contradictory interests in an effort to resolve a challenge at this contentious intersection of the water-energy nexus." These groups requested that
the EPA preliminarily review Pebble Mine's potential ecological impacts." In
what has been the source of much litigation, the EPA drafted a report entitled
An Assessment ofPotentialMining Impacts on Sahnon Ecosystems ofBristol

222. Narula, supra note 201.
223. See id.
224. Wilkinson, supra note 173, at 182-83.
225. Id. at 183.
226. See Dobb, supra note 205.
227. Wilkinson, supra note 173, at 183.
228. Ray Hilborn et al., Biocomplexily and FisheriesSustaiabibiy,100 PROCEEDINGS NAT'L
AcAD.Scis. 6564, 6564 (2003).
229. See id. at 6565.
230. Id. at 6567; Daniel E. Schindler et al., PopulationDiversityand the PortfohioEffect in an
Exploited Species, 465 NATURE 609, 609 (2010).
231. Id. atapp. 1.
232. Seismic Risk at the Pebble Mine, OUR BRISTOL BAY, http://www.ourbristolbay.coi
/factsheets/Seismic.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
233. Narla,supra note 201.
234. Id.

WATER LA WREVIEW

Volume 19

Bay, Alaska ("Assessment") to predict the impacts of a hypothetical copper
mine in the region'
The controversy centers on whether the economic benefits of copper production ultimately outweigh the possible negative costs to Bristol Bay." Many
Alaskans are concerned with the fact that Pebble Mine would be the largest
mining operation ever attempted in the state because it is "in a place where all
the water is interconnected and the well-being of the world's largest salmon run
depends on the whole ecosystem remaining intact.""' These potential environmental implications may be an indirect consequence of the renewable-energy
rebound effect" and associated increases in copper production. " An overarching regulatory approach that chooses between salmon or renewable energy
largely misses the point of natural resource management. Instead, the solutions
to present and future challenges within the water-energy nexus reside in policy
regimes that facilitate decision-making on a case-by-case basis - thereby incorporating all economic, environmental, and political perspectives, and thus embracing the inevitable contradictions.
C. EPA'S "PREEMPVTWE VETO" OF PEBBLE MINE UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER AcT
PLP must acquire sixty-seven pernits to sufficiently advance Pebble Mine
through the permitting stage and into production." Although sixty-six of these
are state-level permits, the sole federal permit has been the thus far interminable
source of conflict. 4' Pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"),
the regulatory jurisdiction of the EPA and Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps")
extends over the "navigable waters" of the United States, which includes navigable rivers, streams, and wetlands."' Pebble Mine is within the Section 404jurisdiction of the Corps and EPA because the potential mining operation would
require the construction of stream diversion channels, as well as discharge of
"dredged-or-fill material" into regulated waters."
From a procedural standpoint, the Corps issues permits for the disposal of
the discharged material." As a precautionary measure, the EPA has oversight

235. See Complaint 1 8, Pebble Ltd. P'ship v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 3:14-cv-00199HRH (D. Alaska, Oct. 14, 2014), 2014 WL 5653282; EPA Science Inventory, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, https://cfpub.epa.gov/si/si public record report.cfm?dirntryd=253500 (last
visited Apr. 2, 2016).
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authority such that the Corps must adhere to EPA regulations when issuing permits to dispose at specified sites." Section 404(c) authorizes the EPA to prohibit specific permits, particularly if the dredging-or-filling "will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds .ad...
1isheiy areas (includingspawning and breeding ares,), wildlife, or recreational
areas."" Despite the EPA's broad authority under Section 404(c), this preemptive or proactive veto process must follow specific procedures before it can prohibit permitting at a specific site. 47 These procedures include a notice-and-comments-period before the agency's final determination. " Since 1980, the EPA
has used its veto authority to prohibit only thirteen projects that were permitted
under Section 404(c)
The EPA, however, has neverprohibited a dredge-orfill project before the operation even applied for the necessary permits - Pebble
Mine would be the first." °
In early 2014, the EPA "invokeled] section 404(c)... and temporarily pre2 1
ventled] the Army Corps from issuing any mining permits in Bristol Bay."
Amidst controversy, some describe the EPA's actions as "biased" and "beyond
federal overreach."... PLP responded by filing suit in federal district court, seeking an injunction against the EPA's use of its Section 404(c) veto authority."
PLP then initiated litigation against the EPA in mid-2014;' 4 alleging that the
agency violated both the Freedom of Information Act (,FOIA")" and the Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA")."" In late 2014, the United States
District Court of Alaska ("Court") granted the preliminary injunction to temporarily halt the EPA from proceeding with its Section 404(c) veto process." As
of February 2016, the effect of the court's injunction is a de facto standoff on
the Alaskan frontier: the EPA cannot move forward to veto and block the mining operation from obtaining the necessary permits, whereas PLP cannot even
apply for the necessary "dredge-and-fill" permit pursuant to the CVVA.25
As part of the 2014 lawsuit concerning FOIA, PLP alleged that the EPA
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improperly withheld documents under the FOIA's deliberative process exemption in response to PLP's discovery request-6 In its complaint, PLP sought
documents and information concerning the Pebble deposit, including internal
communications by EPA officials, as well as their communication with alleged
anti-mining groups." The purpose of the request, according to PLP, "was to
understand and document (i) EPA's surreptitious decision to veto the Pebble
Mine in late 2010, and (ii) EPA's non-public and secretive meetings with those
dedicated
to stopping the project before a permitting process could even
2 62
start."
The FACA lawsuit stermned from its belief that the EPA's scientific analysis
in the Assessment lacked objectivity and placed undue importance on information submitted by anti-mining groups. 3 PLP argued that the EPA improperly formed and utilized the advisory committees that contributed to the Assessment.2 In PLP's 138-page Complaint for Declaratoryand Injunctive Rel'ef
PLP referenced an "Anti-Mine Coalition" that served as an advisory committee
in drafting the Assessment.2 This group included various non-governmental
organizations, anti-mine activists, and lobbyists'
On January 12, 2016, the Court partially resolved PLP's requests in both
of PLP's lawsuits against the EPA.2 " The Court issued a slip opinion based on
an in camera review of discovery documents regarding the EPA's discretionary
release of documents and PLP's allegation that the EPA improperly withheld
other documents.2 ' The opinion did not side with one party regarding the documents, and more importantly, it did not resolve the FACA or FOIA claims.
Following the Court's order that the EPA reevaluate all of the fully withheld
documents, PLP may get the opportunity to further explore the EPA's extensive
records pertaining to the Pebble Mine."' Presumably, the extensive discovery
process will continue for PLP, as the Court did not resolve the EPA's motion
for summary judgment on its FOIA compliance."
With regard to navigating these legal hurdles, both parties must be cognizant of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") of the more than likely eventual achninistrative review of the EPA's decision."2 Moreover, both parties must
be cognizant that the EPA's decision is subject to judicial review... and that the
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court will likely review under the arbitrary and capricious standard'
Considering that the EPA has never before issued a preemptive veto in this contexty'
this matter may have potential for a successful appeal. PLP's best chance to
proceed with the mining operation is to not only prohibit the EPA's preemptive
veto, but also to promote the traditional Section 404 permit application process
under the purview of the Corps . 6 and corresponding review under the National
Environmental Policy Act. 77
The Pebble Mine saga depicts a conflict at the confluence of energy and
environmental law, especially in the context of the EPA's overarching regulatory
schemes. "Pursuant to its environmental agenda," as Daniel Kish, an executive
at the Institute for Energy Research, describes, "the EPA should consider the
effects of a limited copper supply on renewable energy development and electric cars.". 8 Kish further stated that " [i] f the EPA truly cares about environmental protection, it should promote, rather than restrict copper development... 9
These conflicts may become more prevalent as evidenced by a 2014 global mining survey ranking Alaska in the top ten most favorable jurisdictions for investment attractiveness based on mineral endowment and favorable policy for natural resource development."
VI. CONCLUSION: RECONCILING REGULATORY CONTRADICTIONS
The Pebble Mine conflict, in the context of the water-energy nexus, even
elicits a personal contradiction. As an ecologist, I appreciate the potential danger associated with a mining operation in the sensitive Alaskan watershed. But
at the same time, I find equally intriguing the remarkable investment opportunities at Pebble Mine, especially in relation to an expanding market for renewable energy." '
In 2012, a political columnist lambasted the Obamna administration for its
apparently inconsistent energy policies, suggesting that "at the same time that it
is promoting wind energy, the [administration] and its environmentalist allies
are seeking to scuttle the development of a crucial component in wind turbines:
copper... In contrast, those who promote a case-by-case approach to the nation's energy policy should instead embrace this apparent contradiction. Aspects of the Pebble Mine conflict illustrate the type of beneficial compromise
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281. See Powers, supia note 36, at 605-06.
282. Grover G. Norquist & Patrick Gleason, W.H. All Talk on Wind Energy, POLITICO
(Sept. 24, 2012, 9:05 PM), http://www.polifico.com/news/stories/0912/81603.html.
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that arises when our regulatory schemes embrace the water-energy contradiction.' When groups from seemingly irreconcilable ends of the spectrum can
find their interests aligned in opposition of Pebble Mine - including organizations such as Natural Resources Defense Council,"4 Delta Waterfowl,' Dallas
Safari Club,' and even Tiffany & Co. Jewelers"7 - it becomes conceivable that
the United States can better prepare for future energy challenges by acknowledging these regulatory ambiguities.
Moreover, particular aspects of the current national energy regulatory
scheme may be "oblivious to posiive facts about fossil fuels and... susceptible
to negative fabncationsabout fossil fuels [.]"' In the alternative, perhaps society
should question the ramifications if the inverse is also true - and inquire
whether the United States is actually oblivious to negative facts about renewable
energy, while being more susceptible to their positive fabrications. With regards
to the national energy policy, regulations should consider cumulative inpact on
land and ecosystems by crafting law that deliberately avoids "rushing to rank
priorities."'
Renewable energy's dependence on non-renewable copper' portrays the
fact that most energy technologies maintain benefits and drawbacks, as evidenced by the ongoing Pebble Mine conflict."' Taken even further, particularly
in light of reconciling these pervasive water-energy challenges,' perhaps there
should at least be an inquiry as to the benefits of an energy policy that does not
outright vilify fossil fuels. For example, examining the potential economic and
ecological prosperity within a scheme that embraces another distinct contradiction could be beneficial, such as between fossil fuels and climate change regulations. Nevertheless, as technological advancements continue to implicate novel
challenges along the water-energy nexus, recognizing potential contradictory solutions may yield lasting benefits.

283. See supra PartV.
284. See Robert Redford, Opinion, RobertRedford's Plea:Save BnstolBay,L.A. TIMES (May
24, 2013), http://ar-icles.IaTimes.conm/2013/may/24/opinion/a-oce-redford-bristol-bay-mining-201
30524.
285. LUtter to Senate Members of Committee on Appropriations Concerning Proposed Pebble Mine, WILDUFE.ORG (Apr. 3, 2015), http://wildlife.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/T'WS
News-BristolBayL-tter.pdf.
286. See id.
287. See Blame Harden, ffipples from Pebble FeltFarfrom Alaska, GUARDIAN (July 23 2012,
12:28 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/juV23/pebble-mine-alaska-environment-salmon-indigenous-people.
288.

ALEX EPSTEIN, THE MORAL CASE FOR FOSSIL FUELS 193 (2014).

289. Outka, supra note 38, at 244.
290. See CARTER, supra note 6, at 45.
291. See supra PartV.
292. See Kerr, supra note 7, at 724.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Winters v. United States, the United States Supreme Court established
the doctrine of federal reserved rights to water.' Over one hundred years later,
courts continue to define the exact contours of the doctrine and tribal assertions
of water rights are bitterly contested. This Article analyzes two of the last open
issues in the law of federal reserved rights to water: (i) whether tribal reserved
water rights apply to groundwater; and (ii) whether tribal federal reserved water
rights can exist in a non-prior appropriation system of water law.
The doctrine of federal reserved rights has been litigated almost exclusively

*
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within the context of the prior appropriation system of water rights To date,
"[nmo court has adjudicated a tribal reserved rights claim in a riparian jurisdiction."' In fact, Felix Cohen's Hand Book of Federal Indian Law, the leading
Indian law treatise, definitively stated in 1982 that "iI] ndian water rights cannot
be understood apart from the prior appropriation system" of water law.' Read
in context, this statement was not meant to suggest that tribal reserved rights do
not exist in non-prior appropriation systems of water law. Rather, the statement
merely acknowledged that "Iti he doctrine of Indian reserved rights to water has
developed against the backdrop of the state prior appropriation system...
In regard to whether tribal reserved rights apply to groundwater, over the
last fifteen years the tide has definitively shifted towards finding such a right.6
The United States Supreme Court, however, has yet to rule on the issue. Additionally, all but one court to apply the reserved rights doctrine to groundwater
has done so in states with a prior appropriation system of groundwater management.7 Thus, one of the last unanswered questions in the law of tribal reserved
water rights is the question of whether tribal reserved rights extend to groundwater in a non-appropriation based system -of groundwater management. In
light of the persistent drought throughout the Southwestern United States, and
the increasing reliance on groundwater throughout the region, it remains one of
the most important unresolved issues.
A federal district court in California recently heard this issue in the case of

8
Agua Caiente Band of Cahuilla IncHans v. Coachella Valley Water Disrict.

On March 20, 2015, the United States District Court for the Central District of
California held that the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians ("Agua Caliente" or "Tribe") held reserved water rights that could encompass groundwater contained in the Coachella Valley Groundwater basin.' In so holding, the
court added to a growing body of authority extending tribal reserved water rights
to groundwater.'" Interestingly, because California manages its groundwater under a correlative rights framework, the case was only the second to find the
existence of such a right in a non-appropriation based system of water management." Recognizing the novelty and importance of this issue, the district court
certified an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit on the specific question of

2. SeeJudith V. Royster, Winters in the East: TribalReserved Jghts to Waterin Ripaian
States, 25 WM. & MARY ENVrL. L. & POE'Y REv. 169, 169 (2000); but see In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 989 P.2d 739, 747-48 (Gila III)
(Ariz. 1999) (holding that tribes may seek Winters rights to groundwater despite Arizona's reasonable use system of groundwater management).
3. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 1206 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012)
[hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK].
4. RENNARD STRICKLAND ET AL-, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 576
(Reimard Strickland et al., eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN'S 1982 HANDBOOK].

5. See Royster, supra note 2, at 173.
6. See discussion infra Section II.C.
7. See Gila I1, 989 P.2d at 748.
8. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., No. EDCV 13883-JGB, 2015 WL 1600065, at * 1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2015).
9. Id.at *7.
10. Infra Section II.C.
11. See Agua Caliente, 2015 WL 1600065 at *11.
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"[w]hether Winters rights extend to groundwater, in light of California's correlative rights legal framnework for groundwater allocation...,,
The Ninth Circuit is the first federal court of appeals in over forty years to
directly address the issue of whether the Winters Doctrine extends to groundwater."3 Furthermore, because no federal court has addressed the question of
whether the Winters Doctrine applies in riparian jurisdictions, it is also the first
federal court of appeals to examine the general issue of whether the Winters
Doctrine applies in a non-prior appropriation system of water administration.
This question presents the Ninth Circuit with a unique opportunity to fully examine the underlying rationale, purpose, ard fundamental principles of the
Winters Doctrine. 4 In fight of the ninportance of this issue, this Article seeks to
build on existing scholarship and case law to present a comprehensive legal
framework for addressing the question of whether the Winters Doctrine extends to groundwater regardless of a state's system of water administration."
The Article proceeds in four parts. To put the arguments and issues in
context, Part II provides a brief overview of the relevant state systems of water
law and an introduction into the law of federal reserved water rights. Part II
also analyzes the current state of the law in relation to federal reserved rights to
water law. Part HI discusses the history and background that led to the Agua
Caliente litigation, and examines the court's decision to affum the Tribe's federal reserved right to groundwater. Part IV examines the open question of
whether tribal reserved rights apply to groundwater in light of California's correlative rights framework for groundwater allocation. Part IV also studies the
arguments being presented on appeal as to why the Winters Doctrine should
not apply outside a prior appropriation regime, and concludes by presenting a
12.

Id. at *I11*12.

13. As will be discussed infra Section I.C.1, in United States v. CappaerA 508 F.2d 313, 317
(9th Cir. 1974), the Ninth Circuit held that the reserved rights doctrine drdapply to groundwater.
However, the Supreme Court's subsequent holding that the water at issue was actually surface
water puts the validity of the Ninth Circuit's holding into question.
14. Over the years, as the Winters Doctrine became increasingly established, courts spent
"little time discussing the basis of the doctrine; litigation relates primarily to quantity and use of
water rather than whether water rights exist." See Taiawagi Helton, Indkin Reserved WaterRights
in the Dual-System State of Oklahoma, 33 TULSA LJ.979, 981 (1998).
15. Numerous authors analyzed the issue of whether federal reserved rights apply to groundwater. See,e.g., Judith V. Royster, Indrn 7ihalRights to Groundwater,15 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'y 489, 489 (Spring 2006). Most of these works, however, have stopped short ot fully analyzing the issue presented in Agua Cahente. See Stephen V. Quesenbeny et. al., 7 blia
Strategies
for Protectngand PreservingGroundwater, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 431, 453-54 (2015)
(noting that the Arizona Supreme Court considered "whether groundwater not subject to prior
appropriation under state law was susceptible to the federal reserved right of the Winters case[,]"
but acknowledging the unsettled nature of the issue); see alsoJoanna (Joey) Meldn-m, Reservaton and Quantilication of Indian GroundwaterRights in Caifornia, 19 HASTINGS W.N.W.J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 277 (2013) (acknowledging the Arizona Supreme Court's holding, but suggesting that California cownts should extend the Winters doctine to groundwater based on a
"recognition of the hydrological connection between ground and surface water"). Additionally,
other authors have discussed the issue of whether Winters rights exist in a riparian rights system
without discussing how those theories might impact the giroundwater question. See Royster, supra
note 2;Hope M. Babcock, Reserved ndian Water Rights in RianJur'sdicgons:Water, Water Everywhere, Perhaps Some Drops Ibr Us, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 1203, 1203 (2006). Thus,
the purpose of this Article is to add to the existing body of scholarship on tribal reserved rights
by analyzing these two issues in conjunction as they have been presented to the court in Agua
Calkente.
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comprehensive legal framework for why Wjiters applies even in a correlative
rights system of water administration. Finally, Part V discusses the important
practical implications that could result from a favorable Ninth Circuit decision
for the Tribe.
II. STATE SYSTEMS OF WATER LAW AND FEDERAL RFERVED RIGHTS
A. PRIOR APPROPRIATION, RIPARIAN RIGHTS, AND CORRELATIVE RIGHTS

The doctrine of prior appropriation reigns supreme in Western water law. 6
The prior appropriation system "establishes a firm and specific hierarchy
among users," through its "first in time, first in right" principle. 7 Rather than
correlating water rights with land ownership, the prior appropriation system
treats water as an independent usufructuary right.'8 Under the prior appropriation system, a water user obtains a water right by: (i) diverting water from its
natural course; and (ii) putting that water to beneficial use." The beneficial use
prong serves to define the extent of the right,' while the diversion prong establishes the right's priority.' Thus, under the prior appropriation system, those
who divert and put their water to beneficial use obtain a vested property right to
use a specific amount of water." In times of scarcity, those with rights "senior"
in time may claim priority over all those with rights "junior" in time."
The legal counterpart to the appropriative regime is the doctrine of riparianism. In riparian systems of water law, water rights are derived not from use,
but from land ownership." Under the riparian rights doctrine, water rights are
not subject to a priority-based system of administration, and rights holders are
not guaranteed a specific quantity of water.' Rather, "[elvery riparian landowner enjoys a right to make 'reasonable' use of [the] water" adjoining her property. 26
California's correlative rights system 2l of groundwater management closely

16. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, PriorAppropriation:A Reassessment 18 U. DENV. WATER
L. REV. 228, 229 (2015) (noting that seventeen western states have adopted the prior appropriaion system).

17. Reed D. Benson, Alive but Irrelevant The PiorAppropnation Doctrine in Today's
Western Water Law, 83 U. CoLo. L. REV. 675, 682 (2012).
18.

Anthony Scott & Georgina Coustalin, The Evolution of Water Rights, 35 NAT. RE-

SOURCFSJ. 821, 927 (1995).
19. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 79 (5th ed. 2015).
20. See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 53 n.7 (Colo.
1999).
21. See Benson, supra note 17, at 682.
22. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 805 (1976).
23. Id.
24. See Benson, supra note 17, at 679; see also GEYCHES, supra note 19, at 57.
25. Benson, supra note 17, at 679.
26. Id.
27. California's system of groundwater management actually recognizes three types of water
rights: overlying, appropriaive, and prescriptive. See City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency,
5 P.3d 853, 863 (Cal. 2000). As discussed above, the correlative right afforded an overlying
landowner serves as the dominant, and predominant, form of groundwater right, and is subject
only to the limitation of reasonable use. Id. Water users seeking to use water on land that does
not overlie the groundwater basin may acquire an appropriative right to use surplus groundwater
from a basin not in overdraft, but that right will be subordinate to the correlative rights of all
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mirrors rparianism.' In California, an "overlying" landowner has the inherent
right to withdraw all the groundwater "that he can beneficially use on his land[,]"
subject only to the correlative rights of other overlying landowners.' In times
of scarcity, correlative rights, like riparian rights, are apportioned equally among
overlying landowners." Under the correlative rights system, the pro rata share
of each overlying landowner is determined based "solely on his current reasonable and beneficial need for water."3 Thus, a landowner can neither lose a
correlative right through non-use nor can prior use of other landowners preempt that right."
B. FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS: THE WINTERS DOCTRINE
In Winters v. UnitedStates, the United States brought suit to assert its legal
right to water for the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation.' Under the May 1888
treaty establishing the reservation, the Milk River served as the northern boundary of the reservation, and the tribes utilized Milk River water for irrigation and
ranching." Concurrent with the tribes' initial use of water, however, non-Indian
irrigators began to divert Milk River water upstrean from the reservation.' In
1905, a drought prevented the tribes from receiving their full allotment of water,
and the Uited States brought suit to establish the priority and extent of the
tribes' water rights.'
The non-Indian irrigators claimed that they had successfully appropriated
a senior right to use 5,000 miners' inches of water prior to the United States' or
the Fort Belknap Reservation Indians' appropriation of Milk River water." The
Court, however, held that the exact date the tribes' began their diversions was
inconsequential; under the 1888 treaty the Federal Government impliedly reserved, and exempted from appropriationunder state law, all waters necessary
to fulfill the "federal government's purpose of transforming [the Indians] from
hunters and gatherers to a pastoral people."' As a result, the Court held that
the Fort Belknap Indians had a prior and paramount water right, which vested

overlying landowners within the basin. See Quesenberry, supra note 15, at 445. Additionally, in
over-drafted basins, where no surplus water exists, a water user may acquire a prescriptive right
through open and hostile use ofnon-surplus water for the statutory period of five years. Cahfonna
Water Serv. Co. v. Edward Sidebotham & Son, Inc., 224 Cal. App. 2d 715, 726 (Cal. Ct App.
1964).
28. See City ofBarstow,5 P.3d at 863.
29. Tehachapi-Cummings Cnty. Water Dist., v. Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1975).
30. Id.; see alsoGETCHES, supra note 19, at 36; COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 1205.
31. See Tehachapi-Cummings Cnty. Water DisL, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
32. See id. ("The proportionate share of each of each owner is predicated not on his past use
over a specified peiod of time, nor on the ime he commenced pumping.. ."); see also GETCHES,
supra note 19, at 57.
33. 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908).
34. Id. at 565-67.
35. Id. at 567.
36. See COHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 1208.
37. Winters, 207 U.S. at 568-69.
38. Id. at 576-77; COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 1208 (emphasis added).
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on May 1, 1888, to all the water necessary to fulfill the purposes of the reserva-

tion."
This

holding established the modem federal reserved rights
doctrine.'
Later Supreme Court cases affirmed the doctrine and further established its
governing principles."

In 1976, in Cappaerl v.Urned States, the Supreme

Court issued what leading water law authorities consider the "most succinct and
lucid statement of the governing principles of reserved water rights:""
[Wihen the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain
and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves
appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish
the purpose of the reservation. In so doing the United States acquiresa reservedrightin unappropriatedwater which vests on the date ofthe reservation
and is superiorto the tights of future appropriators.4

The Court's language in Cappaertmakesclear one of the primary rationales
underlying the decision mi Winters was that "if [ithe] water had not been reserved, it would have been subject to appropriation by non-Indians under state
law."' The question that Agua Caliente presents, and which this Article explores, is whether the Winters Doctrine applies with equal force under a water
management system where a tribe has a present right to extract all the groundwater that it can put to beneficial use, subject only to the correlative rights of
other landowners.
C. FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS TO GROUNDWATER

As mentioned in Part I, there is a growing body of case law extending the
Winters Doctrine to groundwater.' The Supreme Court, however, has not spoken definitively on the issue, and consciously avoided its only chance to address
the question.' The following section analyzes cases to provide the necessary
context on the current state of the law related to federal reserved rights to
groundwater, and to show why the question on appeal in Agua Calienteremains
open despite these decisions.

39. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
40. See id.
41. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963); Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp.
383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
42.

COHEN'S 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 576; In State ofAnlzona v. State of Califor-

nia, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963), the Supreme Court expanded the doctrine of federal reserved
ights to apply to both Indian and non-Indian lands.
43. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) (emphasis added).
44. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 46 (9th Cir. 1981); but see, e.g.,
David H. Getches, The Unsettling of the West How Indians Got the Best Water Rights, 99
Mich. L. Rev. 1473, 1480-81 (2001) ("IRliparian law had been repudiated in Montana when the
Winters case was filed").
Cappaer 426 U.S. at 138; In re Gen. Adjudicaion of All Rights to Use Water
45. See, e.g.,
in Gila River Sys. & Source, 989 P.2d 739, 751 n.6 (Ariz. 1999).
46. See Cappaer 426 U.S. at 142.
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1. Cappaert v. United States
Cappaert v. United States was the first and only United States Supreme
Court case to discuss the issue of whether federal reserved rights extend to
groundwater. 7 In Cappaert,the United States filed suit to assert federal reserved waters rights to an underground pool in Devil's Hole National Monument in Nevada and to enjoin a nearby ranch's groundwater pumping.' On
appeal from a district court ruling in favor of the United States, the Ninth Circuit
expressly held that the Winters Doctrine includes both surface water and
groundwater."
On appeal, the Supreme Court acknowledged both the Ninth Circuit's
holding and the fact that whether the doctrine of implied reservation of water
rights applied to groundwater remained an open question under Supreme
Court precedent. 5 The Court, however, chose to affirm on alternative grounds,
categorizing the water in the pool, not as groundwater, but as surface water."
Thus, in Cappaert, the Court expressly refused to extend the Wnite, -Doctrine
to groundwater. It held only that the United States could enjoin hydrologicallyconnected groundwater pumping when it interferes with a federal reserved right
to surface water." Additionally, in coming to this conclusion, the Court explained "Nevada itself may recognize the potential interrelationship between
surface and groundwater since Nevada applies the law of prior appropriation to
both."
While the Court in Cappaertdidnot expressly hold that the reserved rights
doctrine applies to groundwater, the opinion does contain language broadly defining the purpose of the Winters doctrine.' Specifically, the Court stated:
"since the implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine is based on the necessity
of water for the purpose of the federal reservaton, we hold that the United
States can protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether the diversion is
, 5
ofsurface or groundwater."
Despite this broad language, it must nevertheless
be acknowledged that the Court had the opportunity to extend the Winters
doctrine to groundwater and consciously declined to do so.' Thus, the question
Cappaertleaves us with, is why did the Court refuse to extend the doctrine of
reserved rights to groundwater? Clearly, one explanation is simple judicial restraint, but restraint from what? One possible explanation is that the Court

47. Seeid.at 131.
48. 426 U.S. at 131-35.
49. United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313, 317 (9th Cir. 1974). Interestingly, as a basis for
this holding, the court relied, at least in part, on the fact that Nevada applies the principles of
prior appropriation to both surface and groundwater. Id. at 317 n.4.
50. Cappaeiz 426 U.S. at 142.

51.

Id.

52.

See id. ("The federal water rights were being depleted because, as the evidence showed,

the (g)roundwater and surface water are physically interrelated as integral parts of the hydrologic
cycle." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
53. Id
54. See id. at 143.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 137, 142; see also Debbie Leonard, Doclnnal Uncertaintyin the Law of Fedcral
Reserved Water Rights: The PotentialImpact on Renewable Energy Development, 50 NAT.
RrsOURCFsJ. 611, 620 (2010).
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seemed to understand the legal difference between hydrologically-connected
groundwater and confined aquifers, and was, at the least, reluctant to broadly
extend the Winters doctrine to the latter.6'
2. Post-CappaertFinding a Reserved Right to Groundwater
Since Cappaert,almost every court to address the issue held that the Winlers Doctrine does extend to groundwater.' However, the first case to hint that
the Winters Doctrine should apply equally to groundwater and surface water
was actually decided pre-Cappaert,"and was relied on by the Ninth Circuit for
its conclusion that federal reserved rights applied to groundwater.' In Tweedy
v. Texas Company, the District Court for the District of Montana stated rather
clearly that while "It] he Winters case dealt only with the surface water,.., the
same implications which led the Supreme Court to hold that surface waters had
been reserved would apply to underground waters as well."" These implications, the court found, included the fact that water would make the arid land
more useful." Thus, according to the court, "whether the waters were found on
the surface of the land or under it should make no difference."'
While seemingly a strong statement in favor of applying the Winters Docnine to groundwater, the case has two serious limitations. First, the court did
not actually find a reserved right to groundwater, making the court's statement
classic dicta.' Second, underlying the court's decision was the fact that both
surface and groundwater were governed by the doctrine of prior appropriation.'
Accordingly, the decision provides little insight into whether "the same implications" underlying the Winters Doctrine hold true under a correlative rights
framework. In fact, the Wyoming Supreme Court later interpreted these "im-

57. See Cappaert 426 U.S. at 142.
58. Only one court has refused to extend the Winters Doctrine to groundwater. That decision, however, was not based on legal reasoning, but on a lack of precedent. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 99 (Wyo. 1988). In
" Itl
he logic which supports a reservation of surface
fact, the court in BgHorn acknowledged that
water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation also supports reservation of groundwater." Id The
court simply refused to be the first court to extend the doctrine in that mainer. Thus, as later

courts, and most commentators have pointed out, the case has little bearing on the future of tribal
rights to groundwater. See, e.g., Michael C. Blurnm, I/nd/ian Reserved Water Rights,in 2 WATERs
AND WATiR RIGHTS § 37.02(d) (Amy K. Kelley, ed., 3rd ed. 2015). However, as one legal
commentator noted, "the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision
per curium, with a split court and without a written opinion." Liana Gregory, "Technically

Open": The Debate over Native American Reserved GroundwaterRights, 28 J. LAND RESOUR cES & ENvrL. L. 361,365 (2008) (citing Wyoming v. U.S., 492 U.S. 406, 407 (1989)). Thus,
like the decision in Cappaert,the Supreme Court's reluctance to review the case may indicate an
unwillingness on behalf of the Court "to explicitly extend the Winters doctrine to [alli groundwater sources..." Id.
59.

See United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313, 317 (9th Cir. 1974).

60.
61.
62.
63.

See id.
Tweedy v.Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968).
Id.
Id.

64. Id. at 386. In fact, the Wyoming Supreme Court relied on the fact that the court did not
actually "recognize a reserved groundwater right" as part of its rationale for refusing to follow the
court's decision. See In re BigHorn, 753 P.2d at 100.
65. Tweedy, 286 F. Supp. at 386.
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plications" as explicitly requiring a hydrological connection between groundwater and surface water."
In addition to the strong dictum in Tweedy, in two other cases decided in
prior appropriation jurisdictions, courts have affirmatively found a reserved
right to groundwater." Both of these cases were premised on the general principle that the "the implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine is based on the
necessity of water for the purpose of the federal reservation," and thus, the
source of that water should not matter.' These two cases are important because
they affirn the broader purpose of tribal federal reserved rights. And they lend
valuable support for the notion that tribal reserved rights do, and should, apply
to groundwater. However, because both of these decisions took place against a
backdrop of prior appropriation, these courts were not forced to engage with
the specific issue on appeal in Agua Caliente.whether the tribes would have
had a federal reserved right to groundwater despite the existence of an equal
and correlative right under state law. Thus, like Tweedy, these cases fall just
short of supplying the comprehensive and necessary legal framework for resolving the issue.69
3. Gila IIT Winters Rghts Extend to GroundwaterDespite the State System
of Water Administat.on
Despite the fact that most cases involving reserved rights have been decided
within the context prior appropriation, one state supreme court expressly extended the Winters Doctrine to groundwater while acknowledging the tribe's
right to pump groundwater as an overlying landowner."0 In In re Gen. Adjudicanon of All -Rightsto Use Waterin Gila River Sys. & Source (" Gila III'), the
Arizona Supreme Court addressed the general question of whether federal reserved rights can extend to groundwater." Relying on the fact that the Cappaert
Court, held that federal reserved rights holders may prevent the diversion of
groundwater to protect surface water rights, the Gila IIlcourt held that federal
law does not differentiate between surface and groundwater "when identifying

66.

See In re Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 99 ("The logic which supports a reservation of surface

water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation also supports reservation of groundwater. Certainly,
the two sources are often interconnected." (citing Tweedy, 286 F. Supp. at 385)).
67. See United States v.Washington Dept. of Ecology, No. C01-0047Z, slip op. at *8 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 24, 2003); The Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation
v. Stults, 59 P.3d 1093,1097 (Mont. 2002). Since 1945, Washington has governed groundwater
by a comprehensive groundwater code that mirrors the state's prior appropriation-based permit
system foi surface water. See TIM BUTLER & MATTHEW KING, 23 WASH. PRAc., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND PRAcTIcE § 8.30 (2d ed.) (citing Schuh v. State Dept. of Ecology, 667 P.2d

64, 65 (1983)). Similarly, Montana's state water permitting system applies a prior appropriation
system to both surface and groundwater sources. See John B. Carter, Montana Groundwater
Lawin the Twenty-First Century,70 MONT. L. REV. 221, 235 (2009).
68. See ConfederatedSalish, 59 P.3d at 1099 (quoting CappaeZ 426 U.S. at 143); Washington, No. C01-0047Z, slip op. at *5-6.
69. See Gregory, supra note 58, at 367 (noting that the cases finding a reserved 6ight to
groundwater "provide little useful dicta or insight as to their decision to make such a monumental
holding, and generally passed over the issue without much discussion"); see also In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 989 P.2d 739, 751 n.6 (Ariz.
1999) (Gila II) (describing the Tweedy courts analysis of the issue as "relatively terse").
70. Gila IIl, 989 P.2d at 747-48.
71. Id.at745.
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the water to be protected."" Thus, the Gila IMIcourt held: "the significant queslion for the purpose of the reserved rights doctrine is not whether the waterruns
above or below the ground but whether it is necessaiy to accomplish the purpose ofthe reservation."
Importantly, the Arizona Supreme Court also addressed the more specific
issue of whether the general holding that reserved rights can apply to groundwater remained true in light Arizona's reasonable use system of groundwater
management." Thus, the case presented an almost identical issue to the one
being presented in Agua Cahlene.whether the United States impliedly reserved
groundwater "in a state that provides all overlying landowners an equal right to
pump as much groundwater as they can put to reasonable use upon their land.""
This argument, which the state water rights holders presented, gave the Gila III
court a unique opportunity to clarify the source and nature of federal reserved
rights. Rejecting the state law parties' arguments, the court stated clearly and
concisely that federal reserved water rights derive from federal law and "are by
nature a preserve intended to 'coninue[ I through years."".. Accordingly, the
court concluded that giving deference to Arizona's law, which extends all landowners the opportunity to pump as much groundwater as they can reasonably
use, did not adequately serve to protect federal rights." These fundamental
principles regarding the source and nature of federal reserved rights are at issue
in Agua Caliente,and the Ninth Circuit should take the opportunity to adopt
the basic principles enunciated by the Arizona Supreme Court.
Gila III, however, also contained an interesting limitation on the tribes' reserved rights to groundwater. The court held that "[a] reserved right to groundwater may only be found where other waters are inadequate to accomplish the
purpose of a reservation. "" The court gave no reasoning for this condition. But
one could read it as an acknowledgment of the fact that Winters rights are not
as easily reconciled in non-appropriation systems of water management, and the
court offering what it believed was a reasonable accommodation. Thus, while
the Arizona Supreme Court's holding stands as the strongest affirmation of
tribal groundwater rights to date, the court imposed a limitation further exemplifying the need for a broad federal appellate holding that confirms the existence of tribal reserved rights to groundwater. As one scholar pointed out,
"[blecause of state court determinations of tribal water rights.., the recognition

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 747.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 747-48.
Id. The common law doctrine of reasonable use "is essentially a rule of capture under

which landowners are allowed to withdraw as much water as desired in conjunction with the reasonable use of the landowner's property, regardless of the.consequences to neighboring landowners." L. William Staudenmaier, Between A Rock and A Dry Place: The Rural Water Supply
Challengefor Anzona, 49 ARiz. L. REv. 321, 328 (2007). Accordingly, there is an argument that
Arizona's system of reasonable use provides even less protection for Indian reserved rights than
California's system of correlative rights. However, as will be explained in further detail, all that
should matter is whether the state system conflicts with the nature and purpose of the federal
reserved rights, not the exact nature of the conflict.
76. G,la 11,989 P.2d at 747-48 (quofingWintersv. United States, 207 U.S. 564,577 (1908)).
77. Id. at 748.
78. Id.
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of groundwater rights varies from state to state." 9 And even "Isitates that do
clearly recognize the right may nonetheless limit it in ways that render groundwater generally unavailable as a primary source, rather than leave the determination of the best water source to the tribes themselves."'
III. AGUA CALENTE BAND OF CAHUmLA INDIANS V. COACHELLA VALLEY
WATER DISTICT
"The Coachella valley forms part of the Sonoran Desert, where water is
scarce.""' The Agua Caliente and the ancestral Cahuilla have occupied the
Coachella Valley and utilized its precious groundwater resources "since time
immemorial."" Historically, the Agua Caliente and their ancestors occupied
approximately 600 square miles of the Coachella Valley.' Groundwater was an
essential source of water for the ancestral Cahuilla, which was essential to meet
the ancestral Cahuilla's needs." Accordingly, the ancestral Cabuilla people employed numerous methods for developing and harnessing the groundwater re-

sources underlying their ancestral territory.'
Two separate Executive Orders in 1876 and 1877 established the modem
Agua Caliente Reservation which encompasses approximately 31,396 acres of
land."8 By establishing the reservation, the United States sought to provide a
permanent homeland for the Agua Caliente, sufficient to "meet the present and
future wants" of the tribe. It was never in doubt that water played a crucial role
in meeting those needs. In fact, in 1874, Mission Indians Special Agent John
Ames noted:
The great difficulty... arises not from any lack of unoccupied land, but from
lack of well-watered land. Water is an absolutely indispensable requisite for an
Indian settlement, large or small. It would be worse than folly to attempt to
locate them on land destitute of water, and that in sufficient quantity for purposes of irrigation...

79.

Royster, supra note 15, at 494-95.

80. Id.
81. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., No. EDCV 13883-JGB, 2015 WL 1600065, at *1, *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2015) (emphasis added).
82. Agua Caicnte, 2015 WL 1600065, at *1, *9; Courtney Cole, "ForIncan Purposes:"
Explorig The Pole Of Water As A Cultural Resource In Secunng A Right To Groundwater
For The Agua Caliente Band Of Cahuilla Indians, 3 AM. INDIAN L.J. 409, 410 (2015).

83. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians' Mem. of Points and Auths. in Support of Mot.
for Sum. J. on Phase I Issues at 1, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley
Water Dist., No. ED CV 13-00883-JGB-SPX (C.D. Cal. E.D. Oct. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Agua
Caliente MSJI.
84. Id. at 2.
85. See Agua Caliente MSJ at 2 ("The pre-contact Cabuilla adapted to drought cycles in the
desert environment by developing naturally appearing springs and groundwater wells. Ancestral

Cahuilla, including the lineages of the Agua Caliente, dug walk-in wells as a water source during
times of water scarcity. The ancestral Caluilla used natural indicators of subsurface water to site
such wells and used the water that they produced for domestic consumptive use.").
86. Id. at 1; see alsoAgua Caliente, 2015 WL 1600065, at *1.
87. SeeAgua Caliente,2015 WL 1600065, at *3,*6 (internal quotations omitted).
88.

412.

Agua Caliente MSJ at 3 (internal quotations omitted); see also Cole, supra note 82, at
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This same sentiment reappeared in 1877, when the Commissioner of Indian Affairs instructed Mission Indian AgentJ.E. Colburn to identify additional
lands for the Agua Caliente reservation. " As Agent Colburn stated, his first
purpose "was to 'secure the Mission Indians with permanent homes, with land
and water enough, that each one who will go upon a reservation may have to
cultivate a piece of ground as large as he may desire."'"
Agua Caliente currently purchase their groundwater from the Coachella
Valley Water District ("CVWD") and the Desert Water Agency ("DWA") (collectively "Water Agencies")."' Experts have well documented California's unhealthy reliance on groundwater and issues with sustainable groundwater management."2 The Coachella Valley groundwater basin ("basin") is no exception.
For decades prior to the litigation, water users continuously and pulled from
the basin creating an unsustainable state of overdraft. ."Recognizing this reality,
Agua Caliente actively sought to engage the Water Agencies in discussions to
address their concerns regarding water quantity and water quality in the basin.
However, when these efforts failed, the Tribe initiated litigation "to ensure the
preservation and long tern availability of the high quality groundwater that is
critical to life and development for all Coachella Valley residents, and on which
the Tribe and its ancestors have relied since time immemorial."9"
A. THE DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMS THE TRIBE'S FEDERAL RESERVED
RIGHT TO GROUNDWATER
Agua Caliente sued the Water Agencies in May 2013 seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief.' Specifically, the Tribe asked the court to: (i) recognize
their aboriginal right to groundwater; (ii) recognize their federal reserved right
to groundwater; (iii) enjoin the Water Agencies from withdrawing groundwater
from the basin in amounts that impermissibly interfere with these rights; and
(iv) enjoin the Water Agencies from continuing to augment the basin's groundwater supplies with untreated, imported water of lower quality than the pre-existing groundwater.' At the outset, the parties agreed to trifurcate the litigation,
89. See Cole, supra note 82, at 413.
90. Agua Cahente, 2015 WL 1600065, at *3(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).

91. Id. at * 2- *3 ("The CVWD is a county water district, and is responsible for developing
groundwater wells in the Coachella valley and extracting groundwater. The DWA is an 'independent special district' created to provide water to the city of Palm Springs and areas that surround it by developing groundwater wells and extracting groundwater.").
92. See, e.g., Colleen Shalby, Even Scarier Than California'sShrinking Reservoirs Is Its
Slinlking GroundwaterSupply, PBS NEVSHOUR (Mar. 20, 2015, 9:27 AM), http://www.pbs.
org/newshour/rundown/califonias-groundwater-loss-mean-enfire-u-s.
93. See COACHELLA VALLEY WATER DIST., CroundwaterReplenishment & Imported Water, http://www.cvwd.org/162/Grotudwater-Replenishment-Imported-Water (last visited April 8,

2016).
94. See Cole, supra note 82, at 414; see geneia]l

AGUA CAIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA
Water Issues: CorrespondenceBetween the Agua Caliente Band of CahuillaIndians
and the United States, Desert Water Agency, and Coachella Valley Water Distnc4 1996-2012,
http://www.coachellacleanwater.org/downloads/Water9620Issues%20%2OPart%2011_Reduced.pdf (last visited April 8, 2016) [hereinafter AGUA CALIENTE CORRESINDIANS,

PONDENCE].
95. AGUACALIENTECORRESPONDENCE, supm note 94, at l.

96. Agua Callente, 2015 WL 1600065, at *2.
97. See Complaint at 15-20, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley
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and Phase I" dealt exclusively with the legal questions of whether Agua Caliente
had a federal reserved right to groundwater under the Winters doctrine and
whether the Tribe had an aboriginal right to groundwater."
Notably, the Tribe and the Water Agencies also stipulated that the groundwater at issue is in a confined aquifer and "does not add to, contribute to or
support any surface stream from which the Tribe diverts water.. ."" This stipulation made clear that the groundwater at issue was subject to California's correlative rights system of groundwater administration,"' which according to the
court, put the groundwater at issue "uncomfortably outside Cappaert'sexplicit
holding." ' Thus, the Water Agencies' argument consisted of two parts: (1) as
a general rule, federal reserved rights do not extend to groundwater; and (2)
even if they can, they do not impliedly exist when the Tribe has a correlative
right to groundwater under California law."3
In regard to whether Winters rights can extend to groundwater, the court
framed the issue as one of appurtenance."' Using Cappaertasits touchstone,
the court interpreted the legal constraints under Winters as whether: "(i) the
reserved water is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the reservation and (ii) the
reserved water is appurtenant to the reserved land.'.. Applying these basic principles, the court concluded that while "[a]ppurtenance, as that term is used by
the Winters doctrine, must provide some legal limitation to imphedly reserved
water rights... that limit should not be drawn between surface and groundwater
sources."" Accordingly, in conformity with Gila III,and the growing body of
case law, the court ultimately held that as long as the groundwater in question is
appurtenant to the reservation, and necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation,'°' Winters rights can extend to and include groundwater resources. '
As to the issue of whether the Winters Doctrine applies even under a correlative rights framework for groundwater management, the court handled this
Water District, No. ED CV 13-00883-JGB-SPX (C.D. Cal. E.D. May 14, 2013).
98. See Agua Caliente, 2015 WL 1600065, at *2 (Subsequent phases will deal with the questions of: "(1) the ownership of certain 'pore space' beneath the reservation; (2) the legal question
of whether a right to a quantity of groundwater encompasses a right to water of a certain quality;
and (3) some of the equitable defenses asserted by the CVWD and DWA.").
99. See id. at *2,*10-*11 (The court found that the Congressional Act of 1851, passed
shortly after California's admission into the United States, extinguished the Tribe's claim to aboriginal right to groundwater. That issue is not currently on appeal and this Article does not examine any of the issues sunounding the court's decision in regard to that claim.).
100. Id. at *3.
101. Id.at*11.

102.

Id.

103. Id. at *2;T mscript of Oral Argument at 16, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v.
Coachella Valley Water Dist., No. EDCV 13-00883-JGB-SPX (C.D. Cal. E.D. Mar. 16, 2015)
[hereinafter Oral Argument Transcript] ("We're asking the Court to rule that as a matter of law
if an Indian tribe has the right to use groundwater under California law, and it has an equal and
conelative right to use the groundwater with everybody else, then under those circumstances, as
a matter of law, there can be no federally-reserved right.").
104. Id. at *4, *6.

105. Id.
106. Seeid.at*7.
107. The court also made clear that the question of whether particular groundwater resources
are necessary to fulfill tie purpose of the reservation goes not to the existence of the right, but to
the anmount of the right. Id. at "4,*7.
108. Seeid. at*6. *7.ee
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by stating bluntly: "It is neither novel nor controversial that Winters rights derive
from federal law, and thus displace state law when in conflict."" However, unlike the Arizona Supreme Court in Gila III,the court failed to clearly articulate
the exact conflict between California's correlative rights framnework and federal
reserved rights law.' 0 While the court did note that existing case law specifically
held that courts should not 'balance' competing interests to determine the scope
of reserved rights under Winters, (possibly referencing the requirement of correlative rationing) the court did not discuss or articulate any of the particulars of
the correlative rights doctrine necessary to make such an association."'
And while the court in Agua Cal'entemay not have provided the same level
of detail in its analysis as in that of Gila III,its decision was a straightforward,
concise, and logical application of the Winters Doctrine that adds substantially
to the body of case law extending the Winters Doctrine to groundwater."' Additionally, and importantly, the court also expressly applied the Winters DocIrine to groundwater outside a prior appropriation system of management.
IV. THE OPEN QUESTION: WHETHER TRIBAL FEDERAL RESERVED
RIGHTS APPLY TO GROUNDWATER IN LIGHT OF CALIFORNIA'S
CORRELATIVE RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR GROUNDWATER ALLOCATION
Acknowledging the lack of precedent on the issue, and the fact that "Islubstantial ground for difference of opinion exists[,]" the district court in Agua Caliente certified an interlocutory appeal to address the question of "[wlhether
Winters rights extend to groundwater, in light of California's correlative rights
legal framework for groundwater allocation."". The question presents the Ninth

109. Id. at *8. The court also relied on the fact that the newly passed California Sustainable
Groundwater Management Act "acknowledges the supremacy of federal water rights, and acquiesces in their priority." Id. The relevant section the court relied on states: "IlIn the management
of a groundwater basin or sub-basin by a groundwater sustainability agency or by the board, federally reserved water rights to groundwater shall be respected in full." Cal. Water Code
§10720.3(d) (2015). While this is most certainly persuasive authority for the proposition that
those in the California state legislature believe that federal reserved rights do extend to groundwater, the California legislature is clearly not in a position to authoritatively interpret federal common law. Additionally, the statute expressly states that it is merely "declaratory of existing law."
Id. However, the ultimate state of existing law is (1) unclear; and (2) within the exclusive purview
of the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly, because the purpose of this Article is to provide a thorough and persuasive legal framework for why the Winters doctrine extends to groundwater regardless of a state's system of water administration, this Article does not expound upon
this basis for the court's decision. That being said, the provision discussed above, and the California Sustainable Groundwater Management Act as a whole, underscores the importance of a
Ninth Circuit decision affirming Aqua Caliente's federal reserved right to groundwater. California's recently passed Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, will require high and medium
priority basins to be managed under a groundwater sustainability plan or coordinated groundwater sustainability plans byJanuary 31, 2020. See Quesenbeny, supra note 15, at 446. Absent an
adjudicated federal reserved right to a specific quantity of groundwater, the Tribe's water right
will be limited at the outset by the conelative tight doctrine of reasonable use. See infra notes
144-48 and accompanying text.
110. See Agua Caliente, 2015 WL 1600065, at *8. Also, despite citing Gila HI/for the proposition that federal reserved rights can extend to groundwater, the court failed to cite the case to
support this part of its analysis.
111. Id.
112. See Agua Caiente,2015 WL 1600065, *4-*9.
113. Id.at*11-*12.
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Circuit with a unique opportunity to fully examine the underlying rationale, purpose, and fundamental principles of the Winters Doctrine, and to fill a gap in
existing tribal reserved rights jurisprudence. Accordingly, this Part first examines the arguments the litigants presented on appeal as to why the Winters doctrine should not apply outside a prior appropriation regime. It concludes by
encouraging the Ninth Circuit to clearly articulate a comprehensive legal framework for why the Whiters Doctrine applies regardless of a state's water administration system.
A. THE WATER AGENCIES' ARGUMENTS: THE NEW, AND JUST AS
INSENSITIVE, SENSITIVITY DOCTRINE
The Water Agencies' arguments on appeal are equally grounded in law and
policy - both of which get to the very heart of the Winters doctrine. The legal
arguments are simple. The Water Agencies argue that because the Tribe has
an existing and equal right to use groundwater, "the rationale of the Winters
doctrine- which was to protect Indian water rights from being subordinate to
the water rights of non-Indian users - does not apply to the groundwater" at
issue in this case."' This argument is premised on the interrelated notions that
"[tihe reserved rights doctrine is a 'doctrine built on implication, ' '.. 5 and that the
implication to reserve water derives from the fact that "if [the] water had not
been reserved, it would have been subject to appropriation by non-Indians under state law.", ' Thus, "Iblecause the Indians were not in a position, either
economically or in terms of their development of farming skills, to compete
with non-Indians for water rights, it was reasonable to conclude that Congress
intended to reserve water for them.""'
These two premises, when combined, lead to the Water Agencies' main
argument: Because the Tribe has always had the right to withdraw all the
groundwater it can put to beneficial use, and the Tribe could not lose that right
despite other appropriation, 8 "there is no basis for an 'implication' that Presidents Grant and Hayes... intended to reserve a right in groundwater that would

114. Joint Brief of Appellants Coachella Valley Water, et. al, and Desert Water Agency, et al.
at 35, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist. et al., No. 1555896, at 35 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Appellant Opening Brief]. The Water Agencies
also frane this argument in terms of whether the question of necessity goes to the existence or
scope of the right, arguing that a federal reserved right exists only if "the prposes of the reservation would be entirelydefeated' without the right. Id. at 21 (quoting United States v. New Mexico,
438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978)). Because this is a corollary of the Water Agencies' primary argument,
this Article does not explore the specific contours of this argument. But it should be noted that
the question of whether New Mexico's primary/secondary distinction applies to Indian reserved
lights in the Ninth Circuit is an interesting question of law and a possibly troubling proposition

for tribes.
115. Id. at 42 (quoting New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 715).
116. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 46 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that
in the seminal reserved rights cases of Winters and Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963):
"if water had not been reserved, it would have been subject to appropriation by nonIndians under state law. lAndl Iblecause the Indians were not in a position, either economically or in tenns of their development of fa ning skills, to compete with nonIndians for water rights, itwas reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to reserve
water for them").
117. Id.
118. See Tehachapi-Cumnings Cnty. Water Dist.v. Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924 (Cal.
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exempt the Tribe from the principles of equality and sharing that apply to all
other users of groundwater." "9 This line of reasoning has found some support
amongst commentators and academics when discussing whether the Winters
Doctrine applies to groundwater and whether the Winters Doctrine applies in
riparian states." According to at least one legal scholar:
The lesson then that the 1'inteisdoctrine ought to teach is that when the
federal government reserves some part of the public domain from entry,
the federal government implicitly reserves for that land the same sort of
right to use water as prevails in the state in which the land is located.' 2'
And while there is some facial logic to these arguments, as will be discussed
in further detail below, they ultimately misconstrue the source, scope, and purpose of tribal reserved rights.
The Water Agencies' policy arguments are equally as simple, but slightly
more troubling. The Water Agencies contend that if the court grants the Tribe
a federal reserved right to groundwater, that right would be senior and paramount to the current landowners' existing rights and would jeopardize other
overlying landowners' rights to the groundwater that they have used and relied
on for decades.'2 Accordingly, the Water Agencies argue that these "adverse
consequences and impacts" need to be taken into account and that "the reserved rights doctrine should be applied with 'sensitivity'to 'its impact upon
those who have obtained water rights under state law and to Congress' general
policy of deference to state water law.'"'"
For this argument, the Water Agencies rely on a quote fromJustice Powell's
dissent in United States v. New Mexico, which introduced the judicial concept
known as the "sensitivity doctrine" into the realm of federal reserved rights.'
Later, an unpublished draft opinion authored by Justice O'Connor in Wyormng v. United States made the doctrine infamous. In that opinion, Justice
O'Connor wrote that "the quantification of Indian reserved water rights requires
a 'sensitivity to the impact on state and private appropriators of scarce water

Ct. App. 1975); see also Appellant Opening Brief, supra note 114, at 42.
119. Appellant Opening Brief, supranote 114, at 42 (emphasis added).
120. See Leonard, supra note 56, at 622 (noting that whether a federal reserved right to
groundwater exists "turms on the groundwater regime followed by each individual state"); see also
Debbie Shosteck, Beyond Reserved Raghts: Tribal Control over GroundwaterResources in A
Cold Winters Climate, 28 CoLuM.J. ENVTL. L. 325, 338-40 (2003) (noting that despite the Ari-

zona Supreme Court's decision in Gila IJI, the Supreme Court "will likely reject the idea of a
reserved right to groundwater" because "lais long as Indian rights are treated evenhandedly under
state law, the Court would determine that no federal rule is necessary").
121. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparnanism, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §
9.06(b)(2) (Amy K. Kelley, ed., 3rd ed. 2015).
122. Appellant Opening Brief, supra note 114, at 65; see also Quesenberry, supranote 15, at
456 ("Because there is no 'correlative rights' principle applicable to the federally reserved right,
it has the potential to completely preempt 'reasonable use' of the groundwater by other overlying
landowners.").
123. Appellant Opening Brief, supranote 114, at 60 (quoting NewMexico, 438 U.S. 438 U.S.
696, 718 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)).
124. See Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions in
Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 683, 707 (1997).
125. 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
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under state law." 26 The draft opinion was never published because Justice
O'Connor was forced to recuse herself from the case, I" but the fact that the
Supreme Court was prepared to adopt" the sensitivity doctrine prior to Justice
O'Connor's recusal has led some to suggest that '[t]
his unofficial declaration of
the Court's attitude towards reserved rights indicates its inclination to curtail
rather than expand the reserved rights doctrine.""
Here, the Water Agencies have taken the sensitivity doctrine to its logical
extreme, suggesting that the court should use it not at the quantification stage,
but to preclude the very existence of reserved rights to groundwater. Accordingly, in California - where water and property are sacrosanct - the possible
force of these arguments'" makes a strong affirmation of both the legal principles and the policy rationales underlying the Winters Doctrine particularly important.
B. WINTERSRIGHTS ARE CREATURES OF FEDERAL LAW THAT PROVIDE
FOR BOTH THE PRESENT AND FUTURE NEEDS OF THE TRIBE
In discussing the question of whether the Winters Doctrine should apply
in riparian jurisdictions, Professor Judith Royster articulated three fundamental
principles of Winters rights relevant to the Agua Cal'entelitigation: (i) because
Winters rights are derived from federal law, they are paramount to state-law
water rights and "nothing in state law can operate to the derogation of those
federal-law tribal rights;" (ii) Winters rights include the amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation; and (iii) the rights, either reserved
to or by tribes, were reserved in perpetuity.''
As to the first fundamental principle, the Supreme Court made clear, on
numerous occasions, that federal reserved rights are creatures of federal law.'.'
The Court has expressed this interplay between federal and state law most
clearly when discussing the role of the McCarran Amendment in adjudicating
federal reserved rights. Because the McCarran Amendment waived the United
States' sovereign imm-mity, and provided "state courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate Indian water rights held in trust by the United States 1," the Court was
forced to address this effect in terms of the law governing federal reserved

126. Id. at 6 8 4 (quoting Wyonming v. United States, Opinion, 2d Draft at 15, No 88-309 (U.S.
1989) (recirculated June 12, 1989)).
127. Id. at 684-685.
128. See Dan Tarlock et al., Water Resource Management: A Casebook in Law and Public
Policy 764 (7th ed. 2014) (noting that "research into the late Thurgood Marshall's papers revealed
a draft majority opinion by Justice O'Connor for a 5-4 majority" that "would have moditied the
PIA standard applying a 'sensitivity docuine' whenever junior water rights of non-Indians would
be put at risk by the recognition of reserved rights").
129. Shosteck, supranote 120, at 344.
130. Shosteck, supra note 120, at 341 (arguing that the Supreme Court will likely decline to
apply the Winters doctrine to gioundwater because "[in the context of groundwater, federal reserved rights could be extremely disruptive to existing state systems"); Gwendolyn Griffith, Indian
Clains to Groundwater" Reserved Rights or Beneficial Interest?, 33 STAN. L. REv. 103, 130
(1980) ("[Aipplying the traditional reservation theory to Indian groundwater rights leads to inefficient and inequitable results.").

131. SeeRoyster, supranote2, at 174, 181, 182.
132. See, e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 145 (1976).
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rights." 3 In Arizona v. San CaitosApache Tribe ofArizona, the Court made
clear that the McCarran Amendment "in no way changes the substantive law by
which Indian rights in state water adjudications must be judged. State courts, as
much as federal courts, have a solemn obligation to follow federal law.' 3.
This fundamental principle informed the decision in Gila IIIand was also
how the district court resolved the issue in Agua Callente." The issue, however,
is that the federal law is not clear regarding reserved rights to groundwater.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit, and ultimately the Supreme Court, may still decline to
"create new federal common law" in favor of deferring to state law.' Under
existing Supreme Court precedent, a court will defer to state law: "(1) if there is
no need for a uniform national rule; (2) if the use of state law would not impede
federal policy or functions; and (3) if the creation of an incompatible federal
rule would have calamitous consequences for state and private landowners." 7
This has led to the suggestion that despite growing precedent in favor of the
tribes, when the Supreme Court is called upon to resolve federal claims to
is
groundwater, it will most likely defer to state law." Accordingly, while "[i]t
neither novel nor controversial that Winters rights derive from federal law,"'3 it
is crucial that the Ninth Circuit clearly articulates and affirms that federal law
serves as the exclusive source of those rights.
Directly related to the source of the right, is the nature and scope of the
right. Because Winters rights only "displace state law when in conflict,]" it is
important that the Ninth Circuit clearly articulates the conflict that exists between correlative rights and federal reserved rights." In this case, the conflict is
obvious: tribal reserved rights need not accommodate other users;'4' and tribal
reserved rights are not based solely on the tribe's current need for water, rather
tribal reserved rights also look to the future."' Under California's correlative

133.

See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 548-49 (1983).

134. Id.at 571. The fact that federal reserved rights are creatures of federal law is also readily
apparent from the fact that federal reserved rights stand in direct conflict with state appropriative
rights. See Montana v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 712
P.2d 754, 762, (Mont. 1985) (noting that "Itlhe doctrine of reserved water rights conflicts with
prior appropriation principles in several respects"); see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supia note 3,
at 1205-06.
135. Inre Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 989 P.2d
739, 747 (Gila III) (Ariz. 1999); Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley
Water Dist., No. EDCV 13-883-JGB, 2015 WL 1600065, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2015).
136. See Shosteck, supra note 120, at 342.
137. Id.at 339 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-28 (1979) and
Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 673 (1979)).
138, Id.at 338.
139. Agua Caliente, 2015 WL 1600065, at *8.
140. Id.; see also Wilson, 442 U.S. at 672-73 (stating that the determination of whether to
apply federal law relies in part on "whether application of state law would frustrate federal policy
or functions").
141. See Agua Caliente, 2015 WL 1600065, at *8; see also Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton, 752 F.2d 397, 405 (9th Cir. 1985); see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 1205
("Indian reserved rights are not reduced.., in time of shortage").
142. See Agua Caliente, 2015 WL 1600065, at *6 ("IWinters rights anticipate increased or
novel future uses"); In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. &
Source, 989 P.2d 739, 748 (Gila III) (Ariz. 1999) ("[Aln implied reservation includes sufficient
waters 'to satisfy the future as well as the present needs of the Indian Reservations.'" (quoting
Ai. v. Cal., 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963))); see also United States v. Alitanum Irrigation Dist., 236
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rights framework, however, if the quantity of water in the basin were deemed
insufficient, the Tribe would receive only its "proportionate fair share" of water
based "on [its]
current reasonable and beneficial need for water."'" Because
this could effectively preclude the Tribe from withdrawing the full quantity of
water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, the application of the
correlative rights framework would frustrate federal policy and create a high
"likelihood of injury to federal trust responsibilities land] to tribal possessory
interests."'"
The court in Gila Ilrelied on a similar conflict when it held that "a] theoretically equal right to pump groundwater, in contrast to a reservedright,would
not protect a federal reservation from a total future depletion of its underlying
aquifer by off-reservation pumpers."" And the only state court to exanine this
issue within the context of riparian rights came to a similar conclusion, noting
that "[rleasonable use... does not necessarily comport with a riparian owner
'
having a sufficient quantity or quality of water to achieve a certain purpose. ."
Thus, as the Agua Caliente correctly argued to the district court: "the California
correlative rights doctrine is simply not an adequate substitute for federally-reserved rights ....It is up to the Ninth Circuit to make this clear.
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT SHOULD AFFIRM THE INDIAN LAW PRINCIPLES
THAT SERVED AS THE FOUNDATION FOR WINTERS

While it is essential that the Ninth Circuit affirm the fundamental legal principles that define the source, nature, and purpose of tribal reserved rights, these
very principles - and the inherent conflict they create with California's correlative rights system - are what fuel the Water Agencies' policy arguments." Thus,
a comprehensive reproach to the Water Agencies' revival of the sensitivity doctrine must also include an affirmation of the policy considerations underlying
the Winters Doctrine.
Winters was not "merely a water law case." "' Rather, the Court grounded
Winters in the most basic of Indian law principles: courts are to construe Indian
laws and treaties favorably to the Indians." This principle, originating in the
Supreme Court case United States v. Winans, ' serves as the true basis for the
F.2d 321, 327 (9th Cir. 1956).
143. Tehachapi-Cummings Cnty. Water Dist., v. Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924 (Cal. Ct
App. 1975).
144. See Wilson, 442 U.S. at 673.
145. 989 P.2d at 748.
146. See Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Virginia, No. 3001 -RW/RC, 2007 WL 6002103, at *14
(Va. Cir. Feb. 5, 2007) ("IIt is plausible that even in a riparian jurisdiction it may be necessary to
imply reserved water pursuant to an Indian reservation or treaty-granted right. Common law
riparianism only grants a riparian owner 'a reasonable use of the water.., without sensible alteration in quality or unreasonable diminution in quantity.'... Reasonable use, howeve,, does not
necessarilycomport with a riparan ownerhavingasuflicientquantity orqualityol water to achi'eve
a certainpurpose." (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
147. Oial Aigument Transcript, supra note 103, at 21.
148. See Getches, supra note 44, at 1486.
149. id.at 1486.
150. Richard B. Collins, 77je Future Course of the Winters Docine, 56 U. CoLO.L. REV.
481, 482 (1985).
151. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
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Winters decision and the ultimate rebuke to the Water Agencies' line of argument.12 This is because, inherent in the Water Agencies' reasoning, is the notion that the Tribe should have the same rights as all overlying landowners.'"
However, tribes are not "merely property owners within their reservations, but
governments that entered into relations with the United States."' Thus, as Professor Royster noted, the Court construed Winans as standing for the principle
"that if an Indian tribe has nothing under a treaty that it would not have without
the treaty, then the treaty is a nullity."'"
Professor Royster relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Washington
v. Washington State CommercialPassengerFishing Vessel Association" as the
basis for this argument.'"' In that case, the Supreme Court rejected an argument
that certain treaty language (granting tribes the "right of taking fish... in common with all citizens of the Territory") gave the tribe merely an equal right to
take fish with non-Indians.' 8 Instead, relying on Winans and its progeny, the
Court held: "Whatever opportunities the treaties assure Indians with respect to
fish are admittedly not 'equal' to, but are to some extent greater than, those
9
Because the Court grounded Winters in the same
afforded other citizens."'5
Indian law principles that informed the decision in Washington State Commercial,the same premise that held true for salmon should hold true for water."

152.

See Getches, supra note 44, at 1484; see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at

1208-09. Doctrinally, Winters rights and Winans rights have come to encompass two separate
and distinct categolies of reserved rights. Winans rights "preserveli a pre-existing use of water[,I"
whereas Winters rights allow for the creation of new uses necessary to fulfill the purpose of the
reservation. See, e.g., Aubri Goldsby, The Mccarran Amendment and Groundwater: Why
Washington State Should RequireInclusion of Groundwater in GeneralStream Adjudikations
Involving FederalReserved Water Rights, 86 Wash. L. Rev. 185, 189 n.33 (2011) (citing United

States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1408-15 (9th Cir. 1983)). This distinction, however, does not
alter the fact that both types of rights are grounded in the foundational Indian law principle that
treaties are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, nor the argument that this principle
should inform the decision in the Aqua Calientecase. See United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co.,
600 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging the Winans "rule of interpretation" as the
basis for the decision in Winters); see also Babcock, supra note 15, at 1240 (noting that "[qiuestions of fairness pervade the issue of Indian water rights" (quoting Charles F. Wilkinson, The
Future of Western Water Law and Policy, in Indian Water 1985: Collected Essays 55 (Christine
L. Miklas & StevenJ. Shupe eds., 1986)).
153. See Roytser, supra note 2, at 193.
154. Id. at 193-94.
155. Id. at 194. The same basic principles hold true for reservations created by Executive
Order, as the Winters doctrine and, "the nle of liberal construction," apply with equal force to
reservations created by Executive Order. See Colville Confederated Tribes v.Walton, 647 F.2d
42, 46 n.7, 47 n.9 (9th Cir. 1981).
156. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n., 443 U.S.
658, 661 (1979).
157. See Royster, supra note 2, at 194 n. 120.
158.

Washington State Commercial,443 U.S. at 659.

159. Id. at 677 n.22. The Arizona Supreme Court also relied on the Court's decision in
Washington State Commercial,but its reasoning was grounded in the fact that under Arizona's
reasonable use doctrine, an "equal right to pump groundwater" results in a direct competition
with non-Indian pumpers for a finite resource. See In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 989 P.2d 739, 748 (Gila III) (Ariz. 1999). While similar, this
rationale is not directly applicatble to California's correlative rights framework, where the Tribe's
right to its proportionate share would be protected.
160. In fact, in upholding the district court's apportionment of the state's salmon fishery between tribal and non-tribal entities, the court looked to the principles enunciated in its reserved
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In other words, whatever reserved water rights the tribes hold as a result of the
treaty and treaty-substitutes establishing their reservations, they are inherently
"greater than, those afforded other citizens." ' Deferring to California's correlative rights framework would contradict this most basic of Indian law principles
62
- and the policies of sovereignty and self-determination that inform it.'
Based on this reasoning, it is clear that when one views the Winters doctrine
not as a "water law case," but as an "Indian law case," the Water Agencies' policy
arguments lose all force. As noted by the esteemed Professor Getches: "If Winters 'fits' anywhere, it Is wit'n Inchanlaw's historicalfradoiion of sustaiaingfiibal
rights whether or not broaderpolicy interests are served.'"" Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit should take this opportunity to not only affirm the source and
nature of federal reserved water rights, but also to clearly affirm and articulate
the important Indian law principles on which this doctrine rests.
V. CONCLUSION: PROVIDING TRIBES IN CALIFORNIA A PROPER SEAT AT

TE TABLE
Agua Caliente is the first tribe in California to assert a reserved right to
groundwater.'64 The Agua Caliente filed suit to protect the groundwater resources they rely on and to give themselves a voice in the management of those
rights."' A Ninth Circuit holding which allows tribes to pursue a Winters right
to groundwater is essential to providing that voice not only for the Agua Caliente, but also for tribes throughout the state.'"
As a practical matter, negotiated settlement is the most conmon method
for determining the scope of federal reserved rights. "' In California, however,
negotiated settlements to tribal water rights are just beginning, and only one
tribal settlement agreement to date has included "groundwater as part of the
federally reserved water right" or has "addressed in any detail, or at all, groundwater protections or quantification.'." This is no surprise. Traditionally, the
rights cases, stating: "In those cases, after determining that at the time of the treaties the resource
involved was necessary to the Indians' welfare, the Court typically ordered... some apportionment that assured that the Indians' reasonable livelihood needs would be met." Washiigton
State Conmnercial, 443 U.S. at 684-85; see also Royster, supianote 2, at 194 n.120 (noting that

"the Court drew an express analogy to reserved water rights" that "helps clarify that the Court, in
fashioning the tribal reserved water rights doctrine, did not intend tribal water rights to be determined by state law principles.").
161. Washington State Commercial,443 U.S. at 677 n.22.
162. Acknowledging the Indian law pohcies of sovereignty, self-sutficiency, and autonomy as
the fundamental policies underlying the Winters Doctrine is important in this context. This is
because many of the normative reasons for applying the Winters Doctrine in a prior appropriation state do not necessarily apply under California's correlative rights framework. See Babcock,
supranote 15, at 1240 (noting the "inapplicability of arguments based on [historical] federal water
policies" in riparian jurisdictions).
163. Getches, supra note 44, at 1493 (emphasis added).
164. Quesenbeny, supra note 15, at 458.
165. See Brett Walton, CaliforniaIndian Tribe Pursues Rigbts to Groundwater,CiitcLE OF
BLUE (luly 28, 2015), http://www.circleofblue.org/watemews/2015/world/california-indian-tribepursues-rights-to-giroundwater/ (last visited April 8, 2016).
166. Id.
167. See Quesenberry, supranote 15, at 460.
168. Id.at 460, 464-65; see also Meldrum, supranote 15, at 278 (noting that in general, tribal
reserved water rights, whether to surface or groundwater, have not played as prominent a role in

WATER LAW RE VIEW

Volume 19

priority and potential size of Indian reserved rights have provided the "incentive
for parties to seek negotiated settlements of Indian water rights claims.' 6 9 Thus,
if it is unclear whether such a right even exists, there is no pressure to include
those rights in the settlement. ' And this is exactly what happened to Agua
Caliente. Prior to initiating litigation, the Tribe engaged in ongoing discussions
with the Water Agencies and attempted to broker a memorandum of agreement to engage in formal settlement discussions. ' The Water Agencies, however, responded that it was their "belief that the Tribe holds neither aboriginal
rights nor reserved rights to groundwater."7 . The Water Agencies informed the
'
there are to be 'meaningful'discussions, we need to know the
Tribe, that " /if
bases for your claims.'. 3 The current litigation seeks to provide that basis. 7 '
Some have characterized the lasting iplication of the Winters Doctrine as
returning "tribal governments to their rightful seat at the table to detemine the
future of [their] shared water resource in the process of settling Indian water
rights .... Clearly, this "rightful seat" is a product of leverage. In other words,
nobody offered the tribes a seat at the table before the courts held that they
rightfully belonged there. Therefore, a decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirming the application of the Winters Doctrine to al sources of
groundwater is an essential step in ensuring that tribes throughout California are
given "their rightful seat" in protecting and managing theirwater.

California water law and water management as they have in other western states).
169. Mergen, supra note 124, at 685. In fact, one of the key elements that defines tribal water
settlements, is that the tribe "will accept smaller amounts of direct diversion water rights than
would normally be allocated in litigation." Celene Hawkins, Beyond Quantitication:Implementing andSustaining Tribal Water Settlements, 16 U. DENY. WATER L REv. 229, 236 (2013).
170. See Quesenberry, supra note 15, at 464 (noting that "Itihe Agla Caliente case highlights
this gap in the protection of federally reserved water rights and serves to focus attention on
groundwater as an essential component of the federal right and the need for tribes to specifically
address its protection and quantification in those situations where it serves as a source of tribal
water.").
171. See AGUA CAIErNTE CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 95, at 157 (letter from Redwine &
Sherrill to Keith Harper and Steven Moore (Nov. 13, 2012)).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. SeeWalton, supranote 165.
175. Barbara Cosens, The Legacy of Winters v. United States and the Winters Doctrne, One
Hundred Years Later, in THE FUTURE OF INDIAN AND FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS:
THE WNTERSCENTENNAL 5 (Barbara Cosens andJudith V. Royster eds., 2012).

TENTH UPDATE TO COLORADO WATER LAW: AN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
JUSTICE GREGORYJ. HOBBS, JR.
To provide our readers with the most up-to-date water law information, the
editors periodically include updates of works previously published in the Water
Law Review. The following is the tenth update to Colorado Water Law; An
Historical Ovemew,Appendtx-Colorado Water Law: A Synopsis of Statutes
and Case Law,' selected by the Honorable Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr.'
UPPER BLACK SQUIRREL GROUND WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT V.
CHEROKEE METROPOLTAN DISTRICT
"Upper Black Squirrel appealed from an order of the water court
interpreting an earlier stipulated decree, to which it and Cherokee Metropolitan
were parties, concerning the latter's rights to ground water in the Upper Black
Squirrel Basin and, particularly, its right to export water for use outside the
basin. Upper Black Squirrel sought a declaration that a provision of the
stipulation, which required Cherokee to deliver wastewater returns back into
the basin for recharge of the aquifer, barred Cherokee and Meridian, another
metropolitan district with which Cherokee had entered into an intergovernmental agreement, from claiming credit for these wastewater returns as
replacement water, for purposes of acquiring the right to additional pumping
from Cherokee's wells in the basin. The water court ruled instead that nothing
in the stipulation, and particularly not its use of the word 'recharge,' implied
abandonment or forfeiture of any right Cherokee might otherwise have to claim
future credits with the Ground Water Commission."
Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Mgrnt. Dist. v. Cherokee
Metro. Dist., 351 P.3d 408, 410-11 (2015).
"Unlike the 'waters of any natural stream,' the management of designated
ground water is governed by the Colorado Ground Water Management Act.
The allocation of rights to the use of ground water, which has been

1. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Hstorical Overview, 1 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 1, 27 (1997). The first update to Justice Hobbs's article appears at 2 U. DENV.
WATER L. REv. 223 (1999); the second update is at 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 111 (2000); the
third update is at 6 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 116 (2002); the fourth update is at 8 U. DENv.
WATER L. REV. 213 (2004); the fifth update is at 10 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 391 (2007); the
sixth update is at 13 U. DENy. WATER L. REV. 389 (2009); the seventh update is at 14 U. DENV.
WATER L. REv. 159 (2010); the eighth update is at 16 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 137 (2012); the
ninth update is at 18 U. DENV. WATER L. Rrv. 390 (2015).

2. Internal citations and footnotes have been omitted from segments of the opinions
reproduced below, with few exceptions.
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characterized as a modified prior appropriation regime, is determined by
application to the Ground Water Commission, which is charged with, among
other things, ensuring that designated ground water aquifers are not
unreasonably depleted. Withdrawals of designated ground water can be made
under this system through the issuance of well permits pursuant to regulations
of the Commission and the local ground water district for the maintenance of
reasonable ground water pumping levels.
Id.at 412-13.
"The water court's order makes clear, and we agree, that the stipulation
bars Cherokee from reusing the exported water, regardless of any right to reuse
foreign water that it might otherwise have had and, instead, requires Cherokee
to make its best efforts to recapture the specified wastewater returns and upon
recapture to deliver them back into the Upper Black Squirrel Creek Basin for
recharge of the aquifer. Whether or not Cherokee may yet derive some benefit
from stipulating away its right to reuse the foreign water it has developed and
agreeing instead to pump the unused portion of that water back into the basin,
is a matter that is simply beyond the scope of the stipulation. Recharging, or
replenishing, an aquifer clearly serves to prevent or at least mitigate its being
mined; but the determination whether the resultant state of the aquifer is such
that water is available for further appropriation, and if so, who should be granted
such an appropriation, and on what terms, are all questions governed by a
different authority, according to rules and regulations promulgated for that
purpose."
Id.at 414.
"Depending upon the specific context or designated purposes for which the
recharge of an aquifer were required, the term 'recharge' could have additional
implications, but standing alone it simiply refers to the physical act of
replenishing the aquifer. As the state engineer later put it in advising UBS
concerning the need to clarify its rules, "Recharge' could mean the physicalact
of rechargingwater into an aquifer with loss of dominion and control, or the
physical act of recharge in a recharge/storage/recovery plan approved by the
Conunission under Designated Basin Rule 5.8, or the physicalact ofrechar'ng
replacement water under a replacement plan.' We agree with the water court
that nothing in paragraph 5's requirement for Cherokee to deliver wastewater
back into the basin for recharge of the aquifer implies that it either must or must
not be entitled to credit in a subsequent application to the Ground Water
Commission for further appropriation."
Id.
ST.JUDE'S Co. v. ROARING FoRK CLUB, LLC.
"The application indicated that the RFC Ditch is a flow-through structure
located entirely on Club land, which returns water to the Roaring Fork River
approximately one half-mile downstream from its point of diversion, and that
the Club used the water in question and the RFC Ditch itself as an 'aesthetic
and recreational amenity to a golf course development, as well as for fish habitat
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and as a private fly-fishing stream.' The Club sought a decree for the amount
in question for 'aesthetic, recreation, and piscatorial uses.'"
St. Jude's Co. v. Roaring Fork Club, L.L.C., 351 P.3d 442, 446 (Colo.
2015).
"[T]he constitution guarantees Colorado's system of prior appropriation as
it had developed since territorial days and protects tfie people of the state from
divestment of appropriation. Under this system, '[a] water right comes into
existence by applying state water to beneficial use.' This system differs
dramatically from 'the commnon law doctrine giving the riparian owner a right
to tie flow of water in its natural channel upon and over his lands,' which was
quickly found to be 'inapplicable in Colorado.' In particular, 'the right to the
maintenance of the "flow" of the stream is a riparian right and is completely
inconsistent with the doctrine of prior appropriation."'
Id. at 448.
"The 1969 Act defines a 'water right' as 'a right to use in accordance with
its priority a certain portion of the waters of the state by reason of the
appropriation of the same,' and defines 'appropriation' as 'the application of a
specified portion of the waters of the state to beneficial use pursuant to the
procedures prescribed by law."'

Id. at 448-49
"In three subparts of the 1969 Act's definition of beneficial use, the General
Assembly has gone beyond the meaning of 'beneficial,' providing legislative
approval for three specific applications of water, for specified purposes: (1) the
inpoundment of water for firefighting or storage for any purpose for which an
appropriation is lawftlly made, including recreational, fishery, or wildlife
purposes; (2) the appropriation by the state of Colorado, for the benefit and
enjoyment of present and future generations and in the manner prescribed by
law, of such minimum flows between specific points or levels for and on natural
streams and lakes as are required to preserve the natural environment to a
reasonable degree; and (3) the diversion of water by a county, municipality, city
and county, water district, water and samitation district, water conservation
district, or water conservancy district for recreational in-chamel diversion
purposes.
The latter two beneficial uses, both of which involve the use of water
instream, are highly regulated. Instream flows to preserve the natural
environment may only be appropriated by the Colorado Water Conservation
Board ("CWCB"), a state agency with a "statutory fiduciary duty" to the people
of Colorado to both protect the environment and appropriate only the
minimum amount of water necessary to do so, and these appropriations
undergo extensive review by the CWCB, subject to notice and comment, and
by an adjudicating water court."
Id. at 449.
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"The Club's proposed 'uses' of the water in question, as expressed in its
application, cannot be beneficial within the meaning of the Act because the only
purpose they are offered to serve is the subjective enjoyment of the Club's
private guests. The flow of water necessary to efliciendy produce beauty,
excitement, or fun cannot even conceptually be quantified, and therefore where
these kinds of subjective experiences are recognized by the legislature to be
valuable, it has specifically provided for their public enjoyment, scientific
administration, and careful measurement. See, e.g., § 37-92-102 (restricting
appropriation of instream flows and in-channel diversions to particular
purposes and amounts as determined by a state agency bound by fiduciary duty,
and with public participation. Without describing a purpose for the accomplishment of which a measurable amount of water, however approximate, must
be used, the Club, by definition, fails to articulate an intent to put the specific
amount of water it claims to a beneficial use."
Id. at 451.
Recognition of the Club's proposed uses would substantially undermine the
intent evident in the legislature's instream flow and RICD provisions. The
General Assembly has taken great care to limit recreational and environmental
uses of water in-channel, largely to deal with the potential dangers and excesses
inherent in capturing the flow of the stream. The Club would indisputably be
barred from appropriating rights for its asserted uses were the water in question
to remain in the natural course of the Roaring Fork River. In effect, the Club
seeks to accomplish by virtue of diversion what the legislature has expressly
prohibited instream: By using a diversion to effectively change the path of a
natural stream or a significant portion of it, the Club seeks approval for recreating a natural stream on its private property and adjudicating the rights to
enjoy the flows therein. This appropriation is tantamount to a 'forbidden
riparian right.' Because an appropriation requires actual application of a
portion of the waters of the state to a beneficial use, the Club cannot acquire
such a forbidden right simply by virtue of diversion.
For these reasons, the Club's asserted aesthetic, recreation, and piscatorial
uses, even when proven as alleged, do not qualify as beneficial uses under the
1969 Act. It is for the General Assembly to approve such unconventional
beneficial uses, as it has done with its instream and RICD provisions." See
People v. Emmert 198 Colo. 137, 597 P.2d 1025, 1029 (1979) ('If the
increasing demand for recreational space on the waters of this state is to be
accommodated, the legislative process is the proper method to achieve this
end.'); Bd.of Cniy. Conm'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 972 (Colo.1995)
('We have consistently recognized that the General Assembly has acted to
preserve the natural environment by giving authority to the Colorado Water
Conservation Board to appropriate water to maintain the natural environment,
and we will not intrude into an area where legislative prerogative governs.'
The water court's judgment decreeing the Club's new appropriative rights
must therefore be reversed, and the decree for aesthetic, recreation, and
piscatorial uses vacated."
Id. at 451-52.
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SAN ANTONIO, Los PINos AND CoNJEOs ACEQUIA PRESERVATION
ASSOCIATION V. SPECIAL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 1 OF THE RIO
GRANDE WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT
"Members of the Subdistrict are landowners within the District who rely on
wells for all or part of their irrigation water supply for lands north of the Rio
Grande River within the closed basin area of the San Luis Valley, in Water
Division No. 3. As described in San Antonio, water levels in the unconfined
aquifer within the Subdistrict have declined significantly due to increased
groundwater consumption and sustained drought. The overall objective of the
Amended [Replacement] Plan is to provide a water management system of selfregulation within the Subdistrict (in lieu of state-imposed limits on the use of
irrigation wells) using economic-based incentives to promote responsible
management and use of irrigation water and ensure the protection of senior
surface water rights. Subdistrict members are required to contribute financially
(through assessment of various fees tethered in part to a farm unit's net
groundwater consumrption) to ftmd Subdistrict operations that, among other
activities, provide economic incentives to fallow or permanently retire lands to
reduce irrigation water consumption.
The Amended Plan requires the Subdistrict to prepare, and obtain the State
Engineer's approval of, an ARP that prevents injury to senior water rights. Each
ARP must estimate anticipated stream depletions caused by groundwater
pumping within the Subdistrict during the replacement plan year, including
lagged depletions caused by prior-year pumping. The ARP must then provide
a procedure and timeline to deliver replacement water to any injured rights on
the Rio Grande or Conejos Rivers or other stream, including delivery to Rio
Grande Compact gauges to reduce any Compact curtailment."
San Antonio, Los Pinos and Conjeos River Acequia Pres. Ass'n v. Rio
Grande Water Conservation Dist., 351 P.3d 1112, 1115-16 (Colo. 2015).
"We note that Objectors' challenges fail to allege or establish injury from
the operation of the 2012 ARP and Amended Plan but, instead, largely raise
legal challenges to these documents."
Id. at 1119.
"We hold that: (1) the water court was not authorized to reconsider the
Amended Plan's methodology that this court approved in San Antonio; (2)
courts are not required to stay operation of an ARP until all challenges are
resolved; (3) the 2012 ARP's inclusion of Closed Basin Project water as a source
of replacement water for depletions caused by Subdistrict well pumping was
adequate and suitable to prevent injury to senior surface water rights; and (4)
the inclusion of augmentation plan wells as Subdistrict wells for the purpose of
calculating total groundwater depletions did not violate the 2010 Decree or the
Amended Plan, and the omission of a separate list of augmentation plan wells
did not invalidate the 2012 ARP."
Id.at 1120.
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"IT]he water court correctly concluded that, to the extent Objectors'
challenges sought to resurrect issues with respect to the Amended Plan
addressed in San Antonio, this court's opinion was binding law of the case.
Under the law of the case doctrine, 'prior relevant rulings made in the same
case are to be followed unless such application would result in error or unless
the ruling is no longer sound due to changed conditions.' A trial court has
discretion to apply the law of the case doctrine to its own prior rulings.
However, the law of the case established by an appellate court must be followed
on remand in subsequent proceedings before a trial court. This principle
protects the finality of judgments and ensures lower courts' adherence to
decisions of higher courts."
Id
"The Closed Basin Decree explains the Closed Basin Project in detail and
states that 'It] he water developedby drainage and the operation of the proposed
wells would be collected in and tansported to' the Rio Grande. (Emphasis
added). The Decree similarly states that the project will 'collect and inMroduce
into the Rio Grande River a large volume of water' (emphasis added).
Regardless of whether such water is characterized as salvaged or developed, the
Closed Basin Decree makes clear that water produced by the Closed Basin
Project is water that would not otherwise have made its way to the Rio Grande.
Thus, the water court in this case could not presume that pumping Project wells
causes injury to senior surface rights, and Objectors presented no evidence that
Project water would in fact reach the Rio Grande without the Project's
operations. In any event, this court has previously rejected a similar challenge
based on Shelton Fams, as an impermissible collateral attack on the Closed
Basin Decree. [citation omitted] (noting that a final judgment by a court with
proper jurisdiction is not subject to collateral attack)."
Id.at 1123.
"We hold that the Closed Basin Project provided a suitable source of
replacement water in the 2012 ARP because "the water could simultaneously
meet Compact obligations and replace injurious depletions. We further hold
that use of the Closed Basin Project water rights for replacement falls within
their decreed purposes. Therefore, the water court properly concluded that
Closed Basin Project water was adequate and suitable to prevent injury to senior
surface right holders."
Id.at 1124.
TUCKER V. TOWN OF MINTURN
"This appeal requires us to decide whether a non-attorney trustee of a trust
may proceed pro se before the water court. Opposer-appellant J. Tucker,
Trustee, appeals the water court's order ruling that as trustee of a trust, he was
not pennitted to proceed pro se because he was representing the interests of
others.
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Addressing a matter of first ilpression in Colorado, we conclude that the
water court correctly ruled that as a non-attorney trustee, Tucker could not
proceed pro se on behalf of a trust."
Tucker v. Town of Minturn, 359 P.3d 29, 30 (Colo. 2015).
"Although we have not previously considered whether a trustee may
proceed pro se on behalf of a trust in a litigation matter, we have made clear in
a number of other contexts that a party who is not an attorney may not, without
counsel, represent the interests of others in a litigation matter.
'The purpose of the bar and our admission requirements is to protect the
public from incompetent legal advice and representation.' Non-attorneys are
thus prohibited from undertaking activities that require the exercise of legal
discretion or judgment on behalf of others."
Id. at31.
MERIDIAN SERVICE METROPOLITAN DISTRIcT v. GROUND WATER
COMMISSION
"We have long and consistently held that in the context of such a
jurisdictional conflict, the Commission must make the initial determination as
to whether the controversy implicates designated ground water. Jurisdiction
shifts to the water court only if the Commission concludes that the water at issue
is not designated ground water."
Meridian Serv. Metro. Dist. v. Ground Water Conmm'n, 361 P.3d 392, 396
(Colo. 2015).
"Meridian next contends that the district court erred when it ultimately
found that the water at issue was designated ground water... [The
detennmation of whether the water at issue was designated ground water turned
on whether, 'under natural conditions,' the water would be visible on the
surface, and whether, in its 'natural course,' it would be available for the
fulfillment of decreed surface rights."
Id.
"Here, the district court found: 'The precipitation that falls in the Basin
would sink into the ground and be part of the ground water supply under natural
or pre-development conditions and is water that would nonnally not be visible
on the surface under natural pre-development conditions in the Basin, except
during heavy rain events.' The court further found that the water that Meridian
sought to divert was merely runoff that had been increased by Meridian's
construction of impereable surfaces. Thus, the court concluded that the water
at issue was 'neither a "natural stream" nor water that is 'tributary to a natural
stream' under natural conditions.
Because each of these findings was amply supported by the record, we
conclude that the district court correctly found that a portion of the water
claimed by Meridian as a result of its development was designated ground water
over which the Commission had jurisdiction."
Id. at 396-97.
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"Specifically, when the General Assembly enacted the Management Act, it
affirmed that the prior appropriation doctrine applies to designated ground
water, and it directed the Conmmission to protect senior appropriators of ground
water. The legislature also recognized, however, that the doctrine should be
modified to permit the full economic development of designated groundwater.
The legislature thus rejected a pure appropriation doctrine for designated
ground water because, whereas surface streams 'are subject to seasonal
recharge,' water can be 'mined' from an aquifer to the point that it could take
many years to restore the water level. Accordingly, the Management Act
empowers the Commission to curtail ground water pumping when the amount
of water needed to fill a water right would, among other things, 'result in
withdrawing the ground water supply at a rate materially in excess of the
reasonably anticipated average rate of future recharge.'
The district court's order in this case was fully consistent with these
legislative determinations and, thus, with public policy."
Id. at 399.

BOOK NOTE
Cynthia Barnett, Rain: A National and Cultural History, Crown Publishers,
New York, NY (2015); 368 pp.; ISBN 9780804137096.
Cynthia Barnett is an environmental journalist who has written extensively
on water in locales spanning the globe. Barnett has also written two prior books,
including Blue Revolution, one of The Boston Globe's top ten science books
of 2011. In Rain: A Natui-l and CulturalHistoiy, Barnett discusses the many
misunderstood notions and unique backdrops for rain, covering everything
from colorful anecdotes to historical tragedies where rain has played a significant role. In exposing the factual, exciting, and sometimes humorous aspects
of rain, Barnett breaks down the in-depth discussion of rain into five parts in
thirteen chapters. Each part possesses a unique theme that Barnett illustrates
with numerous examples.
Part I, "Elemental Rain," covers three chapters. Chapter one, "Cloudy with
a Chance of Civilization," discusses some of the greenest rain-soaked forests
and preserves on earth. Starting with the Hoh Rain Forest in the Pacific Northwest, Barnett paints a delicate picture of the forest with its majestic trees and
foliage, down to the multitude of insects living throughout the wilderness treasure. Traveling along the western coast, Barnett takes the reader to Seattle,
pointing out that Seattle is hardly the rainiest city in the United States. In fact,
Seattle's rainfall does not even compare to any city on the east coast. Barnett
then moves on to the life-sustaining monsoons in South and East Asia- With
over two-thirds of the world's population relying on the monsoons for everything from drinking water to irrigation, monsoons are some of the most important rains in the entire world. Finally, walking through a brief sumnmary of
human development, Barnett sets the tone for the rest of the book by reminding
the reader that rain has been a central component of human growth for throughout our existence.
Chapter two, "Drought, Deluge and Delivery," revolves around the central
theme that the rain giveth, and the rain taketh away. Beginning with cities in
India and Pakistan over 4,100 years ago, Barnett discusses how rain has both
provided life for civilizations and washed it away in a brutal, shocking minute.
Describing the growth of civilization over time, Barnett points out that sudden
lack of rain has destroyed vast, developed civilizations such as Mesopotamia.
She then states that while drought begets death, so does deluge. Barnett notes
that of the "Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, Death, Famine, War, and
Plague/Pestilence; endless rains could presage at least three of them." Barnett
discusses how, in the fourteenth century, great rains foreshadowed the Black
Death. Barnett concludes this chapter by describing how we know that rain, or
the lack thereof, has exacerbated some of the worst tragedies civilization has
ever seen.
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Chapter three, "Praying for Rain," delves into the notion of humans and
their belief, or desire, to control the rains. Beginning with nineteenth-century
Texas and a prayer for rain, and then transitioning to more recent governors of
the very same state, Barnett shows that while some notions or traditions may
change, many do not. In fact, from hunter-gatherer culture in Mesopotamia to
the present, humans have had an affinity for praying for rain. The holy texts of
the Abrahamic religions illustrate this fact. Further, even scientists have sought
to prove the historical truth of the great floods.
Part II, "Change for Rain," encompasses chapters four and five. Chapter
four, "The Weather Watchers," looks at the historical development of meteorology. Beginning with Daniel Defoe and the first modern weather report, Barnett takes the reader through the development of one of the most important
media components available today. Moving to the 1800s, Barnett notes the
contributions of scientists such as Luke Howard in creating the International
Cloud Atlas, and George Symons and his Monthly Meteorological Magazine.
Barnett also notes that Congress established a meteorology agency service in the
1870's that continues its work today. Finishing off with the explosive growth of
the Weather Channel, Barnett shows just how far weather reporting has come
in a little over two centuries.
In chapter five, "The Articles of Rain," Barnett begins with a compelling
story starting in the depths of South America. Indigenous people harvested odd
"goo" - what they called "latex", and Latin for "fluid." Over time, various inventors and explorers learned how to refine the sticky, useful substance leading
to the modern "Macintosh," or the world's first and finest raincoat. An important staple of both fashion and practical uses, Barnett guides the reader
through the historical development of the raicoat, its uses, contributors, and,
ultimately, its lasting power. Noting that other "articles of rain" such as the
windshield wiper and galoshes have important uses, Barnett asserts that the articles of rain have contributed to both our wellbeing and fashion sense for as
long as they have been around.
Part III, "American Rain," begins with chapter six, "Founding Forecasters."
The chapter starts with a description of Thomas Jefferson and his design of
Monticello, Jefferson's main plantation. Monticello required well water which
proved to be a difficult proposition. Barnett then moves on to discuss the historical settling of the United States, including Jefferson's detailed investigations
of rain and climate. Ultimately, like so many others, Jefferson would build cisterns to hold water on his plantation, although the caverns rarely worked. Barnett explains how cisterns were an ancient Roman idea, but the ancient Romans
figured out how to waterproof, while Jefferson could not. Barnett concludes
the chapter by laying the foundation for chapter seven, "Rain Follows the Plow."
In chapter seven, Barnett winds the reader through history, telling the tale
of the development of the American west, and how the rains both assisted and
ruined settlements throughout the brand new country. Using the story of Uriah
Oblinger, a Midwestern settler in the 1800s, Barnett takes the reader through
first the wet, torrid rains of settlements in Nebraska in 1872. Barnett then talks
about how an amazing feat happened: as settlers moved out West, the rain followed. This phenomenon led to the theory "rain follows the plow." Scientists
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began to believe that the more development that occurred, the more moisture
in the air causing rain. But alas, drought eventually hit, and it forced farmers to
leave their claims. Barnett talks about the horrific Mississippi floods of 1927,
which cost hundreds of African American slaves their lives; a tragedy that still
lives on in infamy. To end the chapter, Barnett points to the Dust Bowl and
the River Flood as two seminal times in American history both connected to
rain.
Finishing with chapter eight, "The Rainmakers," Barnett delves into some
of the great fads of the United States. Starting with the 1890s, Barnett takes the
reader through the history of "bombing the skies," the theory that man can control the creation of rain. Discussing theories such as a fireworks celebration
causing sudden rains, and the still-current practice of "seeding clouds" (attempting to cause rain where there may be none), Barnett shows the reader the history
of rain control in American science. No matter how little or great success humans may have, Barnett asserts that controlling rain is a tradition as old as time
itself, and will continue for years to come.
Part IV, "Capturing the Rain," begins with chapter nine, "Writers on the
Storm." Starting out with the story of Morrissey, lead singer of the rock band
the Smiths, Barnett discusses the impact of rain on the cities where music genre,
such as grunge, were borne. From the musty English town of Manchester, to
the rain-soaked streets of Seattle that brought us Kurt Cobain, the lead singer
and guitarist of the band Nirvana, rainy cities have brought about some of the
most depressing, yet widely identified music of our time. Showing that rain
impacts writing as well as music, Barnett reminds the reader that Charles Dickenson wrote during a period called the little ice age, when the weather was some
of the worst society has ever recorded. Finally, reminding the reader of film
classics such as "Singing in the Rain" that bring about passion and rain-soaked
kisses, Barnett shows the reader that rain spans many displays of artistic talent,
each with its own flavor.
In chapter ten, "The Scent of Rain," Barnett describes an often overlooked
aspect of the rain, its smell. Using the unique and time-tested art of perfume
making, Barnett goes to India and perfumers' search of the "smell of India."
The country's dark earthen clay contains a special scent, encapsulated with the
first rains of the season. For centuries, people have sought after India's mira"
atta; a famous rain-scented perfume. Its makers bottle the perfume with care
in specially designed pouches. Following one of India's most prominent manufacturers of the product, Barnett gets a first-hand look at the "smell of rain"
and is able to follow the production from harvest to sale.
Chapter eleven, "City Rains," looks at the United States and its metropolitan areas. Starting in Miami, Barnett provides a detailed description of the look
and feel of a good Florida rain storm. Moving to runoff, Barnett highlights a
serious issue facing many places today: pollution and management of runoff
water. For exanple, cars leave residue on the streets, and sewer systems do not
filter this water during rainstorms in places like California and Florida. Florida
also has problems with its management of runoff; problems that can lead to
disease, pollution, and otherwise undesirable side effects. Barnett then compares the dense rains of Florida to the 2014 California drought and the arid, dry
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plains of Tucson, Arizona. By highlighting the problems each city faces, Barnett
demonstrates how much rai touches our most developed areas.
Part V, the final section, encapsulates the final two chapters of the book.
Chapter twelve, "Strange Rain," is a unique look at some of the odder historical
instances of rai. Barnett explains that rains involving frogs, toads, fish, and
colors of red, yellow, and black are all historical phenomena rooted in fact.
Barnett also tells the reader about the snakes, seeds, and shredded meat that
have showered down on unsuspecting people. Barnett then discusses such historical events such as the Greg Fog that killed 12,000 people, and acid rain that
started with the unchecked pollution of the industrial revolution.
In chapter 13, "And the Forecast Calls for Change," Barnett warns the
reader about the future of rain prediction. In the past, society has been able to
use previous indicators to predict the future of rain. We have measured,
gauged, followed, and predicted rainfall and rain patters. Climate change has
changed the way society approaches the rain. Barnett explains that past indicators are no longer future markers of success due to the recent change in rain
patter. Further, Barnett argues the climate is unpredictable, and asserts that if
humans are to continue to benefit and enjoy the life-sustaining gifts of the rain,
humans need to be mindful of nature and their past. Using the Dust Bowl and
the Great Floods as examples, Barnett reminds the reader that humanity does
not always respond well to changes in rain.
In a final epilogue, Barnett travels to the rainiest place on Earth, Cherrapunji, India. This is a beautiful, special place that receives almost four hundred
inches of rain a year annually. However, this special place has not been immune
from the changes in rain. Barnett explains that as a place that normally sees
almost one hundred inches of rain in June, last year saw only twenty-three
inches. Illustrating how dire the changes in weather can be, Barnett uses the
example of Cherrapunji to show how special the rain can be, and just how important it is.
In conclusion, lain: A Naturaland CulturalHistory is not a book for the
practice of water law, but a great illustration of the societal and cultural importance of rain and water, fundamental pieces of sustainable life and civilization. Providing an interesting, practical, and fun education on rain history and
concepts, Barnett assists the reader in understanding the central importance of
rain, and how it can alter the course of nations, people and, ultimately, history.
ChnstopherMcGowne

MOVIE SCREENING REVIEW
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER SUSTAINABILITY OFFICE: THE GREAT
DIVDEMOVIESCREENING WITH QUESTION AND ANSWER
SESSION
Denver, Colorado

February 17, 2016

The University of Denver Sustainability Office and the Anderson Academic Commons Sustainability Committee hosted a screening of "The Great
Divide," a documentary on the history and future of Colorado water. Harvey
Productions, in association with Colorado Humanities, created the video and
released it in the summer of 2015. The documentary includes footage from
throughout Colorado, including the Colorado River and other areas where Colorado water flows. It provides a forward-thinking approach to Colorado's water
consumption by looking backwards through history.
The documentary provided a fascinating look into all aspects of Colorado
water history, replete with historic photos, videos, and expert commentary. It
contains four easy-to-follow sections with in-depth analysis of different aspects
of Colorado's water.
First, the delved into the history of Colorado water, beginning with presettlement history and moving through modern developments. This included
how the early settlers and survey teams viewed water in Colorado. The documentary then discussed how the lack of rain and wet ground led to ditches and
the application of Spanish law. It then covered how Spanish law led to the
famous case, Coffm v. Left HandDitch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (Colo. 1882), which
established that the prior appropriation doctrine, rather than riparian proprietorship, applied to Colorado water rights.
The documentary's next section explored the impacts of agriculture and
urbanization on development and law. It discussed the growth of agriculture in
Colorado, starting with sugar beet faring in Weld County and orchards in the
West. The documentary also covered the development of in-stream storage
projects to try and meet seasonal flow demands. It explained how the use of
storage and diversion projects allowed farmers to use the arid landscape for
major agricultural projects as they continue to do today. The documentary then
looked at growth of Front Range cities and how the growth has led to a need for
urban water in addition to the water needed for agriculture. The section ended
by addressing problems and alternatives to the growing "buy and dry" policy
that some cities have which transfers agricultural water rights to cities and municipalities that need water for their citizens.
The documentary's third section discussed the environmental movement
and the changes in law and policy that resulted from the movement. It explained how Colorado used inter-basin tunnels and large dams to move and
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store water in order to meet the needs of the growing Front Range at the expense of the Western Slope. It then discussed how various projects have directed water from their natural paths into the areas that need water. This set
the stage to discuss how these projects have impacted the areas supplying water
and why Colorado needed new laws and policies. The documentary continued
by providing an in-depth analysis of the Colorado River Compact and its limits
on local water use and required downstream flows. It also highlighted how Colorado cities have now started a movement to try and make laws that keep sufficient water in the Western Slope to support recreation, parks, and the mountain
ecosystem.
Finally, the documentary discussed Colorado's history of conflict over water. It focused on major disagreements concerning moving Western Slope water to the Front Range, and the way those conflicts morphed into an attitude of
cooperation. The documentary ended by looking at a variety of methods of
conserving water and saving aquifers and stream flows. Specifically, the documentary touched on inter-basin compacts, Aurora Water's renewable water
loops, and the Colorado Water Plan.
Justice Gregory Hobbs, Jr., former Colorado Supreme Court Justice, and
Kristin Maharg, the director of programs for the Colorado Foundation for Water Education, answered questions after the showing. One audience member
asked what efforts there were to conserve water without costing people their
existing rights. Justice Hobbs discussed the various existing methods, such as
sustainable groundwater management, augmentation plans, and some of the effects on fossil groundwater sources. Ms. Maharg discussed how agriculture water consumption relates to consumer spending habits and how some farmers
are selling their underutilized water rights.
When asked how the current laws impacted the controlled release of water
from dams and why the dams did not release the water in a power-generating
way, Justice Hobbs responded that agreements on water levels in Lake Powell
and Lake Mead required those releases and that the releases were to control
sedimentation, rather than to generate power. The question and answer section
concluded with a question asking whether there are any state initiatives to help
farmers obtain new infrastructure, cooperatives, and terminal markets to grow
less water-intensive crops than they currently grow. Justice Hobbs did not think
that there would be any state intervention and that private funding would handle
these kinds of initiatives.

RobertPetrowsky

COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Askins v. Ohio Dep't of Agric., 809 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that
(i) the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision does not apply to notification
requirements; (ii) the Clean Water Act's notification requirement is not a condition of a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit; (iii) the
Clean Water Act does not permit a cause of action against non-polluting regulators for violations of procedural regulations; and iv) the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency's decision not to hold a hearing was not a failure to perfon
a non-discretionary duty, and as such was not actionable under the Clean Water
Act).
This was an appeal from The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, which dismissed all of appellants', Larry and Vickie Askins
("Askinses"), claims. The Ohio Environmental Protection Agency ("Ohio
EPA") administers the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's ("U.S. EPA")
approval. In 2001, the Ohio legislature authorized the Ohio Department of
Agriculture ("ODA") to apply to the U.S. EPA to transfer authority from Ohio
EPA to ODA, so that ODA could administer part of the state-NPDES program.
The Clean Water Act ("CWA") permits such a transfer, but requires the U.S.
EPA's permission prior to transfer. The Askinses alleged that the transfer took
place in 2001, while the Ohio EPA didn't seek permission until some five years
later. As such, the Askinses sued under the CWA's citizen suit provision, alleging various violations of the CWA.
The lower court held that the Askinses failed to state a claim under the
CWA, the U.S. EPA did not fail to perform a non-discretionary duty under the
CWA, and the U.S. EPA, the Ohio EPA, and the ODA did not violate the
CWA. The Askinses appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ("Court"),
arguing that the CWA's citizen suit provision permitted their cause of action.
First, the Court considered whether the Askinses could maintain a citizen
suit action for a violation of the CWA's notice requirement under Section 1314.
The Court reasoned that the notice requirement at issue is not an enumerated
provision requiring compliance, and as such, the citizen suit provision does not
encompass alleged violations of the requirement.
Next, the Court considered whether the notification requirement was a
"condition." The Court concluded that the notification requirement serves as
a timing mechanism, which triggers a state's ability to apply to administer the
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NPDES program, as opposed to a substantive requirement. Further, the notification requirement referred to EPA approval of a state's permit program, not
a state's approval of individual pernits. Finally, the Court concluded that the
Askinses' reading of the notification requirement as a condition was contradictory to NPDES requirements, specifically that state and federal permit conditions be the same. As such, the Court held that the CWA's notification requirement is not a permit "condition."
Third, the Court determined whether there existed a private cause of action
against regulators for violations of procedural regulations. The Court concluded that if Congress intended the citizen suit provision to permit the
Askinses' claim, it would have included language in the explicidy enumerated
circumstances permitting suit. Further, if the citizen suit provision were so expansive as to permit this claim, the provision's remedies would give it more
teeth than the U.S. EPA itself has, by way of the provision's shorter notice period and availability of civil penalties and costs. This is not the case because
Congress intended the citizen suit provision to supplement the regulators' authority. Additionally, cases that considered other, identical citizen suit provisions reached the same conclusion as this Court. Therefore, the Court held,
the CWA citizen suit provision did not permit a private right of action against a
non-polluting regulator for procedural violations.
Finally, the Court considered whether the U.S. EPA failed to perform a
non-discretionary duty. The Court held that the CWA does not require the
U.S. EPA to hold a hearing. Should the U.S. EPA choose to hold a hearing,
the CWA requires it to withdraw approval of a state-NPDES progran after
hearing, proper notice, and time to address the issue. That is to say, the CWA
does not require a hearing in the first place; therefore it is not a non-discretionary duty. The U.S. EPA did not hold a hearing in the present case, so no nondiscretionary duties arose. Thus, the CWA did not permit the Askinses' citizen
suit
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Tim Berrier
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Alaska Eskimo Whaling Comm'n v. U.S. Envt Prot. Agency, 791 F.3d
1088 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding the Clean Water Act neither requires the EPA to
satisfy each of the criteria in the statute when issuing an oil exploration waste
discharge permit, nor determine reasonable alternatives to on-site disposal of
wastes, and that the Clean Water Act does not require the EPA to incorporate
the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission and oil companies' agreed migrating
measures into discharge permits).
The Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission ("AEWC") represents several
native Alaskan villages engaged in subsistence hunting of bowhead whales in the
Beaufort Sea. The AEWC challenged a wastewater discharge permit ("Permit") that the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") issued to oil exploration companies. The Permit authorized discharge of thirteen waste streams into

Issue 2

COURTREPORTS

the Beaufort Sea. The Permit mandated limitations and monitoring requirements, which barred discharge during the fall bowhead whale-hunting season.
Despite these measures, the AEWC claimed that the EPA failed to adequately
consider how the authorized discharges would impose on subsistence communities' fall whale hunt. The AEWC contended that the discharges would divert
the whales further from their migratory routes, making the hunt less productive
and more dangerous.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Court") had
jurisdiction to review the Permit, in accordance with the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") provisions within the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). AEWC petitioned the Court to remand the Permit to the EPA for
further proceedings leading to additional restrictions. The Court reviewed the
action under the arbitrary and capricious standard of the Administrative Procedure Act, which generally states that the EPA's action is presumed to be valid
and must be affirmed if a "reasonable basis" exists for its decisions.
The EPA produced three documents to explain its decision: (i) the Response to Commrents, which included all the comments the EPA received from
the community when drafting the Permit; (ii) its Ocean Discharge Criteria Evaluation ("ODCE"); and (iii) its EnvironmentalJustice Analysis. In the Response
to Comments, the EPA wrote that non-contact cooling water would not cause
an unreasonable degradation to the marine environment because its analysis
indicated the discharge's temperature would dissipate within "100 meters of the
discharge location." In the ODCE, the EPA stated that authorized discharges
would dissipate and dilute to "approximately 600:1 at 100 meters from the discharge point." However, the day before oral argument, the EPA submitted a
letter to the Court that acknowledged a mistake in the record, in which the
model it cited in support of its statements did not include non-contact cooling
water, but actually referred to drilling-related effluents.
Faced with this discovery, the Court remanded to the EPA to reconsider its
determination that non-contact cooling water discharge would not cause "unreasonable degradation of the marine environment," and to submit specific evidence regarding the effects of that discharge on the bowhead whale migration.
The AEWC next argued that the EPA failed to base its decision on two
considerations listed in the CWA for determining degradation of marine waters.
The Court determined that the CWA set forth considerations that the EPA
must follow when "promulgating its own regulations, not the criteria that EPA
must apply to each permitting decision it makes." The Court concluded that
those criteria did not apply to this case.
The Court weighed whether the EPA's application of its regulatory criteria
was arbitrary or capricious. To begin this inquiry, the Court examined 40 C.F.R
§ 125.123 that provides criteria under which the EPA issues discharge permits.
Paragraph (a) of the statute states that "[iIf the director on the basis of available
information... determines prior to permit issuance that the discharge will not
cause unreasonable degradation of the marine environment after application of
any necessary conditions... he may issue an NPDES permit containing such
conditions."
In support of its position, the AEWC first contended that paragraph (c) of
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the statute applied to this case. That paragraph stipulates that the EPA must
determine there were no other reasonable alternatives other than on-site disposal of materials. However, the Court held that there was no evidence in the
record, nor in the regulations, to support the claim that paragraph (c) applied
to this proceeding.
Second, the AEWC argued the evidence did not support a finding that discharges other than non-contact cooling water will not cause an "unreasonable
degradation of the marine environment." The AEWC's challenge of the EPA's
evidentiary analysis was based on two CWA criteria: (i) the potential impact the
discharge will have on human health; and (ii) "[sluch other factors relating to
the effects of the discharge as may be appropriate."
The Court disagreed with the AEWC, holding that the record was "replete
with evidence" that the EPA fully considered the AEWC's concerns and that it
considered the CWA's criteria in making its determination. Therefore, the
Court held that the EPA was not arbitrary or capricious in issuing the Permit.
Third, the AEWC argued that the EPA did not provide a rational explanation of how the EPA's monitoring program would prevent conflict with subsistence use and that the EPA acted arbitrary and irrational in relying on such monitoring programs. Again, the Court disagreed with the AEWC. It found that
the detailed description of the monitoring program included requirements for
monthly monitoring, post-drilling reports, and ongoing monitoring of marine
mammal deflection during discharges. Based on these requirements, the Court
held there was no basis for concluding that the EPA's design and implementation of the monitoring program was arbitrary or capricious.
Finally, the AEWC contended that the EPA should adopt the same nitigation measures that the National Marine Fisheries Services ("NMFS") adopted.
These are the same measures the AEWC, Shell Gulf Oil of Mexico, and Shell
Offshore, Inc. agreed to in a separate Conflict Avoidance Agreement. The
Court held that the EPA was not required to adopt those terms because the
AEWC identified no legal authority requiring such measures. The Court found
no measures that would mandate the EPA to incorporate the NMFS mitigation
measure or the Conflict Avoidance Agreement into the Permit.
Accordingly, the Court remanded to the EPA for a determination of
whether the discharge of non-contact cooling water would cause an "unreasonable degradation of the marine environment," and denied the petition in all
other respects.
Vann A. Ellerbruch
Alaska Wilderness League v.Jewell, 788 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming the district court's ruling that: (i) the Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement's approval of the challenged oil spill response plans was not arbitrary and capricious; (ii) the Endangered Species Act did not require the Bureau
of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to consult with any enviromnental
agencies before approving oil spill response plans; (iii) the Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement was entitled to Chevron deference for its interpretation of the Oil Pollution Act; and (iv) the National Environmental Policy Act
did not require the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to do an
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environmental impact statement before approving an oil spill response plan).
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA") outlines the procedure for exploration and development of oil and gas resources offshore. This
process has four stages. First, the Secretary of Interior creates a five-year leasing
program under which operators may search and mine for oil and gas. Second,
the Secretary must approve the leases under agreed upon terms and conditions.
Third, the lessee must provide the Secretary with a plan of exploration and an
Oil Spill Response Plan ("OSRP") pursuant to the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
Fourth, after searching for oil and gas, and successfully finding either, the lessee
has must submit a production and development plan to the Secretary for approval.
At the third stage, the Secretary of the Interior has delegated its power to
the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement ("BSEE") to approve
OSRPs to prevent and respond to oil spills. The CWA requires these plans at
four levels: national, regional, local, and individual. At the individual level, owners and operators must propose an OSRP for approval that outlines their response to a potential "worst case discharge" of oil or some other hazardous
substance.
Shell Gulf of Mexico Inc. and Shell Offshore Inc. (collectively "Shell") acquired three leases for offshore exploration and production-two leases in the
Beaufort in 2005 and 2007, and one in the Chukchi Seas in 2008. Shell complied with all regulations at the time for intended exploration, but due to the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, the Secretary of the Interior placed a temporary moratorium on all offshore drilling. The United States Department of
Interior required owners and operators to provide new information in all
OSRPs after the moratorium ended. To comply with the new criteria, Shell
updated its OSRPs for its three leases. BSEE approved the updated Beaufort
and Chukchi Seas OSRPs.
Alaska Wilderness League, a coalition of environmental groups, sued Secretary of Interior, SallyJewell, in her official capacity because of the approval of
Shell's three OSRPs. Shell intervened as a co-defendant. On cross-motions
for summary judgment, the United States District Court for the District of
Alaska ("district court") ruled in favor of Jewell and Shell. Alaska Wilderness
League appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
("Court"). The Court reviewed the granting of summary judgment de novo and
reviewed the record of the agency's action under the arbitrary and capricious
standard.
First, Alaska Wilderness League argued BSEE's approval of the OSRPs
was arbitrary and capricious because Shell assumed it would be able to recover
ninety to ninety-five percent of any oil spilled in either of the seas via mechanical
means. A figure that Alaska Wilderness League claimed was unrealistic and
that Shell failed to support with any evidence. First, the Court found that Shell
could store, not recover, ninety to ninety-five percent of any spilled oil. Further,
the Court found that BSEE did not rely on this information i approving Shell's
OSRPs. Accordingly, the Court concluded BSEE's approval of the OSRPs was
not arbitrary and capricious.
The Court next addressed Alaska Wilderness League's argument that
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BSEE failed to consult with other agencies in order to comply with the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). The Court disagreed, reasoning that ESA only triggers consultation when the agency's involvement is discretionary, and, in this
case, BSEE's approval of the OSRPs was non-discretionary. Therefore, the
Court held that ESA did not require BSEE to do a consultation.
The Court then applied the two-step Chevron deference analysis to assess
BSEE's interpretation of the applicable sections of the CWA. At step one of
its Chevron analysis, whether the statute in question is ambiguous, the Court
found that the CWA was ambiguous in both its structure and its language. The
Court found the CWA has ambiguous language because of three pertinent sections: (i) 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) requires an operator to "prepare and submit.., a plan for responding, to the maximum extent practicable, to a worst
case discharge;". (ii) § 1321 (j)(5)(D) lists six requirements that the OSRP "shall"
meet; and (iii) § 1321(j)(5)(E)(iii) states that if the OSRP meets all six requirements, then BSEE "shall" approve it.
Specifically, the Court found the text ambiguous as to whether BSEE has
the discretion to consider any additional environmental factors in making its
determination of an OSRP. The Court found that the "maximumn extent practicable" language in § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) suggested the agency had discretion in its
approval of an OSRP. However, the Court also found §§ 1321(j)(5)(D) and
1321(j)(5)(E)(iii) to be a laundry list of requirements that an OSRP must meet.
If an OSRP meets those requirements, then BSEE must approve the plan; removing any agency discretion. Additionally, the Court found the statute's structure ambiguous because of the discretionary language in one section, and the
rigid language in the one following it. The Court found this difference created
C"a statute whose halves do not correspond to each other - giving rise to ambiguity that calls for Chevron deference." Under this finding of ambiguity, the
Court found it must defer to BSEE's interpretation of the statute as long as its
interpretation is reasonable.
The Court then underwent the second step of the Chevron analysis to detennine whether BSEE's interpretation was reasonable. Courts must defer to
an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute as long as that interpretation
is reasonable. BSEE argued that § 1321(j) (5) (A)(i) mandated it to promulgate
regulations that help operators follow the OSRP requirements listed in §
1321(j)(5) (D). Then, separately, § 1321(j)(5)(D)-(E) lists exactly what the OSRP
shall include and the agency shall approve. The Court agreed with BSEE's
interpretation that the statute mandated the agency to publish regulations to
outline how operators can comply with the list. The Court also agreed with
BSEE's interpretation that it could not consider anything more than the list
when granting an OSRP. Having found BSEE's interpretation to be reasonable,
the Court deferred to the agency's interpretation.
The Court also found that BSEE's interpretation was consistent with
longstanding agency policy. The Court explained how BSEE has a history of
regulating in conformity with the goals of the Oil Pollution Act that amended
the CWA. The legislative history of the Oil Pollution Act suggests that Congress meant to create specific requirements of OSRPs, not guidelines open to
interpretation by the courts or agencies.
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Additionally, the Court addressed Alaska Wilderness League's four additional arguments. First, Alaska Wilderness League argued that the similarity in
language between the requirements listed in § 1321(j)(5)(E) and the section of
the statute governing federal response plans to spills subjected the approval of
OSRPs to ESA consultation. However, the Court disagreed with this interpretation. Under the sections of the statute governing federal response plans, an
ESA recommendation may prompt agency action, but the plan "shall include,
but not be limited to" a number of factors. This federal response plan requirement, unlike that in § 1321 (j)(5)(E), does not limit the factors to those listed.
Second, Alaska Wilderness League argued that the regulations contain no
language to support approval of the OSRPs just because they address the cleanup plan to some degree. The Court quickly dismissed this argument. The
Court found that the statute states that the purpose of the OSRP is to prepare a
response plan for an accident at sea resulting in release of oil, and that Congress
ordered these plans be in compliance with "the Oil Pollution Act's amendiments
to the Clean Water Act." The Court deferred to BSEE's interpretation that the
OSRPs were sufficient and justly approved, despite any explicit language governing BSEE's decision.
Third, Alaska Wilderness League argued that BSEE had discretion over
whether OSRPs met the criteria in § 1321(j)(5)(E), thus triggering ESA consultation. The Court found this argument to be at odds with previous Supreme
Court's rulings. The Supreme Court previously held that "ESA cannot defeat
an agency's nondiscretionary statutory directive." The Court held that BSEE's
act of granting OSRPs was nondiscretionary, and so it did not trigger any interagency review under ESA.
Lastly, Alaska Wilderness League claimed that BSEE violated the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") by failing to do an environmental impact
statement ("EIS") before approving the OSRPs. Under NEPA, all federal agencies must conduct an EIS before conducting any "major Federal action" that
significantly affects the environment. However, the Court noted that there is an
exception to this requirement when the environmental impact is the result of a
decision over which the agency had no discretion. The Court ruled that because
BSEE had no discretion over the approval of the OSRPs under the statute, it
also had no discretion over the environmental impacts, making BSEE exempt
from performing an EIS.
Accordingly, the Court affinned the district court's ruling.
D.W. Nelson, Senior CircuitJudge, dissenting.
Senior Circuit Judge Nelson agreed with the majority's ruling that BSEE
acted appropriately when it approved the OSRPs in question, but dissented to
all other aspects of the majority opinion. Specifically, the dissent agreed with
Alaska Wilderness League's contention that BSEE's action was discretionary,
triggering an ESA consultation.
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's finding that BSEE was exempt from performing a NEPA analysis. The dissent did not agree with the
majority's interpretation of the NEPA exception. The dissent argued that as a
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regulator of environmental consequences "the [BSEE] did in fact possess the
kind of discretion that necessitated NEPA review."
WJarnes Tilton

ONRC Action v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 798 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2015)
(holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
the Bureau of Reclamation because the two water sources at issue were not
"meaningfully distinct" and did not require the governmental entity to obtain a
permit under the Clean Water Act).
In 2012, ONRC Action, an Oregon-based environmental group, filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon contending that the Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") discharged pollutants from
the Klanath Straits Drain ("KSD") into the Klamath River without a permit, in
violation of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The Bureau filed a motion for
summary judgment and ONRC Action filed a cross-motion for partial summary
judgment. A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation in favor of
the Bureau because of the Water Transfers Rule, which the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") adopted through regulation. The district court
adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation finding summary judgment in favor of the Bureau and denying ONRC Action's motion for partial
summary judgment. ONRC Action appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ("Court").
In 1905, Congress authorized the Klamath Irigation Project ("Project") to
provide irrigation to approximately 210,000 acres of land in Oregon and California through a system of dams, pumps, drains, tunnels, and canals. The Project draws water from the Klamath River and Upper Klamath Lake, and eventually conveys the water from Lower Klamath Lake back into the Klamath River
through the KSD. In the early 20th Century a natural waterway called the Klamath Straits connected the Lower Klamath Lake and the Klamath River. A
local railroad severed the Klamath Straits in 1917, but the Bureau restored flow
in the 1940s when it created the KSD. The KSD includes two pumping stations
that keep water flowing within a certain operating range; however, the pumps
are not always active. The KSD generally follows the historic pathway of the
Klamath Straits, with only a slight deviation passing through marshland that
acted as a historical hydrological connection between the water bodies.
To resolve whether the district court correctly granted sununary judgment
in favor of the Bureau, the Court looked to recent Supreme Court precedent
in determining whether Lower Klamath Lake and Klamath River were "meaningfully distinct" water sources. The Court cited Los Angeles County Flood
Control Dist v. NaturalResources Defense Council ("L.A. County'), where
the Supreme Court held that pumping water between different parts of a water
body is not a discharge of pollutants under the CWA. The Supreme Court
went on to add that a water transfer is a discharge of pollutants only if the bodies
of water are "meaningfully distinct." As a result of the Supreme Court's holding
in L.A. County, the Court did not rule on whether the Water Transfers Rule
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applied to the KSD discharge, nor whether the rule was within the EPA's authority.
Finally, the Court compared the KSD-Klamnath River transfer to L.A.
County and South Florida Water Management Dis&ict v. Miccosukee Tribe.
Like the riverbed in L.A. County,the KSD is an improved version of a natural
waterway that previously existed. Further, the water that the KSD transfers into
the Klamath River originated in that river. The last point the Court made is that
if the Bureau removed the pumps and headgates it placed in the 1940s the Klamath Straits would convey water between the Klamath River and Lower Klamath Lake, finalizing the argument that the waters are not meaningfully distinct.
The Court emphasized this point because whether the CWA required the Bureau to obtain a permit turned on whether the two water bodies were meaningfully distinct.
Accordingly, the court affinned the sununary judgment in favor of the Bureau.
Josh Oden
STATE COURTS
ARIZONA
Arizona Dep't. of Water Res. v. McClennen, 360 P.3d 1023 (Ariz. 2015)
(holding that: (i) Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-172 provides the only grounds for
which the Arizona Department of Water Resources can deny an application for
severance and transfer of a water right; and (ii) the statute defines "interested
persons" as those with interests protected by § 45-172 and whose rights the
transfer would affect).
In 2010, Freeport Minerals Corporation ("Freeport") sent applications to
the Arizona Department of Water Resources ("ADWR") to sever water rights
from Planet Ranch in Mohave County and transfer them to a wellfield near
Wikieup. The proposed transfer would not physically remove any water, but
rather it would give Freeport the right to use water for mining and municipal
uses without losing priority.
Freeport previously entered into settlement agreements with the Arizona
Game and Fish Department, the Hualapai Tribe, and the Department of the
Interior, which Congress approved in the Bill Willians River Water Rights Settlement Act of 2014 ("Act"). The Act was scheduled to expire in December
2015 if Freeport failed to fulfill certain conditions, including the ADWR granting Freeport's applications.
Upon receiving Freeport's applications, the ADWR published notice in
numerous Mohave County newspapers stating 'any interested person' could file
a written obection. Mohave County ("County") filed an objection to Freeport's
applications, arguing that the transfer would affect the county's water supply,
increase taxes, and was against the public interest. The ADWR rejected the
County's arguments, finding that the county did not have an affected water right.
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Additionally, the ADWR concluded it was not authorized to deny the applications on the basis it would cause an increase in tax burdens to residents or it
would be against public interest. An administrative law judge upheld the
ADWR's decision finding that none of the County's objections were based on
the "limitations and conditions" enumerated in Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 45-172.
In December 2014, the County filed an appeal in superior court, which
vacated the ADWR's final decision in June 2015. Freeport and the ADWR
filed appeals with the Arizona Court of Appeals and moved to transfer the case
to the Supreme Court of Arizona ("Court"). The Court granted the petition for
special action.
The Court first addressed whether the ADWR had authority to deny severance and transfer applications for reasons other than those listed in the statute. Section 45-172(A) provides: "la] water right may be severed from the land
to which it is appurtenant... land] may be transferred for use... without losing
priority theretofore established, subject to the following limitations and conditions." One such limitation is that the ADWR director must publish notice of
applications in a newspaper in the county where the drainage or watershed lies.
The published notice must include that any interested person may file written
objections within thirty days from the last day of published notice.
In construing this statute, the Court analyzed legislative intent. The statute
identifies specific limits or conditions in approving water rights transfers. The
Court found that the ADWR's review of an application is a "licensing decision,"
which prohibits the ADWR from basing its decision on any condition not specifically authorized by the statute.
The County argued that the ADVWR has discretion under § 45-172(A) to
consider other factors because the statute says water rights "may" be severed
and transferred. However, the Court found "may" to refer to the ability to sever
and transfer the water right. The Court reasoned that interpreting "may" to
allow the ADWR broad discretion to deny an application overlooks the rest of
the sentence stating "subject to the following limitations and conditions." The
County cited various statutes purportedly supporting that the ADVVR could
deny applications for reasons not listed in § 45-172(A), but the Court found
them unconvincing. Thus, the Court found the ADWR did not abuse its discretion in denying the County's objections, which were not listed in § 45-172(A).
The Court next addressed whether the County qualified as an "interested
person" entitled to file objections to the transfer and severance applications.
Because the phrase "any interested person" is ambiguous, the Court found it
was subject to more than one meaning.
The County first argued that the Court should interpret the phrase "any
interested person" as anyone having an interest or concern about the transfer
and severance of water rights. The Court found this interpretation would allow
almost anyone to file objections, rendering the word "interested" essentially
meaningless. The Court specifically noted that words should not be construed
in isolation, but rather taken together in context.
Read in context, the Court construed the phrase "any interested person" to
mean any person having a statutorily protected interest that would be affected
by the application for proposed transfer and severance. The Court concluded
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the County was not an "interested person" entitled to file an objection in this
case because it had no such protected interest.
Second, the County contended that "interested persons" should encompass
more than those persons who have existing water rights because the statute requires the director to give notice of the applications. The County reasoned that
if "interested persons" were only those having an interest protected by statute,
it could send notice directly to those persons, rather than circulating notice in a
newspaper. The Court found this argument unpersuasive because publication
requirements are not inconsistent with imposing limitations on who may file
objections.
Third, the County argued it qualified as an "interested person" because approval of the severance and transfer would cause it injury. Specifically, the severance would increase tax burdens on county residents and could negatively
affect water supplies. The Court found that this argument improperly conflated
standing, which requires plaintiffs to allege sufficient injury in order to appear
in court.
Fourth, the County claimed that the ADWR must first consult with the
County before deciding on applications under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-269.09(A).
The County also contended it has an obligation under Ariz. Rev. State § 11-804
to protect water resources in the county. The Court found neither statute applied.
Last, the County argued the Court should construe § 45-172(A) liberally to
"promote the ends of justice." The County cited Aimer v. Superior Court,in
which the Court adopted this approach when interpreting the phrase "party
beneficially interested." Finding that "any interested person" was not synonymous with the phrase "party beneficially interested," the Court declined to
adopt this approach.
Accordingly, the Court vacated the superior court judgment and affirmed
the ADWR's final decision.
Kelly Ledoux

COLORADO
In the Matter of Water Rights, 361 P.3d 392 (Colo. 2015) (holding that: (i)
the Colorado Ground Water Commission had jurisdiction to make the initial
determination of whether the water at issue was designated ground water; and
(ii) a portion of the stomn runoff water at issue was "designated ground water"
under the Groundwater Management Act, rather than surface water).
The Colorado Ground Water Commission ("Commission") held hearings
in 1967 and 1968 in order to resolve the proper designation of a ground water
basin in the Upper Black Squirrel Creek Basin ("Basin"). It found that "'virtually all' of the water in the basin was underground water, and water flowed on
the surface only 'during and immediately following' periods of heavy rainfall
from summer storns." The water was also not adjacent to a continuously flowing natural stream and would never reach a tributary system. As such, the Commission determined that the Basin qualified as a designated ground water basin,
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and entered its findings in a final order (the "1968 Order").
The Meridian Service Metropolitan District ("Meridian") proposed a development in the Basin area. Its development would result in an increase in
surface water runoff due to the creation of impermeable surfaces. In 2011,
Meridian filed an application for such surface water rights in the District Court
for Water Division No. 2 ("Water Court"). In its application, Meridian sought
conditional rights to divert and store runoff water from an unspecified Upper
Black SquirTel Creek tributary. Opposers challenged the Water Court's jurisdiction to hear the matter because while Meridian characterized the water in its
application as "storm run-off," the water directly recharges the Basin and is
therefore designated ground water subject to the Commission's administration.
The Water Court agreed that Meridian's application presented a jurisdictional
question, and the Water Court and stayed its proceedings while Meridian initiated a case before the Conurnission.
A hearing officer for the Commission concluded that the water Meridian
sought to appropriate was designated ground water and not surface water. The
hearing officer reasoned that, except for Meridian's development of impermeable surfaces, falling precipitation in the Basin would either recharge the aquifer, evaporate, or hydrate plants. The Commission affirmed the hearing officer's conclusion, and Meridian appealed to the El Paso County District Court
("District Court"). The District Court agreed with the Commission and concluded that naturally falling precipitation would not reach a tributary system,
and as such, the surface streanms are "'only streams because they are manmade."' Therefore, the District Court denied Meridian's application for surface water rights.
On appeal, Meridian made four arguments before the Supreme Court of
Colorado ("Court"). It argued: (i) the Commission did not have subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case; (ii) the Commission improperly classified the storm
runoff as designated groundwater water; (iii) claim preclusion barred the Commission from finding that a portion of water was designated ground water; and
(iv) public policy concerns weighed in its favor.
The Court first addressed Meridian's jurisdictional-based argument in
which Meridian argued that the Water Court, not the Commission, had jurisdiction over the case because the issues involved conditional rights and surface
water. In support of this argument, Meridian referenced The Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 ("1969 Act"), which grants water
courts jurisdiction over "water matters" in the state. The 1969 Act, however,
"applies only to the administration of surface and underground water that is in
or tributary to natural streams." In contrast, The Colorado Groundwater Management Act ("Management Act") grants the Commission jurisdiction over designated ground water issues. More importantly, in the case of a jurisdictional
conflict between the deciding bodies, jurisdiction vests with the Commission to
initially determine if designated ground water was at issue. The water court only
obtains jurisdiction if the Commission concludes that the contested water is not
designated ground water. Accordingly, because this case involved a jurisdictional issue, the Court rejected Meridian's argument and found that the Commission had jurisdiction to make an initial determination.
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Next, the Court turned to the issue of classification. Meridian contended
that the District Court erred by finding that the water at issue was designated
ground water, and not surface water. In making a determination, the Court first
looked at the Management Act, which defines "designated ground water" as
"ground water which in its natural course would not be available to and required
for the fulfillment of decreed surface rights." The Management Act also defines
"ground water" as "any water not visible on the surface of the ground under
natural conditions." Considering these definitions and the record, the Court
upheld the District Court's finding that the water Meridian sought to divert was
not simply surface water. The Court found ample support in the record to
conclude that a portion of the water Meridian sought to appropriate was the
result of man-made impermeable surfaces and did not occur naturally, except
during heavy rain events. The Court also rejected Meridian's definitional arguments based on case law because the facts of the cases were too dissimilar.
The Court then turned to Meridian's argument that claim preclusion prevented the Commission from finding that a portion of the water at issue was
designated ground water. Meridian contended that claim preclusion occurred
because the Commfission stated in its 1968 Order that only water in the Basin
was designated ground water. The Court found that claim preclusion did not
apply because the earlier and present proceedings did not involve identical
claims for relief. Additionally, the runoff water at issue in this case, created in
part by Meridian's development, could not have been a part of a lawsuit in 1968.
Finally, the Court addressed Meridian's public policy argument and held
that the District Court's reasoning, and not Meridian's, was consistent with public policy for three reasons. First, the Court reasoned that allowing people to
own a previously untapped water supply, resulting from development that replaced natural land conditions, would be contrary to public policy. Second, the
Court found that it could not condone Meridian's application because doing so
would result in a type of unprecedented "'super decree"' that would allow Meridian access to the water "free from both the call of the Arkansas River and the
Commission's oversight." Third, even though only four percent of precipitation
recharges the aquifer, the Court found that granting Meridian's application
would have resulted in an overall reduced rate of recharge, which would harm
senior designated ground water users.
Accordingly, the Court affirned the District Court's holding on all four issues.

Kobl Webb
MONTANA
Teton Co-op Canal Co. v. Teton Coop Reservoir, 365 P.3d 442 (Mont
2015) (holding: (i) the Water Court's finding that Teton Canal's predecessors
in interest did not develop a certain diversion point was clearly erroneous because they developed the diversion point to build Glendora Canal; (ii) the Water Court's finding that the Eureka Reservoir's priority date related back to the
1890 Notice was incorrect because the 1890 Notice did not contemplate the
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Eureka Reservoir; and (iii) the Water Court, on remand, must determine Eureka Reservoir's priority date).
In 1890, Teton Canal's predecessors filed an appropriation notice ("1890
Notice") for claims along the Teton River for irrigation purposes. Immediately
following the 1890 Notice, Teton Canal's predecessors constructed the Glendora Canal. In 1891, the predecessors filed another larger claim along the Teton River ("1891 Notice"). The 1891 Notice listed a diversion point two miles
from the Glendora Canal's diversion point. Both the 1890 and 1891 Notices
described part of the purpose of appropriation as to create reservoirs.
In 1893, Teton Canal's predecessors sold their interests to a company that
later transferred those interests to Russell Shepherd. Shepherd subsequently
became involved in a court case adjudicating water rights on the Teton River
("Perrycase"). During the Perycase, Shepard transferred his rights to Teton
Canal. In 1908, the Perrycourt issued a decree that effectively extinguished the
claims made under the 1891 Notice. While Teton Canal demonstrated interest
in developing a reservoir, it had not done so by 1926, the year when the United
States General Land Office inspected the site. Teton Canal finally constructed
the reservoir in 1937.
In 1982, Teton Canal submitted claims for six distinct water rights along the
Teton River to comply with the requirements of the Montana Water Use Act
of 1973. All six claims listed an identical priority date: April 18, 1890. The
point of diversion, the Eureka Canal, was also the same for all six claims. Water
distributors, Teton Coop Reservoir Co. ("Teton Reservoir"), Lower Teton
Joint Objectors, and the Farmer's Co-op Canal, all objected to Teton Co-op
Canal's claims to the Eureka Reservoir. Teton Canal settled with all of the
objectors besides Teton Reservoir. After conducting evidentiary hearings, the
Montana Water Court ("Water Court") issued an order in favor of Teton Canal. The Water Court held that Teton Canal's water rights claims related back
to the 1890 Notice. Teton Reservoir appealed the judgment of the Water Court
to the Supreme Court of Montana ("Court").
On appeal, Teton Reservoir argued that the Water Court erred in determining that Teton Canal's claims to the Eureka Reservoir related back to the
1890 Notice. The Court reviewed the Water Court's findings of fact under the
clearly erroneous standard and its conclusions of law for correctness.
The Court first examined whether Teton Canal's predecessors intended to
include the Eureka Reservoir in the 1890 Notice. Teton Reservoir argued that
the Water Court erred in determining that Teton Canal's predecessors did develop the diversion point described in the 1890 Notice. Teton Reservoir also
asserted that the Water Court disregarded evidence clearly demonstrating that
Teton Canal's predecessors built the Glendora Canal, which corresponded with
descriptions of the 1890 diversion point. The Court reviewed the evidence
including maps and testimony from an engineer who had helped construct the
Glendora Canal. The Court determined that the Teton Canal's predecessors
did develop the 1890 diversion point when they created the Glendora Canal.
"Thus, the Court held that the Water Court's clearly erred in finding the predecessors had never developed the diversion point.
Teton Reservoir next argued that the 1890 Notice did not contemplate the
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Eureka Reservoir; rather, the 1891 Notice, which the court had since nullified,
first asserted the Eureka Canal as a new diversion point. Conversely, Teton
Canal argued that it consolidated its practices to include the Eureka Reservoir
in the 1890 Notice. The Water Court found that the 1890 Notice contemplated
multiple reservoirs including the Eureka Reservoir. On appeal, the Court assessed whether Teton Canal's claims could relate back to the 1890 Notice. The
Court reviewed the evidence and agreed with Teton Reservoir. The Court
found that Teton Canal's predecessors intended the Glendora Reservoir to be
part of the 1890 Notice, but intended the Eureka Reservoir to be a part of the
nullified 1891 Notice. The Court held the Water Court misinterpreted the
nullified 1891 Notice and, therefore, the Water Court was incorrect in finding
that Eureka Reservoir had a priority date of 1890.
The Court then addressed Teton Canal's argument that the Eureka Reservoir is a part of the 1890 Notice because the diversion point "simply moved" to
a point upstream following the nullification of the 1891 Notice. The Court
noted that the law required "reasonable diligence" on the part of Teton Canal
and its predecessors to develop the Eureka Reservoir. In analyzing the reasonable diligence prong, the Court examined evidence of the course of conduct of
Teton Canal following the Perrycourt decree. Because Teton Canal took fortyfive years to build the Eureka Reservoir, the Court concluded that Teton Canal
failed to proceed with reasonable diligence in developing the Eureka Reservoir
site. Therefore, the claims could not relate back to the 1890 Notice, and the
Water Court erred in concluding that Teton Canal "aggressively pursued" the
development of the reservoir.
Finally, the Court considered what priority date it should assign to the Eureka Reservoir. Teton Reservoir asserted the year should be 1936, the year
when construction on the reservoir began. Because Teton Canal did not provide an alternate date, the Court remanded this question to the Water Court.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the order of the Water Court and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Brian Hinkle
NEVADA
Eureka Cnty. v. State Eng'r of Nev., 359 P.3d 1114 (Nev. 2015) (holding
that the State Water Engineer provided insufficient evidence to support his finding that the applicant could mitigate the impact of appropriation on existing
water rights).
In 2005, General Moly, Inc. ("General Moly") began to apply for water
rights in anticipation of the molybdenum mine that it sought to construct in
Eureka County ("Eureka"). The following year, General Moly created a subsidiary, Kobeh Valley Ranch, LLC ("KVR"), to take charge of the proposed
mine's water rights. KVR submitted multiple applications for water rights between 2006 and 2010.
Eureka and several senior water rights holders in the area objected to
KVR's applications because, inter alia, they conflicted with existing rights. The
Nevada State Engineer ("Engineer") held several hearings on the matter and
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ultimately found that, although KVR's applications would impact existing rights,
KVR could fully mitigate the impact. Thus, the Engineer granted all of KVR's
applications and required that KVR develop a mitigation plan ("3M Plan") to
alleviate any impact.
Eureka, as well as Kenneth F. Benson, Diamond Cattle Company, LLC,
and Michel and Margaret Ann Etcheverry Family, LP ("Benson-Etcheverry"),
petitioned the Seventh Judicial District Court, Eureka County ("district court")
for judicial review of Engineer's rulmig. The district court did not grant the
petition because it found that the Engineer's ruling had substantial evidence and
that conflict avoidance through mitigation comported with the requirements of
the Nevada statute. Eureka and Benson-Etcheverry appealed the district court's
denial of judicial review to the Nevada Supreme Court ("Court") and asked the
Court to determine whether the Engineer may consider mitigation abilities
when assessing the conflicts between a proposed water right application and
existing rights.
The Court first addressed whether the Engineer complied with the controlling state statute, Nevada Revised Statute § 533.370. The statute requires that
"where [a] proposed use or change conflicts with existing rights... the State
Engineer shall reject the application and refuse to issue the requested permit."
The Court declined to decide if the statute allowed the Engineer to grant applications on the condition of future mitigation. Instead, the Court focused on
whether Engineer's ruling had substantial evidence.
The Court analyzed the record and found that although the Engineer labeled existing water right holders as "likely to be impacted," expert testimony
portrayed this labeling as a significant understatement. Specifically, two experts
for KVR admitted that the proposed pumping would cause flows to cease and
stock watering wells to dry up. Because the requested appropriations could
"completely deplete" the water sources underlying existing rights, the Court
ruled that KVR's applications fit undeniably within the statutory requirement of
a "conflicL"
Next, the Court considered the Engineer's evidentiary support for his reliance upon the 3M Plan to resolve the water rights conflicts. The Court limited
its analysis to a determination of whether substantial evidence supported the
Engineer's decisions. The Engineer found that "flow loss can be adequately
and fully mitigated by [KVRI should predicted impacts occur[,]" but neither the
Engineer nor KVR articulated which techniques would comprise this mitigation
plan or what evidence suggested that mitigation would truly restore senior water
rights. The Court found that rather than requiring KVR to propose a mitigation
plan before he granted appropriation rights, the Engineer required KVR to submit such a plan afier he granted all of its change and use permits. The Court
warned that granting water rights before submission of a mitigation plan could
interfere with the due process rights of those who wish to protest an application
because the challenge could only result in vacating the mitigation proposal. The
Court did not adopt Engineer's and KVR's assumption that an effective 3M
Plan could circumvent the statute's "conflict" stricture. Instead, the Court ruled
that Engineer provided insufficient evidence to support his theory of mitigation
and thereby violated the requirements of the state statute by granting KVR its
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applications in spite of imminent impact.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the order of the district court and remanded the case.
Stephen Klein
OHIO
Fairfield Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Nally, 34 N.E.3d 873 (Ohio 2015) (holding that a new Total Maximum Daily Load for pollutant discharges into a watershed was a rule as defined under the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act
and, as such, should have been properly promulgated to afford interested parties their rights to notice and be heard before the rule's submission to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency for approval).
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, or Clean Water Act, seeks to
restore and maintain the integrity of U.S. waters through (i) technology-based
effluent limitations on "point sources" discharging pollutants; and (ii) waterquality standards for protecting the use of identified water bodies. The Clean
Water Act also requires each state to identify waterways that are too impaired
to implement applicable water-quality standards and then rank waterways based
on pollution severity. States must then develop a Total Maximum Daily Load
(TMDL), which establishes a maximum amount of the specified pollutant that
may be discharged into the waterway without violating water-quality standards.
Once the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") approves a state's
TMDL, the state must implement that TMDL.
Pursuant to these requirements, the Ohio Environmental Protection
Agency ("Ohio EPA") developed a document in 2005 called the "Total Maximum Daily Loads for the Big Walnut Creek Watershed" ("TMDL report"),
which the EPA subsequently approved. Using stream-survey data from 2000 of
Blacklick Creek-one of the 54 "stream segments" in the Big Walnut Creek
watershed-the report put forth new phosphorous discharge limits for Blacklick
Creek. The Tussing Road Water Reclamation Facility ("Tussing Road plant"),
owned by Fairfield County ("the county"), is one of the sources subject to the
report's new limitation. In 2006, the comty applied for and received a renewed
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit for the
Tussing Road plant. The new permit included the TDML-derived phosphorous discharge limitation.
The county appealed this ltnit to the Environmental Review Appeals Commission ("ERAC"), which found that while the Ohio EPA had a valid basis for
imposing the limit, it failed to consider whether such a limit was feasible. Thus,
the ERAC vacated the phosphorous limit and remanded the case to the Ohio
EPA. Subsequently, the county appealed the ERAC's finding that the Ohio
EPA had a valid foundation for imposing the limit, and the Ohio EPA crossappealed (asserting that the TMDL had been federally approved mad that federal law required Ohio EPA to set the phosphorous limit). The Tenth District
Court of Appeals ("lower court") affirmed the ERAC's order, finding that there
was sufficient factual foundation for a phosphorous limitation and rejecting the
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county's assertions that the new limitation lacked meaningful review and, therefore, violated due process. The county appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio
("Court").
The Court first considered whether the TMDL was a "rule" within the requirements of Chapter 119 of the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act, which
defines a "rule" as any "standard, having a general and uniform operation,
adopted, promulgated, and enforced by any agency." Because the TMDL sets
a new legal standard-applied by the Ohio EPA-to "all current and future dischargers in the Big Walnut Creek watershed," the Court observed that the limit
fell within Chapter 119's definition of "rule." Additionally, the Court disagreed
with the agency's argument that the TMDL is merely a tool for implementing
its pre-existing legal obligation. Examining the consequences of a TMDL, the
Court determined that even though the Ohio EPA allocated limits individually
to different point sources, the same standards and procedures applied to each;
thus, the TMDL had "general and uniform effect." Finally, the Court noted
that the TMDL creates new legal obligations. The results of the TMDL development process were new mandatory loading reductions rather than "mere enforcement of compliance with existing authority," as argued by the Ohio EPA.
Thus, the Court held this indicated that the TMDL was indeed a rule subject
to rulemaking procedures.
The Court then addressed the county's second argument-that the TMDL
itself establishes a new water-quality standard and therefore requires rulemaking
procedures. Previously, the Ohio EPA had promulgated a narrative standard
for phosphorous in the Ohio Administrative Code, requiring limitations on
phosphorous "to the extent necessary to prevent nuisance growths of algae,
weeds, and slimes that result in a violation of water quality criteria." However,
the TMDL imposes a numneric limit for phosphorous for all water bodies in the
Big Walnut Creek watershed. The Court found that this new numeric limit
constituted a water-quality standard; therefore, it should have been first promulgated as a rule under Chapter 119.
Because the TMDL was a rule, the Court held that the Ohio EPA should
have complied with Chapter 119's rulemaking procedures, which include
providing public notice, an opportunity for public comment, and a public hearing before using the TMDL-derived target in an NPDES permit. The Court
found that while the Ohio EPA did make a draft of the TMDL available for
public review before submission to the EPA, that act alone did not satisfy the
rulemaking procedural requirements. Because agencies must give the public
certain due process rights before a rule attains final federal approval, the Court
held that Ohio EPA's failure to do so ultimately deprived NPDES perumit holders of their rights to notice and be heard regarding the rule.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's judgment, vacating the
new phosphorous standard and remanding the cause to the Ohio EPA
Justice O'Donnell concurred as to the ruling, but agreed with the court of
appeals' reasoning. Justice O'Connell observed that the Ohio Administrative
Code allows water-quality standards to be either numeric or narrative in nature,
and the Ohio EPA had already promulgated the narrative standard for phosphorous limits (quoted above). Because TMDLs merely provide the factual
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and technological data needed to implement Ohio water-quality standards, Justice O'Donnell argued that TMDLs are not administrative rules and need not
be promulgated as such. In O'Donnell's view, TMDLs are not legal standards,
but objective, factual determinations that the Ohio EPA makes to interpret and
implement the water-quality standards. Accordingly, Justice O'Donnell would
affirm the court's ruling on the grounds that the Ohio EPA did not challenge
the lower court's determination that the Ohio EPA failed to consider the technical feasibility and economic reasonableness of the limit, rather than the
Court's ruling that the TMDL was a rule.
Katy Rankin

WYOMING
In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
Sys., 358 P.3d 1265 (Wyo. 2015) (affirming that the special master properly
allocated the burden of proof to the landowner and that the district court did
not err in finding that 52 acres of a state permit should return to the permit
holder because the permit holder demonstrated sufficient evidence of irrigation
on the Hat Bar property from before the permit expired until the present date).
In 1977, the State of Wyoming began the general adjudication of water
rights in the Big Horn River System. This appeal concerned the adjudication's
third and final phase that dealt with state water rights demonstrated by a permit
or certificate. The United States Bureau of Indian Affairs ("the Bureau") first
filed the state permit at issue in 1905. The Hat Bar Cattle Company ("Hat
Bar") was the successor to the permit. Jerry Winchester and his wife own Hat
Bar. The permit indicated that Wind River water reached the Hat Bar property
by conveyance through the Enlarged Aragon Ditch and then through a ditch
traversing the property of Betty Whitt, a neighboring landowner.
The permit expired on December 31, 1963, but the State never canceled
the permit. The Fifth Judicial District Court, Washakie County ("district
court") implemented procedures for the third phase of the Big Horn River adjudication ("Phase III Procedures"). Pursuant to the Phase III Procedures, the
State would reinstate the expired permit prior to adjudication, followed by a
state-conducted field inspection to confirm requirements for reinstatement.
Thereafter, the water rights specialist for the Wyoming State Engineer's Office
("state water rights specialist") concluded that 52 of the 207 acres under the
permit showed signs of irrigation, and recommended adjudication of the 52
acres. Whitt objected to the State's Report and Recommendation.
Following a contested case hearing, the Special Master upheld the State's
Report and Reconmmendation and submitted a report to the district court recommending it adjudicate the 52 acres at issue. Whitt filed an objection to the
Special Master's Report and Recommendation in the district court The district
court adjudicated the 52 acres, adopted the Special Master's Report and Recornmendation, and entered a final order regarding the general adjudication.
Whitt appealed to the Supreme Court of Wyoming ("Court").
Three arguments fornmed the basis for Whitt's appeal: (i) the Special Master
erred in shifting the burden of proof to her; (ii) the Special Master clearly erred
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in finding beneficial use of the water right prior to December 31, 1963; and (iii)
the State and permit holder did not demonstrate sufficient evidence of the continuous irrigation of the 52 acres from December 31, 1963, until the hearing.
h considering Whitt's first argument, the Court reviewed de novo the special master's allocation of the burden of proof. Whitt relied on the Phase III
Procedures that indicated the claimant, Hat Bar, had the burden of proof to
produce evidence in support of adjudication. Whitt argued, however, that the
Special Master allocated the burden to her because the report stated that the
State had the initial burden of proof in demonstrating the authenticity of the
State's report. The Court held that although this statement in the report was
inaccurate, the Special Master did not err because he correctly stated later in
the report that the burden of proof was on the claimant, Hat Bar. Further, the
Court noted that the party with the burden of proof usually presents its case
first, and here the Special Master required the State and Hat Bar to present
their case first. In the examining the record, the Court found that the State
explained the foundation recommending adjudication of the 52 acres. Lastly,
the Court found that Whitt presented her evidence, and the Special Master
took the case under consideration. Thus, the Court held the Special Master
did not err in allocating the burden of proof.
Next, the Court considered whether the Special Master's finding of beneficial use before December 31, 1963, was clearly erroneous. The Court stated
that a finding is clearly erroneous when there is evidence supporting the finding,
but the entirety of evidence leaves the reviewing court with a "definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed." Again, the Court considered
the Phase III Procedures, which provided for adjudication of a permit not in
good standing based on evidence that irrigation occurred before the permit's
expiration date and irrigation continued from that point until the present. The
Hat Bar permit expired on December 31, 1963. Testimony revealed the existence of ditches on the property before 1963, from which the Court inferred
irrigation must have occurred at some point before December 31. Further,
Whitt's ex-husband testified to the existence of farmland on the property in the
1960's that would have required irrigation. Finally, Winchester testified that he
remembered his father irrigating the property in the early 1960's.
The state water rights specialist, who conducted the inspection and prepared the Report and Recommendations in 1994, testified that he typically relied on aerial photographs that demonstrated evidence, or lack thereof, of irrigation. However, the state water rights specialist explained that he could not
remember if he had relied on aerial photographs in this case because too much
time had passed since he prepared the report. Despite the state water rights
specialist's ambivalent testimony, the Court upheld the Special Master's findings and held that the Hat Bar property showed sufficient evidence of irrigation
prior to December 31, 1963.
Finally, the Court reviewed the Special Master's finding of continuous irrigation from December 31, 1963, until the hearing. Whitt argued that the Court
should look to Wyoming's abandonment statute for guidance when determining the definition of "continuous." The Court noted that, according to the statute, abandonment occurs when the owner of the water right does not use the
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right for a period of five years. The Court accepted Vitt's interpretation of
the term "continuously irrigated" as meaning irrigation at least once every five
years. Applying this definition, the Court considered conflicting testimony regarding the existence of a ditch across Whitt's property. The superintendent of
Water Division 3 testified that he saw a ditch and a pond when he visited the
property in 2004 and 2007. He also testified that he saw evidence of irrigation
in aerial photographs of the property from 1994 and 2001. Similarly, Winchester and the state water rights specialist testified that the ditch crossed Witt's
property.
Alternatively, Whitt testified that wastewater may have flowed across her
property, but irrigation water never crossed through a ditch. Nonetheless, the
Court held that the use and reuse of wastewater constituted beneficial use, and
thus concluded that Whitt's testimony supported the finding of continuous irrigation. Whitt also argued that there were gaps in the evidence of irrigation.
The Court agreed with Whitt's observation that evidence of irrigation was missing from 1994 to 2001. The Court held, however, that the Special Master reasonably relied on the evidence of irrigation from 1994 and the years prior, 2001,
2004, 2005, and 2007, and that this evidence was sufficient for the Special Master to find continuous irrigation.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's holding adopting the
Special Master's Report and Recommendation.
Daphne Hamdlton
Forbes v. Forbes, 341 P.3d 1041 (Wyo. 2015) (holding: (i) water rights are
real property that parties must disclose during discovery proceedings; and (ii)
trustees cannot transfer water rights to individual trust members because it is
not in the best interest of all beneficiaries).
Six members of the Forbes family formed the Beckton Ranch Trust
("BRT") in 1920. The trust holds certain parcels of land with water and ditch
rights in Sheridan County, Wyoning. Presently, the BRT has nineteen beneficiaries, and William "Cam" Forbes ("Cam") is the acting trustee. Some time in
2009 or 2010, the Wyoming Board of Control ("VBC") asked Cam to correct
discrepancies between permitted water rights and actual water usage on BRT
land. Acting as trustee, Cam filed four petitions for changes in place of use. In
2012, the WBC granted the petitions transferring the water rights onto Cam
and his sister's, Julia Forbes ("Julia"), land. Cam did not notify any of the other
trust beneficiaries of the transfer. Citing other issues with his siblings' management of the BRT, Cam's brother, Waldo E. "Spike" Forbes ("Spike") resigned
as trustee and sued to remove the remaining trustees, alleging that they breached
their duty of loyalty to the trust. Spike sought removal of his siblings as trustees
of BRT. During discovery, Cam did not disclose the water rights transfers.
Spike learned of them from another source during pretrial proceedings.
After the Sheridan County District Court removed Cam and Julia as trustees, the siblings appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court ("Court"). Cam
and Julia argued that the trial court erred in removing them as trustees and finding that they profited from the transfer.
The Court held in favor of Cam and Julia because Spike did not include
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the water rights transfers in his original complaint for breach of loyalty, and he
failed to amend his complaint to include the specific water rights claim. He
thus did not give fair notice that the water rights were at issue. Because the trial
court used the water rights exhibits as part of its decision to remove Cam and
Julia as trustees, the Court found that the trustees did not have sufficient notice.
The Court noted that the parties could have resolved the issue by asking for a
continuance on the basis of the surprise evidence. Even though the defendant
trustees did not ask for a continuance, they made numerous objections to the
inclusion of the water rights transfers in evidence. The Court found this argument against their removal as trustees persuasive.
The Court did find that Spike should have disclosed the water rights transfers during discovery. The interrogatory that called for "details of all transactions of real property" included information regarding water rights of the BRT.
The Court did not find that there was enough specificity in the pleading regarding the water rights to properly sanction Cam and Julia under the Wyoming
Rules of Civil Procedure 37(c). Therefore, it declined to remove them as trustees of the BRT.
Next, the Court considered whether Cam's transfer of water rights on behalf
of himself and sister breached his duty of loyalty to the BRT beneficiaries. Due
to the the trust's specific language and Cam's failure to distinguish between his
own property and property held by the BRT, he did not manage the trust in the
sole interest of the beneficiaries. The Court concluded that that self-dealing
alone constituted a breach of the duty of loyalty. However, the Court noted
that Cain's breach of duty of loyalty did not warrant his removal as a trustee of
the BRT.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's order removing Cam
and Julia as trustees of the BRT.

Sarah Rice

STUDENT SYMPOSIUM
FEDERAL VS. STATE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE
GROUNDWATER: CONCERNS RAISED OVER U.S.
FOREST SERVICE PROPOSED DIRECTIVE
Kobi Webb, J.D.2016, Stuirn College of La w
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Forest Service ("Forest Service") manages 193 million
acres of land in the United States, which comprise of 8.4 percent of the total
land area, and most of which lies west of the Mississippi River. In May 2014,
the Forest Service announced a proposal to amend its internal policies. The
amendment would establish a comprehensive framework for groundwater management on National Forest System ("NFS") lands. Following publication in
the Federal Registry, the agency received over 250 comments from interested
parties, including state and city governments, tribal groups, and conservation
organizations. Some comment submissions supported the Forest Service's policy changes. Others expressed concern over its lack of authority to institute
groundwater regulations, and its potential overreach into state rights. More specifically, commenters argued that the proposed directive had the potential to
usurp state groundwater management by what they perceived was a huge expansion of federal authority over reserved water rights. Ultimately, the Forest Service withdrew its proposed directive, but it intends to revise and resubmit similar
directives following additional internal and external consultation efforts.

II. THE GROUNDWATER DREcTrivE
The Forest Service does not have a comprehensive policy for managing
groundwater resources on NFS lands. Its current policies provide little internal
direction and only address "agency inventory and monitoring activities for
groundwater." The proposed groundwater directive, entitled "Groundwater
Resource Management," would have amended the Forest Service's internal directives for Watershed and Air Management
Substantively, the proposed directive would help the agency manage access
to and utilization of groundwater resources under NFS lands. Broadly speaking, it would establish policies and procedures to help the agency evaluate activities that potentially affect the quality and quantity of groundwater. The agency
identified four objectives and eight broad changes that would result from the
new directive. Among them, and relevant to this discussion, is the establishment
of a framework for evaluating existing and proposed Forest Service uses and
special use authorizations. For any such uses, the agency would begin to require
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"appropriate water conservation measures" to avoid, minimize, or mitigate adverse effects to groundwater. The agency would not authorize development
projects or use of groundwater if such uses failed to "adequately protect resources." Further, the Federal Service would assume that all groundwater and
surface water is "hydraulically connected, unless demonstrated otherwise."
The Forest Service offered numerous reasons for its policy change; however, two underlying rationales stand out. First, the agency concluded that
groundwater has inextricable links to all other sources of water in a watershed,
so it is therefore "appropriate to include groundwater" in its management of
NFS lands in order to maintain the integrity of all water resources. Second, the
Forest Service asserted that there is a "need" to create a consistent policy that
addresses both surface water and groundwater resources, and the directive responds to external rules and recommendations calling for such policies.
II. LEGAL CONCERNS
The agency published the proposed groundwater directive for public comment and tribal consultation. It received hundreds of responses from interested
parties. Some, including conservation groups and those representing tribal interests, favored, or were otherwise neutral to, the proposed policy changes.
However, a majority of those submitting comments opposed the Forest Service's groundwater directive for a variety reasons. Predominantly, the agency
itself recognized that "[sitates and a number of other organizations raised concerns that the proposed directive would exceed the Agency's authorities and
infringe on State authorities to allocate water."
To the first point the agency identified, many commenters remarked that
the Forest Service lacked independent authority to regulate groundwater, even
that located under NFS lands. For instance, the Western Governors' Association ("WGA"), which represents the governors of nineteen Western states, argued that states have exclusive authority over ground water in the United States.
Congress granted such authority to the agency in the Desert Land Act of 1877,
and the Supreme Court confirmed it in CaliforniaOregon Power Co. v. Beaver
PortlandCement Co. Although the federal government retained some power
by reserving rights to surface water on public lands, the WGA and others contended that the Forest Service did not have such a reserved right to groundwater-not in the 1897 Organic Administration Act and not in case law. The Forest
Service, on the other hand, argued that the proposed directive did not grant the
agency any new authorities. Instead, it simply clarified the agency's already existing authority that mandates its protection of NFS lands, which inherently includes the regulation of groundwater. Thus, this argument makes it clear that
the Forest Service believed that federal reserved water rights apply to groundwater, and that the proposed directive was arguably an explicit expansion of
those federal rights.
Commenters also highlighted the second concern the agency identified,
that the directive infringed on state authority over groundwater management.
Many argued that the proposed directive overreached its stated goal and appeared to create federal rights that inherently conflicted with conferred state
rights to groundwater. The Forest Service later argued that "Itihe proposed
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directives did not, and any future actions will not, infiinge on State authority."
However, anbiguity in the policy nonetheless created tension. Without clarity,
for instance, the proposed directive as written could have allowed the Forest
Service to place quantity-based restrictions on waters connected to NFS lands,
even if a state has previously authorized a diversion and depletion. Additionally,
commenters argued, the Forest Service should not presume a hydrological connection between surface water and groundwater. It should instead leave this
decision to the laws or agreements of individual states.
IV. CONCLUSION
In June 2015, the Forest Service withdrew its proposed groundwater directive. Although the Forest Service withdrew its directive, it announced an
intention to continue engaging in dialog, both internally and publically, to develop revised proposed directives on the issue. Ultinately, if the Forest Service
manages to establish policies involving access to or utilization of groundwater
resources on NFS lands, even for the purpose of enhancing water quality, it may
constitute a large expansion of federal reserved water rights.
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FEDERALLY RESERVED RIGHTS AND INTERSTATE
GROUNDWATER ALLOCATION
Sarah Hoffman, LL.M 2016, Stanford Law School,
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I. INTRODUCTION

This post explores the intersection of two topics that have historically been
neglected in interstate water allocation, and in particular in interstate compacts:
groundwater and tribal reserved rights to water. Against the backdrop of the
Agua Calientecase currently before the Ninth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals, which raises the potential for broader recognition of tribal reserved rights
to groundwater, this post focuses on interstate dimensions of recognizing such
rights. Interstate waters may be allocated in three ways: 1) an equitable apportionment decree from the U.S. Supreme Court; 2) legislation by the U.S. Congress that allocates water between states; or 3) interstate compacts. This piece
focuses on how tribal reserved rights have been dealt with under interstate compacts.

II. FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS AND GROUNDWATER
The recognition of federally reserved Indian rights to surface water is well
entrenched in water law jurisprudence, dating back to U.S. Supreme Court
cases such as Witersin 1908. As the Agua Caiiente case before the Ninth
Circuit highlights, tribal reserved rights to groundwater remain less established.
We first set out some background for tribal reserved rights claims to groundwater. Then, we explore the interaction between federally reserved Indian and
state rights to groundwater in the context of interstate allocations.
Even within individual states, the recognition of tribal groundwater claims
may be problematic when addressing the allocation and governance of water
rights. While rights to surface water are well established, tribal rights to groundwater were typically not considered when initial allocations of water rights occurred. Independent of tribal reserved rights, states have experienced difficulty
in formulating regulatory frameworks to conjunctively manage both surface water and groundwater, particularly where different state water rights systems apply
for surface water and groundwater. The introduction of tribal reserved rights
to groundwater, which may predate current claims, could have cascading effects
on long-established uses of water. The displacement of these claims and the
unsettling of long-settled expectations of continued use pose an issue that we
feel should be prophylactically addressed.
I.

INTERSTATE ALLOCATIONS AND FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS

Inconveniently, aquifers do not always follow state lines. In the case of
transboundary aquifers, which extend across two or more states, it is unclear
how federally reserved rights interact with the different states' allocations from

WA TER LA W RE VIEW

Volume 19

the aquifer. At least two possible approaches exist: either 1) the federal reserved
right takes priority, with the remaining groundwater allocated between the states;
or 2) the federal allocation is taken from the allocation of the state in which the
federal reserve is located. The Supreme Court followed the latter approach
in Aiizona v. Calitbrnia,which allocated Colorado River water between these
states. In that case, the Special Master upheld the federal government's reserved rights claim to water on behalf of various tribes, and the Special Master
to the U.S. Supreme Court determined in his report that "all consumption of
mainstream water within a state is to be charged to that state, regardless of who
the user may be" (Rifkind, Special Master's Report, at p. 247). Thus, water
used on Indian reservations would be chargeable to the state within which the
use was made. The Supreme Court accepted this analysis, but it did not explain
why.
Nevertheless, while the limited jurisprudence on this issue would take reserved rights from the allocation of the state in which the reservation is located,
ArLzona . Caifornjamay not establish a general rule for the allocation of Indian
water rights. Importantly, it seems that all parties (including the United States)
agreed to this approach, so that the merits of an alternative approach may not
have been ully ventilated. Further, any broadly applicable rule may be limited
by the Special Master's reliance on the specific legal franework in that case,
including the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act and pre-existing federal contracts for the delivery of water in the region.
Of the 24 interstate compacts dealing with the allocation of interstate water
resources listed on the National Center for Interstate Compacts database, only
nine mention Indian rights, and none use the phrase "federally reserved rights."
The compacts that do refer to Indian rights generally do not deal with this issue
beyond a boilerplate acknowledgement that nothing in the compact "shall be
construed as affecting the obligations of the United States of America to Indian
tribes," such as the Colorado River Compact of 1922 and the Klamath River
Compact of 1957.
Unfortunately, should a tribal claim to the use of surface water or groundwater be made, this boilerplate language is not helpful in divining who is responsible for satisfying such rights. One exception to the silence on this issue is the
Snake River Compact, which explicitly states that reserved Indian rights are to
be deducted from the state allotments in which the reservation is located. Similarly, the California-Nevada Compact of 1969, which is not technically in force
as it never gained U.S. Congressional approval, specifically notes that "there is
allocated to Nevada for use on the Walker River Indian Reservation a maximum of 13,000 acre-feet per year."
Charging tribal reserved rights to state allocations, however, is not the only
possible approach. In Montana v. Wyoming, the Special Master noted Montana's position that because the Northern Cheyenne Tribe's water rights predated the Yellowstone River Compact of 1950-they dated to as early as 1881the Tribe's rights should take priority over both states' post-1950 rights. In
1991, Montana and the Tribe had agreed to the Northern Cheyenne-Montana
Compact, which assigned the Tribe a 20,000 acre-foot storage right with a pnority date "equal to the senior-most right for stored water in the Tongue River
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Reservoir," which is April 21, 1937 (Thompson, second interim report, at 158).
Wyoming, however, expressed its concern that Montana should not be able to
"give away" water rights to the Tribe and then ask Wyoming to curtail its own
rights to make up any shortfall for Montana users. Because neither the Tribe
nor the United States were parties to the case, the Special Master did not consider the case to be an appropriate venue to decide the nature of the Tribe's
water rights. Accordingly, this question remains to be decided another day.
Meanwhile, interstate compacts similarly neglect groundwater; only six interstate compacts contain any mention of groundwater, and these references are
fairly cursory. In the Bear River Compact and Klamath River Compact, for
instance, groundwater is mentioned to clarify that it falls outside the scope of
the surface water apportionment in the Compacts. By contrast, the AlabamaCoosa-Tallapoosa River Basin Compact provides that "Iwlater resources" or
"waters" means "all surface waters and ground waters contained or otherwise
originating within the ACT Basin," signaling an intention that the Compact applies to both sources. The Upper Niobrara River Compact of 1962 treads a
middle ground, as it is confined to surface water apportionment, but expresses
an intention to later apportion groundwater as soon as "adequate data on
ground water of the basin are available." Studies have subsequently been undertaken in the Upper Niobrara Basin, but some fifty years later, the Compact
has not been updated to encompass groundwater. In the absence of express
wording in the relevant compact, the Supreme Court has found that surface
water allocations can be extended to groundwater; this appears to represent the
default position. For instance, in Kansas v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court
found that, although the Republican River Compact did not address groundwater, it could be framed to prevent groundwater use within a state that affected
interstate surface water flows.
IV. WHO SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SATISFYING FEDERAL RIGHTS?
Accordingly, how should future courts, and states while negotiating compacts, approach the allocation of liability to satisfy federal reserved rights water
claims? As adverted to above, the dominant theory and practice is that, unless
provided otherwise, reserved rights shall be charged to state allocations. The
possible basis for this approach is the argument that a compact made between
states and ratified by Congress estops Congress from later asserting a federal
interest to modify the specific allocation identified in the compact. This is because compacts are authorized by the Compact Clause in the U.S. Constitution
and then approved by Congress, so they may enjoy some measure of quasiconstitutional status. However, Professor A. Dan Tarlock suggests that this legal
position may be outdated in light of cases suggesting that an interstate compact
cannot limit Congressional exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce
(see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Wheehn). A related explanation is a pragmatic one
founded in the very purpose of interstate compacts. That is, states enter into
compacts, surrendering some of their sovereignty, to secure certainty of supply.
Allowing later federal claims to modify this allocation would risk upsetting and
reopening established interstate compacts. Professor Tarlock suggests that the
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best approach is to treat Indian claims as "analogous to interstate waters allocated to another state by interstate compact" (Tarlock, at p. 653). This would
involve federal claims being satisfied out of the state's allocation. Within that
framework, he suggests that federal reserved rights would usually take priority

over state uses (see, e.g., Hinderliderv. La Plata& Cherry Creek Ditch Co.).
Conversely, other states have taken the position that satisfaction of Indian
rights is a basin-wide responsibility. There are compelling arguments in support
of this approach; it may be unfair to charge one state with responsibility for
satisfying the entirety of a federal reserved claim to water in a shared water basin
because in some cases, the quantum of the potential federal right may be greater
than the state's entire allocation (as may be the case in Arizona), or federal
claims may aise in relation to already over-allocated basins. This would upset
the affected state's interests under the compact and drastically change the nature
of the bargain struck.
On a principled level, prior federal reserved rights generally preempt all
subsequent state claims. Therefore, it is misleading for a state to talk about
"giving away" water rights, as Wyoming argued in Montana v. W4/oming; because the federal reserved right was never within the state's power to give. Moreover, the concern expressed by the Tribe in that case was that characterizing
their reserved rights as falling within the state's allocation could result in relegation of that right. Although in that case, this concern rests largely on the terms
of the Yellowstone River Compact itself, broader vindication of tribal rights may
weigh in favor of a basin-wide response. This issue arises when we consider the
dynanics of tribal water settlements, which are usually negotiated between the
lederal government, tribes and the relevant state. A state that is required to
satisfy any tribal settlement with its own water allocation alone may be more
likely to take a hard-nosed approach to negotiations than one that has greater
resources available from the basin. Moreover, because the McCarran Anendment of 1952 waives federal sovereign imnmunity for adjudication tribal reserved
water rights, these proceedings often take place in state courts, which have traditionally been seen as less sympathetic to Indian interests than federal courts.
Therefore, any federally reserved allocation arguably should not factor into the
quantity of water that is available for division between states.
This distinction may be easier to draw on paper than in practice, particularly
when states allocate water before federal claims are officially recognized, because it assumes that the federal reserved right is both fixed and quantifiable.
This is not necessarily the case, particularly when states are negotiating compacts where inchoate federal claims exist that have not yet been advanced. That
is, in order to reserve water for potential federal claims, it would be necessary
to first identify the scope of such claims. Moreover, where less information
exists to guide management of groundwater, it may not be feasible to preemptively identifty how much water needs to be set aside to insure against all possible
future claims. This is by no means a straighfforward undertaking, and it would
most likely require engagement with relevant federal and tribal interests. The
risk of this approach is that quantifying federally reserved rights is in itself a
vexed and lengthy process, and so interstate co-management of water basins
could be delayed.
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While these issues complicate the matter, we suggest they are not insurmountable. The existence of federally recognized tribes and reservations overlying groundwater is easily ascertainable, so it may be that, where possible, states

should proactively reserve water based on the "practicably irrigable acreage"
standard. Further, an approach that prioritizes federal reserved rights may well
encourage earlier, more meaningful engagement with tribal stakeholders when
states negotiate water allocations. Ultimately, it is important that tribal water
rights are not undermined through the willful f'ailure of states to address these
issues.

V. CONCLUSION
These issues will only become more'contentious and problematic as demand for water continues to grow, and as a changing climate leads to increasingly drought and scarcity in some parts of the American Southwest. Greater
demands will be placed on already stressed aquifers as groundwater is increasingly looked to as a supplemental source. States should look not only to collaboration with both tribal and private parties, but to other states in attempting
to proactively address these inevitable problems.
VI. REFERENCES
Cases and Compacts
Agua Caliente Band of Cabuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., No.
EDCV 13-883-JGB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49998 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2015).
Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-105, 111
Stat. 2233 (1997).
Bear River Compact, Pub. L. No. 85-348, 72 Stat. 38 (1958).
California-Nevada Compact for Jurisdiction on Interstate Waters, Cal. Water
Code § 5976 (Vest 2016).
Hinderlider v. La Plata & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. __ (2015).
Klanath River Compact, 71 Stat. 497 (1957).
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, 59 U.S. 421 (1856).
Snake River Compact, 64 Stat. 29 (1950).
Upper Niobrara River Compact of 1962, Pub. L. No. 91-52, 83 Stat. 86 (1969).
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).

WATER LA WREVIEW

Volume 19

McCarran Amendment of 19.52, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1988).
Secondary Sources
A. Dan Tarlock, One River, Three Soverej -ns: Indian and Interstate Water
ights, 22 LAND &WATER L. REV. 631 (1987).
Barton Thompson, SECOND INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER,
MONTANA J/. WYOMING, Oct. Term 2014 (Dec. 29, 2014).
DOUGLAS S. KENNEY, NATURAL RES. LAW CTR., UNIV. OF COLO. SCH. OF
LAW, WATER ALLOCATION COMPACTS IN THE WEST: AN OVERVIEW

(2002).
John Leshy, Inteis:tate Groundwater Resources: the Fedeai
HASTINGS W.-NW.J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1475 (2008).

Role, 14

National Center for Interstate Compacts, State Search,http://apps.csg.org/ncic/

Simon Rifkind, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, ARIZONA V CALFORNIA,
Oct. Term 1960 (Dec. 5, 1960).
Robert T. Anderson, Indin Water lghAs, PraeticalReasoning,andNegoziated
Settlements, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1133 (2010).

Issue 2

FEDERAL RESER VED WA TER RIGHTS

THE WINTERSDOCTRINE: IS IT JUST ABOUT
QUANTITY?
W.James Titon, J.D. 2016, Stuin College ofLa w
I. INTRODUCTION

Many in the United States take water for granted. It is a commodity that
typically comes out of a faucet clean and at a low cost. However, not everyone
in the United States has this amenity. In rural areas, residents commonly rely
on wells drawing out water that is not pure for consumption. Many Native
Americans, residing in their sovereign nations within the United States, lack access to clean water for drinking, bathing, cooking, and other every day uses.
There is a question of how these Native Americans can ensure their water is of
the quality other United States citizens take for granted.
It seems that only drastic events make water a discussion at the dinner table;
events like the Gold King Mine spill, where three million gallons of metal-polluted water spilled forth from an abandoned mine turning the picturesque clear
water of the Animas River yellow-orange. Both the Southern Ute Tribe and
the Navajo Nation are directly downstream of the polluted Animas River in
southern Colorado and across the border in New Mexico. The Animas is a
tributary of the San Juan River, which flows through over 200 miles of the Navajo Nation. These tribes rely on the river to grow food, for drinking water, and
for their modern muricipal and industrial needs. How are Native American
tribes to ensure the reserved water they have a right to use is of the quality they
expect and need to sustain themselves? This Article discusses the notion that
some inherent right to quality may arise from the Winters doctrine. It also
considers other means for federally recognized tribes to ensure their water is of
a useable quality.

IU. WATER QuALrY miN WNTERSDoc'rRNE
Under Winters, the United States Supreme Court held that Congress set
aside land for the Native American tribes to live on, and, along with the land,
Congress impliedly reserved water. Congress' implied reservation of water for
the land, and any other reserved federal land, was based on the amount of water
necessary to fulfill the reservation's need when it was established. Presently,
courts acknowledge both reserved Native American water for growing crops and
water for traditional tribal uses, such as hunting and fishing.
Some legal scholars believe that Winters may apply to the quality of water
as well. In the Winters opinion, Justice McKenna wrote, "in furthering and
advancing the civilization and improvement of the Indians... it is essential and
necessary that all of the waters of the river flow down the channel uninterruptedly and undiminished in quantity and undetenoratedin quality," allowing for
the tribes to argue an inherent right to both water quantity and water quality.
The Hopi Tribe in northeastern Arizona recently made an argument for
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their right to water quality. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit ("Court") heard the case. In Hopi Tribe the Court held that the United
States did not have a fiduciary duty, under Winters, to ensure the quality of
Native Americans' water supply. The Hopi Tribe brought the action seeking
monetary relief because of high arsenic concentrations in their water supplies.
Arsenic is a naturally occurring contaminant found in rock and soils. The Hopi
Tribe wanted funds to improve their infrastructure and ability to provide clean
water to the reservation. The Hopi Tribe argued that the United States had an
affirmative duty to ensure water quality on the reservation. They argued this
duty existed based on the Winters doctrine and the Act of 1958, holding in trust
Hopi lands as described in 1882.
The Court denied the Hopi Tribe's argument for two reasons. First, the
Hopi Tribe's argument that the United States had a fiduciary duty to act did not
persuade the Court. No language in the Act of 1958, or the Executive Order
argument. Second, the Court took issue with why
of 1882, gave weight to tiffs
the contaminant was in the water. The Hopi Tribe could not drink their water
because of arsenic contamination, but this contamination is natural. Natural
erosion, as opposed to third-party actions, resulted in the unsafe amount of arsenic in the reservation water. The Court acknowledged that in a situation
where an upstream user affects the water quality, the United States might have
a duty to act. The Court held, however, that the United States had no fiduciary
responsibility to improve the water quality when the contamination occurred
naturally.
The Court did not find a connection between water quality and Winters
doctrine in Hopi Tribe, but nevertheless there is still an argument for an inferred connection between the Winters doctrine and water quality standards.
The Court's decision in Hopi Tribe left room for Native Americans to argue
for a right to water quality under Winters. The Court's dicta in Hopi Tribe
seems to assert that the United States does have a duty to act when a third-party
diminishes the water quality, as opposed to harmful, naturally occurring minerals. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona ("District
Court") found such a duty in United States v. Gila Valley IrigationDisarct
The District Court identified two reasons why the Apache Tribe's water was
tainted. First, upstream irrigators diverted the entire flow of the stream. When
the irrigators returned the water to the stream it carried with it salts from the
irrigated lands. Second, upstream water users pumped groundwater in excess,
particularly when flows in the Gila River were low. Groundwater has higher
salinity than surface water, so the water coming back into the Gila River at low
flow had a higher salinity than what naturally occurs. The upstream users,
through these two acts, raised water salinity to an unusable level for the Apache
Tribe's salt-sensitive crops. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District
Court's decision that: (1) the landowners' diverted water was strictly for agricultural irrigation use; (2) the district court's interpretation of the Globe Equity
consent decree of June 29, 1935, Article VIII in all of its parts; and (3) that the
"lower valley diverters in Gila Crossing District were not entitled to priority call
as against upstream diverters."
The Gila Valley case contrasts the Hopi Tribe case. When interpreted
together, it is likely that upstream users are liable for the polluted water that a
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tribe uses downstream. Further, the United States has a duty to ensure water
quality only when it has a fiduciary duty to the tribe. However, when natural
causes lead to water pollution, the United States has no duty to provide the tribe
with clean water, even when a fiduciary duty exists.
II. ANOTHER MEANS OF ENSURING CLEAN WATER
To be sure, no federal court has stated a clear rule regarding an implied
right to water quality under Winters. However, Native American tribes have
other means of ensuring their water is of the quality necessary for agricultural
and other purposes. The Clean Water Act allows for the Environmental Protection Agency to treat tribes as states. A Native American tribe, to be treated
as a state, has to show that it has a governing body with governmental powers,
that it will perform functions related "to the management and protection of water resources," and that the tribe is capable of such authority. The tribes that
qualify gain the benefit of receiving assistance from the United States to restore
water quality where contamninated.
Once the United States recognizes the Native American tribe as a state under the Clean Water Act, the tribe is able to set its own standards on water
quality. The tribe's water quality standards must be reasonable and enforceable
against upstream water users. This power gives federally recognized Native
American tribes the ability to set their own enforceable water quality standards,
and provides the federal government with assistance in ensuring water quality
improvements in the United States.
There are several barriers that prevent tribes from taking advantage of this
statute. One barrier is acquiring the necessary capital to sustain a governing
body that can handle the responsibilities that come with governmental powers.
Further, tribes bring projects under this statute that are likely costly, even with
federal assistance. The statute imposts an additional barrier in that only federally recognized tribes may exercise governmental authority over water quality.
State governments and the Federal government do not always recognize the
same tribes. Therefore, while tribes may seek federal assistance to ensure water
quality on their reservations, state-imposed hurdles prevent many tribes from
being able to request that assistance.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite what some legal scholars believed as far back as twenty years ago,
the courts have yet to decide a case that addresses whether Winters applies to
a right to water quality. Professor Judith Royster has suggested that if the courts
find Native American tribes have a right to water quality it will likely be closely
tied to the quantity of water. While Winters remains open regarding water
quality, there are other avenues for federally recognized tribes to ensure their
water is of a necessary quality under the Clean Water Act. Those means, however, are not without obstacles.
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TRIBAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS TO
GROUNDWATER AS RECOGNIZED IN
SETTLEMENTS AND LITIGATION:
STATUS AND TRENDS
Daphne HamillonJD.2016, Sturm College of Law
I. INTRODUCTION
The Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians ("Agua Caliente") holds irnpliedly reserved water rights in the Coachella Valley in Southern California.
President Ulysses S. Grant established the Agua Caliente's reservation by Executive Order in 1876. Today, water in the Coachella Valley is scarce, and the
Agua Caliente seeks to satisfy the tribe's needs by asserting that the tribe's reserved water rights include the right to groundwater resources. However, controlling law is unclear on the issue of whether tribal reserved water rights extend
to groundwater. State supreme courts are split on the issue. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Ninth Circuit") will be the first federal court of
appeals in forty years to address the issue. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit will
consider whether when the government created the Agua Caliente reservation
the government impliedly reserved rights to groundwater in the context of California's correlative water rights framework.
II. BACKGROUND ON FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS TO WATER
Federal law provides a framework for Native American tribes' possession
of water rights. These tribal water rights impliedly arise from the establishment
of the reservation. The reservation grant thus provides a property right to the
land and an implied right to sufficient water to fulfill the purposes of the reservation. Winters v. United States was the seminal case that established the implied reservation doctrine. The Supreme Court held in Winters that the Fort
Belknap tribes gained the right to use unappropriated water from the Milk River
for the reservation needs.
Tribal reserved rights vest at the creation of the reservation and hold priority over those of future appropriators. Tribes do not abandon the reserved
rights by nonuse. Further, most federal reservations predate, and therefore
hold priority over, state water law rights. Prior court decisions further explain
the application of Winters to groundwater.
mH. TRIBAL RESERVED RIGHTS TO GROUNDWATER RECOGNIZED BY
LITIGATION
The Agua Caliente court found persuasive that every court, with the exception of the Wyoming Supreme Court in a 1989 decision, that has addressed the
issue of whether Winters extends to groundwater held in the affirmative. Many
courts declined to directly address the issue, but acknowledged the possibility
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that Winters could encompass groundwater. The cases that have previously
recognized tribal reserved rights to groundwater are not abundant, but they followed one of two lines of reasoning. Some courts relied on the hydrologic interrelationship between groundwater and surface water to find that Winters applies to both. Other courts took a logical approach and reasoned that
groundwater should be available to fulfill a water reservation along with surface
water.
In In re Gila River System & Source, the Arizona Supreme Court was the
first court to expressly hold that the federal reserved rights doctrine extended
to groundwater. The Gila court's 1999 opinion acknowledged that the hydrological connection between groundwater and surface water is such that groundwater pumped from a distance may significantly diminish the surface flow.
Nonetheless, Giladeemed the distinction between groundwater and surface water as insignificant for purposes of applying the reserved rights doctrine. Even
though the Gila court expressly extended the reserved rights doctrine to groundwater, it restricted tribal rights to groundwater. Gilalimited tribal reserved rights
to groundwater to "where other waters were inadequate to accomplish the purpose of the reservation."
In 2002, the Montana Supreme Court recognized a tribal federal reserved
right to groundwater in Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Stults. In
Salish, the court prohibited the state agency from issuing water use permits until
the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes quantified their water rights. Like
Gia, the court noted that the groundwater must be necessary to fulfill the purposes of reservation, but refrained from determining whether the groundwater
at issue met this standard. Instead, the court ruled that the tribes' federally
reserved water rights included groundwater. The court's holding was rooted in
logic. The court failed to find a reason to exclude groundwater from the tribes'
reserved water rights, so it refrained from limiting the tribes' rights in such a
way.
The hydrological connection between groundwater and surface water
formed the basis of the Ninth Circuit's extension of Winters to groundwater in
United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co. In that case involving the Pyramid Lake
Indian Reservation, the court reasoned that the reciprocal hydraulic relationship between groundwater and surface water is such that allocations of groundwater would predictably affect the surface water in a nearby flowing river. Further, the court interpreted the decree that reserved water in the Truckee River
included a right to groundwater if the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe needed
groundwater to fulfill the purpose of the reservation. The court additionally
held that because the tribe's decreed rights were the two most senior water rights
in the Truckee River and those rights extended to groundwater, other users'
allocations of groundwater may not adversely affect the tribe's right to the surface water.
In New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamod4 a New Mexico district court
extended Winters to groundwater for hydrological reasons. This case involved
the Pueblo Indians' prior right to water in a Rio Grande tributary for domestic
and irrigation uses. The decree gave the tribe water rights appurtenant to its
irrigated acreage. The court held that water rights appurtenant to the tribe's
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land included groundwater because groundwater and surface water were physically interrelated, and therefore both were appurtenant to the tribe's land.
IV. TRIBAL RESERVED RIGHTS TO GROUNDWATER RECOGNIZED BY
SETnLEMENT
Indian Tribes have entered into settlement agreements to resolve disputes
over federally reserved rights to groundwater. Many of these settlement agreements expressly recognized tribal federally reserved rights to groundwater.
For example, a 2007 settlement agreement between the United States, the
Lumnmi Indian Nation, and the State of Washington recognized the tribe's right
to groundwater on the Lummi Reservation in Northwest Washington. The
agreement resolved a water rights case in which the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington held that Wintemr rights on the Lummi Reservation extend to groundwater. The agreement gave the Lumrni the right to
groundwater on the Lummi Peninsula. Specifically, the agreement allocated
the right to use 120 acre-feet per year of groundwater to the State of Washington, Department of Ecology, and the remainder of the groundwater to the
Lummi. The Lummi gained the exclusive right to regulate the use of groundwater underlying the reservation, and the agreement prohibited groundwater
withdrawal unless the Lummi had authorized the withdrawal.
In addition to court settlements, state and federal settlement acts have resolved disputes over groundwater rights. Many of these settlement acts recognize a tribal reserved right to groundwater. One such federal settlement act is
the Snake River Water Rights Act of 2004. This act resolved water rights disputes between the Nez Perce Tribe, the State of Idaho, and private water rights
holders. The settlement act clarified water rights in the Snake River Basin in
Idaho, and it allocated to the tribe the right to groundwater. Focusing on the
hydrological connection between groundwater and surface water, the settlement
quantified the tribe's right to surface water and stated that the right extends to
the groundwater source beneath.
V. LIMITATIONS ON USE OF TRIBAL RESERVED RIGHTS TO

GROUNDWATER
Several courts that recognized tribal reserved rights to groundwater placed
limitations on the rights. Federal reservation grants originally derived from the
idea that the water is impliedly reserved to the extent that the water is necessary
to fulfill the purpose of the reservation. The Ninth Circuit has broadly defined
the purpose of the reservation as it relates to water rights in order to provide a
home for native peoples. Courts that analyzed groundwater in the context of
Winters considered whether groundwater was necessary to fulfill the reservation's purpose. The reservation grant itself thus set an initial, and broad, limitation on groundwater rights. Courts have limited tribal reserved rights to
groundwater based on quantity, pumping maximum, purposes of groundwater
usage, sales outside the reservation, and necessity.
The Nevada Supreme Court linited the quantity of groundwater allocations on the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation in Pyjmiad Lake Palute Tibe
ofIndians v. Ricci The court established the limitation on groundwater as the

WATER LA WREVIEW

Volume 19

amount of water in the Orr Ditch Decree adjudication. The court held thatwhile the decree impliedly gave the Pyramid Lake Palute Tribe a right to
groundwater, the decree restricted that right to the tribe's personal yield of water
as set forth in the decree. Because the specified amount of water in the decree
represented the tribe's full adjudication, the tribe had no right to groundwater
in excess of that anount.
In a 1990 settlement agreement between Idaho and the Shoshone-Bannock
Tribes, the tribes discussed the right to water under, anismig on, flowing across,
adjacent to, or otherwise appurtenant to the reservation. The agreement lirnited
the tribes' respective rights in terms of necessity: the agreement restricted the
tribes' use of groundwater to instances where their diverted water from other
sources was insufficient. If the one of the tribes diverted less than the agreedupon quantity, the tribe had the exclusive right to divert groundwater.
A settlement contract between the Jicarilla Apache Tribe and the United
States limited groundwater rights with regard to the effect on the surface water
sources. The contract addressed water rights in the Navajo River, Navajo Reservoir, and San Juan-Chama Project. Under the contract, the tribe had the express right to adjudicate water rights from either the groundwater or surface
water. The tribe gained the right to lease its water off-reservation, but the contract prohibited the tribe from withdrawing groundwater if doing so would adversely impact the surface water source. As anr additional measure relating to
the protection of surface water sources, the contract required the tribe to implement a conservation program.
VI. PREvious CASES AND POTENTIAL GUIDANCE TO EXAMINING AGUA
CALIENTE DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS
The Agua Caliente court distinguished the water at issue from other cases
recognizing tribal reserved right to groundwater. Many prior cases focused on
the hydrological connection between surface water and groundwater to extend
Winters to groundwater. However, Agua Caliente did not involve hydrologically connected groundwater and surface water. The defendants in Agua Cal'ente argued that the tribe did not need groundwater to fulfill its reservation's
purpose, so Winters did not apply. Various courts have previously considered
this argument, but each court implemented a somewhat different solution.
Nonetheless, reference to the history and trends of previous cases may help
define and clarify the scope of the reserved rights doctrine in relation to the
Agua Calientegroundwater.
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I. INTRODUCrION

Agua Cal'ente raises pressing issues at the intersection of Federal Indian
law and water law that have yet to be conclusively resolved by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Among these issues are whether federal reserved water rights apply to
groundwater and the scope and circumstances under which aboriginal water
rights, with a priority date of time immemorial, may be claimed. This piece
explores in depth the Agua Caliente's claim to aboriginal rights to groundwater,
and how the district court ruled on this claim in its March 20, 2015 ruling on
summary judgmenL
II. BACKGROUND ON FEDERAL INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
Although the law of Indian water rights remains in flux, water rights potentially available to federally recognized tribes fall into two categories: (1) federal
reserved, or Winters, water rights and (2) aboriginal, or Winans, water rights.
Both types are at issue in Agua Caliente,and while this post primarily discusses
the Agua Caliente Band's aboriginal water rights claim, an overview of both
types of rights provides useful background.
First, tribes may be entitled to federal reserved water rights. The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized reserved water rights in Winters v. United States,
207 U.S. 564 (1908), which concerned the Fort Belknap Indian reservation in
Montana. The Milk River flows through the Fort Belknap reservation, and, at
the time of the case, a number of non-Indian Montanans had obtained state
appropriative rights to the river's water. The federal government sought to restrain these state-sanctioned users from diverting water upstream of the reservation, and the question arose whether the Indian reservation possessed water
rights through which it could restrain other appropriators. In response to this
question, the Court held the reservation did possess water rights because, in
setting aside the Fort Belknap Indian reservation, the federal government reserved water sufficient to fulfill the purpose of the reservation. In other words,
if by treaty the United States reserved land to provide a tribal agricultural homeland, the resulting Indian reservation and its occupants would possess federal
reserved water rights to the quantity of water necessary to fulfill that agricultural
purpose. Later courts, such as Anzona v. California,373 U.S. 546 (1963), clarified that these rights apply to waters appurtenant to the reservation and have a
priority date commensurate to the date of the treaty or other federal action reserving the lands.
In addition to reserved water rights, tribes have invoked aboriginal water
rights carrying a priority date of time immemorial. The key Supreme Court case
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supporting such rights is UnitedStates v. Vians, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). While
Winans was not a water rights case, it contains a principle of Indian law applicable to water rights, nanely that treaties and other federal actions are not a
grant of rights to the Indians, but rather a grant of rights f-on them. Thus, according to Winans, tribes retain rights that they did not explicitly cede in a treaty
or other agreement. In the case of Winans, these retained rights included hunting and fishing.
The central case recognizing the Wians principle with respect to water
rights is UnitedStates v. Adair,723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983). There, the Ninth
Circuit held the Klanath Tribe of Oregon possessed aboriginal title to certain
lands, hunting, and fishing rights, and "by the same reasoning, an aboriginal
right to the water used by the Tribe as it flowed through its homeland." Id. at
1413. While the Klanath Tribe ceded title to most of its ancestral lands by
treaty, the Tribe retained exclusive use and occupancy rights. Relying on
Wians, the Adair court found that there was "no indication in the treaty, express or implied, that the Tribe intended to cede any of its interest in those
lands it reserved for itself." Id. at 1414. Thus, the court held, the Tribe possessed a continuing water right on the Klamath Reservation to support its hunting and fishing lifestyle. This right, the court explained, carried a priority date
of "time immemorial." 1d.
Im. RESERVED AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS IN AGUA CALJENTE
The Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians ("Agua Caliente" or "Tribe")
is a federally recognized tribe with a reservation in southern California's
Coachella Valley. The Tribe has used and occupied the land constituting and
surrounding their curTent reservation for generations. The Tribe's ancestral
homeland in the Coachella Valley forms part of the Sonoran Desert, where
water is scarce, particularly in California's current drought. In 2013, the Agua
Caliente sued the Coachella Valley Water District and the Desert Water
Agency seeking, among other requests, a declaration that the Tribe possesses
both federal reserved and aboriginal rights to the Valley's groundwater. This
lawsuit began in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.
The parties to the suit agreed to break the action into three phases. Phase
I, which was decided in March 2015, addressed two primary legal questions: (1)
whether the Agua Caiente held federal reserved rights to groundwater under
the Winters Doctrine, and (2) whether the Tribe held aboriginal rights to
groundwater. The court held the Tribe's federal reserved water right included
a right to groundwater. The court found the reservation's purpose was to provide a tribal homeland, and thus the Tribe possessed a federal reserved water
right sufficient to fulfill that purpose. The court reasoned that this right extended to the groundwater beneath the Tribe's land as an appurtenant source
of water. See Agua CalienteBand of CahuillaIndians v. Coachella Valley Water
Disatct,Case No. EDCV 13-883-JGB, 2015 WL 1600065 (E.D. Cal., Mar. 20,
2015) at 7-10 (hereinafter "Agua Caliente"). Because the extension of the Winuters doctrine to groundwater has not been settled by the U.S. Supreme Court,
this constitutes a major victory for the Tribe.
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The Eastern District, however, denied the Tribe's aboriginal rights claim.
This section recounts the parties' arguments in this case.
A. THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
The aboriginal rights arguments in Agua Cah'ente centered on federal statutes enacted in the wake of California joining the United States. In 1848, Mexico ceded land that would become the State of California to the United States
in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Shortly thereafter, in 1850, California was
admitted to the Union and became a state. And just one year later, the U.S.
Congress passed the Act of 1851, which sought to protect the property rights of
former Mexican citizens and to settle land claims in California. The Act required those claiming property rights to file their claims within two years.
Coachella argued that the 1851 Act required all claims to land to be submitted, mad that the Agua Caliente's failure to submit a claim within the twoyear period set forth in the Act meant that any claims to the land were extinguished in 1853. Likewise, Coachella argued that the record lacked sufficient
factual support for Agua Caliente's aboriginal groundwater rights claim. In particular, Coachella emphasized the lack of evidence that Agua Caliente reservations had any wells in use, but rather that they only used surface water.
Agua Caliente countered that the 1851 Act did not extinguish their aboriginal rights. Agua Caliente did not dispute that they failed to file a claim in the
two-year window of the Act. Instead, they argued that the Act, which on its terms
pertained to "each and every person claiming lands in California by virtue of
any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican government," Plaintiff's
Brief at 20 (citing An Act to Ascertain and Settle the Private Land Claims in the
State of California, 9 Stat. 631 (March 3, 1851)), did not apply to them because
their claim to land did not stem from the Spanish or Mexican government. Rather, they claimed aboriginal rights based on use and occupation since time immemorial, and did not rely upon title derived from the Spanish or Mexican
government. To buttress this argument, Agua Caliente also pointed to an 1853
Act passed by the U.S. Congress to transfer California lands in which the United
States retained a proprietary interest to the United States. Because this 1853 Act
included an exception for "land in the occupation or possession of any Indian
tribe," the Tribe argued that this provision explicitly recognized as valid the kind
of aboriginal tide that they asserted. In making this argument, Agua Caliente
also attempted to distinguish a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases finding aboriginal rights to be extinguished by the Act of 1851. It did so on the ground that
those U.S. Supreme Court cases addressed "Indian land rights that fell within
the purview of the 1851 Act," but that Agua Caliente's land rights did not fall
within the purview of the 1851 Act
Likewise, .because an 1850 law passed by the U.S. Congress created a treaty
commission for the purpose of clearing aboriginal tide claims of non-missionized Indians, Agua Caliente argued that they did not fall within the scope of the
Act of 1851. The Act of 1851, their argument went, did not apply to Indians
outside the zone of missionization because the 1850 Act covered their claims.
Agua Caliente also noted that they had negotiated a treaty with the United States
in 1852 that set aside a reservation, but that they were not notified of the U.S.
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Senate's failure to ratify the treaty for some time.
Finally, Agua Caliente argued that even if their aboriginal land rights had
been extinguished by the 1851 Act, they subsequently reestablished title by continuing their exclusive use and occupancy of the land and water on their ancestral lands.
B. THE COURT'S RULING
The court's ruling on summary judgment granted the Agua Caliente federal
reserved rights to groundwater, but denied the claim for aboriginal groundwater
rights. It rejected both of Agua Caliente's aboriginal rights arguments, finding
that the Tribe's failure to file a claim in accordance with the Act of 1851 extinguished any aboriginal water rights. Moreover, the court held that even if the
1851 Act did not extinguish these aboriginal rights, the establishment of a reservation in 1876 "effectively re-extinguished that right." Agua Calienteat 13.
Although the court did not explicitly address Coachella's argument that no
factual support demonstrated groundwater use in the relevant time period, the
court did note that aboriginal rights to groundwater are not founded upon use
of groundwater itself, but rather derive from a right to occupancy. See Agua
Caliente Bandof CahuillaIndians v. Coachella Valley Water Disnc4 Case No.
EDCV 13-883-JGB, 2015 WL 1600065 (E.D. Cal., Mar. 20, 2015) at 13 fn. 12
("[No such freestanding aboriginal rights exists, all derive from a right to occupancy."). Accordingly, proof of actual groundwater use was not necessary.
The court's decision to deny aboriginal rights to Agua Cahente relies fairly
heavily on U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding the Act of 1851. Although
the argument that an aboriginal right does not stem from Spanish or Mexican
authority and that property rights not stemming from Spanish or Mexican authority are not covered by this Act appears persuasive on its face, past U.S. Supreme Court decisions have interpreted the Act of 1851 as requiring tribes
claiming aboriginal land rights to have filed a claim pursuant to the Act to preserve their occupancy rights. The main case finding otherwise, Cratmer v.
United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923), upon which Agua Caliente relied heavily,
contains some language favorable for the Tribe. See, e.g., id.at 231 ("The Indians here concerned... and their claims were in no way derived from the
Spanish or Mexican governments."). Nevertheless, while the U.S. Supreme
Court has not affirnatively stated that all aboriginal land claims in California fall
within the ambit of the Act of 1851, the Ninth Circuit in US.ex rel Chunie v.
lingrose,788 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1986), effectively interpreted the line of U.S.
Supreme cases as doing just that. The Chunie court distinguished Crameron
the ground that the tribe in that case did not occupy the land in question at the
time of the Act of 1851. Interestingly, the Eastern District did not address Agua
Caliente's argument about the 1850 treaty commission, so the court's exact perception of that argument remains unclear. Nevertheless, the Eastern District did
not find it persuasive enough to rule in the Tribe's favor on the aboriginal water
rights claim.
The Eastern District's assertion that the creation of a reservation for the
Tribe in 1876 reservation extinguished aboriginal rights, however, appears inconsistent with prior case law on aboriginal water rights. As put forward in
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Winans, reservations are not a reservation of rights to tribes, but rather a reservation of ights from them-a reservation of those not granted. Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit in Adai, 723 F. 2d at 1414, noted, concerning the aboriginal water rights it found to exist for the Klamath Tribe, "It]he rights were not created
by the 1864 Treaty, rather, the treaty confirmed the continued existence of
these rights." The Eastern District here, citing Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399,
412 (1994) instead explained that reservation means "the United States withdraws land which it then 'set[s] apart for public uses.'" The Eastern District used
this statement to support the assertion that "an aboriginal right of occupancy is
fundamentally incompatible with federal ownership." Agua Calienteat 13. This
assertion, of unclear origin or legal underpinning, contradicts Adai; which recognized a continued aboriginal right of occupancy on a federal reservation.
Adair; 723 F. 2d at 1414.
IV. CONCLUSION
First, in our estimation, the Eastern District should have refrained from
foraying into the counterfactual that the Tribe might have reclaimed its aboniginal tide between the Act of 1851 and the 1876 establishment of its reservation.
Alternatively, just as the Ninth Circuit did in Adair, the court could have conducted a robust interpretation of the executive order that established the reservation in 1876 to determine whether or not it reserved any remaining aboriginal
rights. We feel that it is a legal error to conclude that a reservation automatically
extinguishes any aboriginal rights that may exist without even exantining the text
of the order establishing the reservation. However, because the Tribe has
elected not to appeal the aboriginal rights portion of this ruling, the order and
its flawed reasoning will remain on the books.
Case law surrounding the presence of aboriginal water rights remains
murky. Although Agua Caliente ultimately prevailed on their reserved water
rights claim in this case, recognition of aboriginal rights can be crucial to tribes,
primarily when 1) a federal reserved rights claim is not available; or 2) the pniority date guaranteed by a reserved right is not early enough to preserve a tribe's
access to water. Given the lack of clarity in aboriginal water rights, erroneous
decisions in this arena are not surprising. Appellate courts should work to make
the law here more clear when the opportunity to do so arises to provide better
guidance to lower courts attempting to make sense of the confusing state of the
doctrine.
Although this piece has focused on the legal underpinnings of aboriginal
rights, it is worth acknowledging that, from the perspective of basic fairness,
these legal underpinnings are themselves seriously flawed. During this time period, eighteen tribes in California negotiated treaties with the United States that
were never ratified. No one bothered to notify the tribes of this fact. Combined
with the Act of 1851, these actions left many California tribes homeless. On top
of this, these tribes had to endure state-sanctioned attempts to get rid of the
Indian population. There are some tools within the law, such as aboriginal water
rights, that can be used to advance tribal interests, but that does not change this
country's history of using the law itself to subjugate the people who have lived
here the longest, a history that is still present in certain strains of modem legal
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I. TRIBAL PARTICIPATION IN THE SUSTAINABLE GROUNDWATER
MANAGEMENT ACT

In 2014, the California Legislature passed the Sustainable Groundwater
Management Act (SGMA), which implements a comprehensive framnework for
the regulation of groundwater in Califoria. SGMA relies on local agency leadership to achieve "sustainable groundwater management," defined as the management and use of groundwater without an "undesirable result," such as unreasonable reduction of groundwater storage, degradation of quality, seawater
intrusion, or land subsidence. Under the new law, certain high- and mediumpriority basins will be required to adopt sustainable groundwater management
plans the end of January 2022, and to attain sustainable groundwater management by 2040. While SGMA contains several provisions pertaining to tribes, it
raises many more questions than it answers about how the new regulations will
affect the more than one hundred federally recognized Indian tribes that reside
in California.
Much of the uncertainty about SGMA's impact on tribes and vice versa
stems from the fact that federally recognized tribes are sovereign entities that
often fall outside of state regulation; tribes have a government-to-government
relationship with the U.S. federal government. This means that, with regard to
their federal water rights, federal tribes can effectively ignore SGMA if they so
choose, which poses potential problems for the state and local sustainability
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agencies, because sustainably managing an aquifer generally requires managing
the total amount of water removed from the aquifer by all users. If a local sustainability agency cannot control - or doesn't even know - the amount of
groundwater used by a tribe, it will be more difficult for that agency to manage
its groundwater basin. As a result, SGMA seeks to pull federal tribes into local
considerations of groundwater management and conservation; it provides that
tribes "may voluntarily agree to participate in the preparation or administration
of a groundwater sustainability plan" and are "eligible to participate fully in planning, financing, and management." Still, the Act does not - and cannot - that
federally recognized tribes participate or ilfact do anything at all.
The question of whether to participate in the SGMA process raises complex issues for tribes, and since the first deadlines under SGMA have not yet
passed, the tribes appear to be in a "wait and see" mode - they are waiting to
see how the process takes shape and plays out before deciding whether to participate. To date, no tribe has fully begun participating in a local SGMA process
of developing a sustainability agency or groundwater plan. In part, this is likely
the result of tribes' concerns that participating in the SGMA process - a state
law to which they are not subject - will impinge on their sovereignty. Tribes
may not want to be forced to report to the state; instead, they wish to preserve
their government-to-government relationship at the federal level. For similar
reasons, tribes may be hesitant to share their groundwater data and knowledge
about the hydrogeology of any aquifers underlying their reservation. Moreover,
even if tribes are interested in coordinating with local agencies or the state, they
may lack institutionalized mechanisms for doing so, because historically many
of them have coordinated with federal, rather than state, agencies. Collaborating with local entities ider a state law may be an uncomfortable posture ad
new procedure for tribes. Thus, for those tribes who may be interested in participating, establishing a formal relationship between tribes and the state that
doesn't entail the state regulating tribes will be a major challenge moving forward.

But if tribes opt not to participate in the SGMA process, what does that
mean for the basins that they overlie? It could mean future havoc for basin
plans if tribes assert federally reserved water rights after the basin plans are established. SGMA guidance documents have appropriately emphasized how to
contact and invite tribes to participate, but they have not named the risks of not
including tribal participants. If a tribe asserts a federally reserved water right
after a basin plan has been established, it may render the basin plan ineffective
by bringing the total amount of groundwater extracted from the basin above the
amount required to achieve "sustainable groundwater management."
The potential for this situation to arise is the result of the nature of the water
rights that federal tribes living on reservations may be able to claim. Under the
Winters doctrine, when Congress reserves land for an Indian reservation, Congress also reserves water rights for the tribes living on the reservation. Those
tribes have a right to the amount of water necessary to fulfill the purposes for
which the reservation was created, which can include the amount needed to
farm all the "practically irrigable acreage" on the reservation. That "reserved"
water right is a federal right and thus usually paramount to rights later perfected
under state law. As a result, unlike holders of state water rights, tribes with
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federal water rights need not follow the reasonable and beneficial use doctrines
that are part of the California water law regime for both groundwater and surface
water rights. Nor do they lose the water right from non-use - federally reserved
water rights are not subject to abandonment, so tribes may come forward and
assert a water right at any time - including potentially after a basin plan has been
established under SGMA.
The concern that tribes will disrupt existing water allocation regimes by suddenly claiming or exercising their reserved water rights is not new, however.
Historically, tribal claims of federally reserved water rights were made with respect to surface water, which presented complex issues for the appropriative
rights systems employed in western states like California because they affected
the priority of existing rights. Whereas priority date under the state system is
based on the date when the appropriation was initiated, federally reserved water
rights have a priority date that goes back at least as far as the date on which the
reservation lands were set aside. As a result, a tribe claiming a federally reserved
right to surface water today could bump down in priority all the rights established after the date on which the reservation was created.
II. POTENTIAL INTERACTIONS BTWEEN FEDERALLY RESERVED
GROUNDWATER RIGHTS AND CALIFORNIA'S GROUNDWATER REGIME

Similar problems arise in the context of groundwater, which recent case
law, including the Eastern District of California's decision in Agua Caliente,suggests can also be the subject of federally reserved water rights. California manages state groundwater rights under a water rights system that merges three different types of water rights - overlying, or correlative rights; appropiative rights;
and prescriptive rights. The California Supreme Court first recognized correlative and appropriative rights to groundwater in 1903 in the landmark case Katz
v. Walkinshaw. Under this groundwater rights regime, users whose land lies
above an aquifer are vested with overlying rights, which allow groundwater extraction for use on the overlying land subject only to the limitation that the
amount extracted is reasonable for use on the overlying parcels compared to
the demands of other overlying users. Appropriative rights are established according to a first-in-time, first-in-right system and relate to groundwater extraction for use on property that does not overlie the aquifer. These rights are
junior to overlying rights - appropriators may only use "surplus" water, or water
in excess of what is required by overlying users and that will not result in aquifer
overdraft. Finally, prescriptive rights can be created by the open and adverse
continuous use of groundwater in an overdrafted basin for the prescriptive period, which in California is five years. Thus appropriative rights can shed their
junior status as compared to overlying rights if they become prescriptive rights
through this process. How federally reserved rights to groundwater will interact
with or fit in to this complex state groundwater rights system remains largely an
open question.
If the tribe's land overlies a groundwater source, it may begin pumping under the correlative rights doctrine, making a claim to the correlative right of
"reasonable use" under state law. Under that state law correlative right, if there
is insufficient water to meet the demands of all overlying landowners, then each
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must reduce their use in relation to the other overlying landowners.
If, however, the tribe claimed their groundwater right was a federally reserved right, three potential scenarios could occur. First, if the date of creation
of the tribe's groundwater right preceded perfection of all other overlying
groundwater rights, the tribe's right would probably be absolute and superior,
rather than correlative, to others. Granting a tribe its entire allotment in this
scenario would likely follow the California Supreme Court's rule for coordinating state surface water appropriative and riparian rights, which provides that appropriative rights supersede subsequent riparian rights and vice versa. Riparian
surface water rights, like overlying groundwater rights, are correlative. As a restilt, the tribe's federally reserved right could effectively preempt the state water
rights of other users, thus making sustainable groundwater management more
difficult, especially in times of scarcity or if the tribe's water right is large relative
to the total amount of water available in the basin.
In a second scenario, all overlying groundwater rights could predate a tribe's
reserved right. Under this scenario, because federal reserved rights cannot interfere with prior state water rights, the tribe's right would likely be satisfied after
the overlying rights, similar to a state appropriative groundwater right.
Finally, in a third scenario, the date of the creation of the tribe's groundwater right could fall between the dates when other overlying groundwater rights
in the basin vested. In this scenario, three potential outcomes exist for coordinating overlying users' rights with the tibe's reserved right to groundwater: (1)
the tribe's right might be enjoyed in its entirety, preempting all subsequent overlying users, with all overlying users (including those predating the tribe's reserved right) sharing in shortage, which means all overlying users reduce use
proportionally if there is not enough water to meet their total demand; (2) because some overlying rights precede the tribe's reserved right, the tribe's right
might be satisfied after all overlying rights; or (3) the tribe's right might, together
with other overlying state groundwater rights holders, reduce use proportionally
in times of shortage. This scenario - where a tribal reserved right is created
subsequent to some overlying groundwater rights but before some others mimics a scenario left unresolved in California surface water law when a surface
water appropriative right is both predated by and followed by separate correlative, riparian rights to the same waterbody. According to the authors of one
water law casebook, in this surface water situation, "[if you cannot find a solution [to this quandary], do not worry. Neither can we. To our knowledge,
moreover, no court has ever confronted this Gordian knot in a published opinion. This issue typically does not arise because title to most private land in
California was acquired before rival appropriative water rights were perfected."
Because tribes like the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuila Indians, located in
Southern California's Coachella Valley, may hold reserved rights to groundwater with priority dates around the time when overlying groundwater rights first
vested - the Agua Caliente's Winters right to groundwater would date to 1876
- this "Gordian knot" might become more common as tribal reserved rights to
groundwater are increasingly recognized.
In addition, tribes sometimes pump water from an aquifer and deliver it to
lands that do not overlie that aquifer. Under California groundwater law, this
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situation would make them state law appropriators. If the tribe claimed a federal reserved right to groundwater in this distant aquifer, however, their reserved
right would probably function like reserved rights to surface water: the tribe's
groundwater right would be fulfilled before appropriators with priority dates
after the establishment of their reservation and after appropriators with earlier
priority dates. Meanwhile, a tribal reserved right to groundwater that it uses on
lands that do not overlie an aquifer might be fulfilled subsequent to all overlying
groundwater rights, like state appropriative rights, or in conjunction with overlying groundwater rights as described above.
Il.

CONCLUSION

These complexities highlight the importance of aboriginal rights to groundwater - tribal reserved rights with priority dates of tune tnmemonial. Aboriginal
groundwater rights with a priority date of time immenmorial would almost certainly resolve the legal headaches described above, with tribal rights trumping
all state groundwater rights. Another post in this series discusses the aboriginal
rights claim in the Agua Callente case.
Ultimately, under either the correlative rights or the Winters doctrines, a
federally recognized tribe on a reservation overlying an aquifer could claim a
right to the groundwater at any time, even if it has not previously been pumping.
With a claim under the state correlative rights system, this would likely pose a
fairly manageable problem for groundwater managers, since the tribe's right
would be limited by what is reasonable use in relation to other overlying users.
But an absolute, non-correlative, federally reserved claim to groundwater might
frustrate basin plans and the established groundwater rights regime. This is not
to say that tribes are in any way at fault for unsustainable groundwater management in California; in fact, aquifer overdraft throughout the state is largely the
result of historic non-enforcement of the groundwater rights regime except
through litigation and adjudication in some basins. Rather, the intersection of
tribes' federally reserved rights to groundwater and the California groundwater
regime engenders extreme legal complexities and uncertainty that may have unintended consequences for groundwater management under SGMA.
Further uncertainty for basin managers might arise from questions like: if a
reservation both overlies an aquifer and is crossed by surface water, may a tribe
decide which water resource to make the subject of its federally reserved right
(i.e., whether to claim a federally reserved right in the surface water or the
groundwater)? Can it make a claim to some of both the surface water and the
groundwater? If a reservation overlies two different aquifers, may a tribe claim
a federally reserved right in one and a correlative right in the other? Given that
courts have only somewhat recently begun to find federaly reserved rights in
groundwater, these and many other questions about the interaction between
California's groundwater rights system and federally reserved groundwater
rights remain unresolved. In the end, it is in the interest of state and local agencies to attempt to overcome hurdles like tribes' concerns about sovereignty in
order to coordinate with them on groundwater to ensure that SGMA can be
implemented effectively while respecting tribal water rights.
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The 2016 University of Denver Water Law Review Annual Symposium
("Symposium") focused on the topic of Interstate Water Compacts, both past
and present. The first speaker, retired Colorado Supreme CourtJustice Gregory Hobbs, Jr. spoke on the history and importance of interstate water compacts, both in the United States as a whole and Colorado in particular.
Justice Hobbs began the Symposium by noting how interstate compacts illustrate the delicate mix of federalism that makes the United States unique. His
presentation centered around the story of Delphus Carpenter, a graduate of the
Sturm College of Law and the father of the interstate water compacts created in
Colorado. Born in 1877, a year after Colorado became a state, Carpenter grew
up working the land in Greeley. After graduating law school, he became a practitioner in Greeley. He was a strong believer in the prior appropriation doctrine. Coloradans at that time, and settlers across the West, believed that they

owned the water within their territories, but this view would soon prove incorrect.
Justice Hobbs noted the significance of 1902. The Federal Reclamation
Act took effect that year and Kansas sued Colorado over water rights in Kansas
v. Colorado. Moreover, both the Bureau of Reclamation and the Federal Government asserted that plaumed reclamation project should receive all unappropriated water. Justice Hobbs explained that the states, including Colorado, were
not happy with the situation that was developing in the West, a war of sorts for
water rights. In 1907, the Supreme Court finally issued its decision in Kansas
v. Colorado,holding that a fact specific equitable apportionment analysis would
control these types of disputes between states over water rights. Justice Hobbs
stated how Colorado "won" the first round of apportionment due to its settled
agriculture across the state.
Next, Justice Hobbs discussed how the changing border of the United
States in the late nineteenth century affected the development of water rights in
the West, particularly in regards to Mexico. At that time, homesteading was the
philosophy of the West, and, when federal law granted a homestead it only
included surface water rights. Justice Hobbs asserted that this foreshadowed
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the eventual difficulty of adjudicating groundwater rights under interstate compacts. Justice Hobbs remarked on the prescience of the framers of the Colorado Constitution, who declared that the water belonged to the public and the
people. This idea was part of the homestead philosophy, but had even deeper
roots in the traditions of Native Americans who lived in the West long before
Europeans had settled there.
Justice Hobbs then turned back to the story of Carpenter. He explained
that Carpenter entered into this mix of uncertainty after graduating from law
school. Carpenter was a one term state senator. Nonetheless, after he left office, the whole state of Colorado turned to him on a bipartisan basis to assist
them in the growing number of disputes over waters within the state. In 1908,
the Supreme Court declared that the new reservations for Native Americans
needed enough reserve water to sustain their populations and such water was
not subject to any state doctrines. Justice Hobbs discussed how it was a rude
awakening for the states to learn that they did not own their own water. Additionally, there was growing concern among the citizens of Colorado over lawsuits from downstream states. At this tine, Carpenter represented the Greeley
Water District, and sought one hundred thousand acre-feet of water from the
Lararie River, but Wyoming was not inclined to deal. Justice Hobbs explained
how all of these circumstances forced Carpenter to reconsider his belief in the
prior appropriation doctrine, and prompted him to begin research on compacts
to settle these disputes.
Justice Hobbs described how people in Colorado and the surrounding
states were not receptive to the idea of the federal government issuing decrees
to resolve these water disputes. Carpenter and others wanted to rely on state
sovereignty to resolve the disputes between the states and make binding contracts. These negotiations began in 1922 in Washington D:C. Justice Hobbs
described how Carpenter brought detailed maps along with him to show plans
to irrigate the entire Eastern Slope. Carpenter also wanted the states to be able
to use the water as they saw fit within their own borders. By the end of the
negotiations, he accomplished his goal of giving state courts the power to work
within their own rules through compacts. Carpenter also set the landscape for
how courts adjudicate these water rights today.
Justice Hobbs closed his speech by describing the importance of water storage here in the West, especially as more and more people migrate to urban
centers like Denver. Justice Hobbs noted how Carpenter knew this when he
worked as a state senator to establish the correct priority dates for the reservoirs
in Colorado. To illustrate this point, Justice Hobbs displayed various images of
reservoirs across Colorado, including Cherry Creek and the Rio Grande Reservoir. Justice Hobbs asserted that, following the 1922 negotiations, Carpenter
laid the foundation from which eight more interstate compacts would arise.
However, Justice Hobbs pointed out that the success of interstate compacts
does not ensure a conflict-free future. Justice Hobbs finished his remarks by
saying: "We want it all, and we think we can do it all. But there is a limited
water supply, and we share it."
Bunan Hinkle
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STATE ENGINEERS' PERSPECTVES, ON THE ADMINISTRATION
OF INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS
Historically in the arid American West, explosive population growth and
increased drought sparked a series of intense legal and political battles. These
disputes are not confined to state or country boundaries and often turned on
who controlled an increasingly valuable resource: water. Water shortages result
in complex and heated disputes between states which take years - sometimes
decades - to resolve.
With such high stakes on the line, it is common for stakeholders to turn to
the legal system for redress. However, the laws that govern most of the West's
water systems, such as the prior appropriation doctrine rule ("first in time, first
in right"), appear tailor-made for conflict. While the prior appropriation system
appeared to work in the in the past because arid climates still had enough water
for all parties, those days ceased to exist as populations increased. The booming West is now an environment ripe for fighting.
Recognizing the prior appropriation system was not sustainable between
states, state engineers, the individuals charged with the responsibility for administering water rights, turned to interstate compacts for a solution. Interstate compacts are used as an instrument for state cooperation in carrying out affirmative
programs for solving common problems; here, ensuring water reaches downstream states while also securing water for each states' constituents.
Such high stakes in the allocation of scarce water resources, further emphasize the importance of the state engineer's role in this admilistration. State
engineers have the responsibility and authority to administer water rights and to
realize the benefits and exercise the obligations of numerous interstate compacts that form the backbone for allocating water throughout the West. State
engineers are critical players in the process, making decisions, advising attorneys, and oftentimes deciding if an issue is worth litigation or can be settled
through negotiation.
The University of Denver Water Law Review brought together a panel of
current and former state engineers from Kansas, Wyoming, Colorado, and Nebraska to discuss their experience with interstate compacts. Specifically, the
panel explained how interstate compacts work; the challenges state engineers
face implementing the terms of the compact; how state engineers protect their
state's interests; and the best way to achieve the benefits bargained for in the
compacts. While tensions exist in every river basin, the "State Engineers' Perspectives on the Administration of Interstate Water Compacts" panel, moderated by Colorado's First Assistant Attorney General, Karen Kwon, was more
like a reunion of old friends. The panel included David Barfield, Dick Wolfe,
Patrick Tyrrell, and Jeff Fassett who represent competing interests in the interstate compact disputes, but who have developed friendships over the years they
have worked together. While each state has different perspectives on administering the compacts, the panelists all agreed that cooperation is essential to effective administration of interstate compacts.
The panelists primarily focused on the Republican River Compact. The
water at issue in the Republican River Compact flows through Colorado, Nebraska, and Kansas. Over the past few decades, it has been the center of a
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number of political disputes. In the latest entry of this saga, the dispute turned
on the 1943 interstate compact for the Republican River. David Barfield, the
Chief Engineer for the Kansas Division of Water Resources, began the discussion with a brief overview of the dispute. He noted that those who formed the
compact accounted for the developmens they assumed would occur. Based
on that accounting they created an allocation framework which theoretically
would ensure that each state maintained the appropriate allocation of water.
Like all interstate compacts, however, the interstate compact did not account
for every possible problem that could arise.
In this dispute over states' rights to the waters of the Republican River Basin, the Supreme Court adopted the special master's recommendations that Nebraska had "knowingly failed" to comply with the Republican River Compact.
The Court awarded Kansas $3.7 million for its losses and $1.8 million in partial
disgorgement. It declined to order an injunction against Nebraska and found
that Nebraska should decide how to achieve compliance. Since the holding,
both Colorado and Nebraska have taken significant actions towards compliance
including: (i) groundwater retirements; (ii) surface water buy-outs; and (ii) draining Bonny Reservoir and, most importantly, developing augmentation projects.
There continue to be some disputes over developing augmentation projects as
these need compact administration approval.
The Republican River Basin case, like most interstate compact disputes,
often has contentious legal rhetoric surrounding the conflict. However, all of
the state engineers emphasized that the states have established a close working
relationship in recent years that should keep water in the river and the neighboring states out of the courts. It is this collaborative effort to settle conflicts
outside of court that the panel said is key to the successful allocation of limited
water resources.
In discussing the dispute, Barfield highlighted several recurring issues state
engineers face in administering interstate compacts. This dispute underscores
the difficulties of administering the water rights when compacts created by one
generation and left to the next generation to administer. Barfield emphasized
that the personalities and personal relationships that helped (or in some cases
prevented) a compact's formation, are different than those which administer the
agreed-upon terms. This separation could lead to unexpected conflicts simply
because there was a change in the players involved. In these situations, cooperation is the key to success.
Barfield, like the rest of the panelists, said that unexpected change further
complicates the administration of these interstate compacts. If unanticipated
change did not happen, he stated, the interstate compacts would work "just
fine." However, interstate compacts are created with limited information about
the future -which leads to challenges later in administration. For example, significant ground water development connected to the surface water system creates a technical challenge for the administration of the compacts when the interstate compact is silent on the matter. Barfield has worked on finding a
solution to this problem for decades and has made some progress. He concluded by noting that his job as state engineer is to identify when there is a dispute and work through the appropriate dispute mechanism to ensure his state
gets its share of water.
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Patrick Tyrrell, the State Engineer for the Wyoming State Engineer's Oflice, spoke after Barfield. Tyrrell said that state engineers can either initiate
interstate litigation over the administration of a compact or they can work to
prevent litigation and resolve disputes without resorting to the judicial process.
To refuse to regulate under an interstate compact will invariably result in a lawsuit. The state engineer is responsible for implementing language of a compact
that is oftentimes unclear and antiquated, and must navigate the differences in
state water laws. These administrative challenges can, and often do, contribute
to very different opinions at compact commission meetings. For example, Tyrrell noted that there may be differences across state lines as to what constitutes
a reservoir. Tyrrell noted that when it comes to implementing and administering these vague and outdated compacts, it is easy to lawyer-up and end up in
court. Again, echoing Barfield, Tyrrell stressed that it is in all parties' best interest to settle any water dispute outside of court. The onset of litigation signals
that the parties have actually failed in their primary role of addressing and resolving water disputes.
Tyrrell also noted that states are naturally skeptical of their neighbors and
cautioned that this skepticism leads to distrust, which further complicates discussions on water administration. He pointed to the clash between Montana
and Wyoming over the North Platt twenty to thirty years ago, which ended in a
lawsuit, as an example. To combat distrust and skepticism, Tyrrell noted the
importance of communication and the monthly meetings he has with other
states to create a transparent relationship. He concluded by reiterating that a
state engineer's primary (and perpetual) responsibility is to educate constituents
about what compacts will allow state engineers to do and not do-something he
called "minding your manners at home."
Dick Wolfe, the State Engineer for the Colorado Division of Water Resources, followed Tyrrell. Wolfe highlighted the critical point that interstate
compacts were created as an alternative to litigation. Wolfe also highlighted the
practical limitation of compacts insofar as they do not anticipate some of the
challenges that arise in the future. Rather, they were designed to establish a
structure and set of principles for implementing the compact. Specifically,
Wolfe referenced the challenges that arose due to the development of groundwater between the 1950s and 1980s: (i) climate change; (ii) the implementation
of the Endangered Species Act; and, (iii) bypass flows. None of these developments were considered when the interstate compacts were originally developed.
While these challenges are not directly addressed in many interstate compacts,
the compacts and those charged with administering them need to be flexible
and seek out practical solutions with the advancing age of the compacts.
In determining how to resolve unanticipated changes, Wolfe quoted Albert
Einstein: "A clever person solves a problem; a wise person avoids it." Wolfe
said that through the dispute over the Arkansas Compact and Republican Compact as it relates to ground water pumping, Colorado has learned - the hard
way - that ignoring facts does not make the problem go away. He said that by
channeling the "clever person" we can, and should, work cooperatively in addressing potential conflicts, thereby avoiding much larger problems later.
Through water commissions the state engineer has the power to anmend the
interstate compact to some degree without having to actually amend the entire
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compact. Through these commissions the state engineer has addressed the alleged violations of the interstate compact and brought them to the attention of
state officials before they file a lawsuit. Therefore, commissions allow the state
engineers the flexibility to work wfhin the compact and cooperatewith neighboring states, rather than allowing parties to become polarized and lawyer-up.
Litigation only complicates the actual allocation of water.
In concluding his portion of the talk, Wolfe stressed the importance of collaboration beyond anything else. He pointed to the settlement over the Arkansas River as an example of where the states worked together on developing the
issues. Moreover, Colorado has tried to become more transparent by providing
data to check what the state is doing. By working hard to take these steps to a
more transparent relationship, state engineers can build the trust which is essential to dealing in interstate compacts
Jeff Fassett is the former state engineer of Wyoming and current Director
of the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources. Fassett began his speech
by recognizing the friendships between the panel members - but joked "all
good friends have to keep an eye on each other." Fassett drew on his past
experiences to highlight that interstate compact disputes are not hard to start,
but are very difficult to stop once initiated. Moreover, because these cases take
place in the United States Supreme Court, the parties have one chance to get it
right - something that makes all parties nervous.
Citing the immense amount of time and resources expended in reaching
the settlement between Wyoming and Nebraska, Fassett noted that there were
five attempts to settle the case before it reached oral arguments. Each attempt
failed, in part because of the poor relationships between the parties. He emphasized that at the end of the day it took a change in the players to reach a
solution. Ultimately, it came down to the water officials, like the state engineers'
office, to develop the final settlements.
At the end of the panel discussion, moderator Karen Kwon commented
that some of the panelists seemed less than excited about opening compacts.
She asked how the panelists maintain copasetic relationships and implement
the compacts as the relationships change. All of the panelists stressed the importance of meeting regularly to maintain open lines of communication. This
transparency and communication mitigates any natural skepticism of neighboring parties, which leads to more cooperative allocation of water. The panelists
highlighted that an often overlooked aspect of their job is their role as an ambassador. It is necessary and essential to engage with neighboring states. Cooperation is key.
Jenmer Najar

THE COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE
LOWER BASIN
Ted Kowalski, Chief of the Interstate, Federal & Water Information Section of the Colorado Water Conservation Board, moderated a panel at the Symposium featuring three speakers addressing different perspectives from the
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Lower Basin.
The first speaker was Bill Hasencamp, Manager of Colorado River Resources, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California ("MWD"). Hasencamp represented the municipal provider perspective on the panel. M"D
covers a one trillion-dollar economy, 5,200 square mile service area, and - as
one of the largest water providers in the country - approximately nineteen million residents. Hasencamp explained how the drought in the 1990s forced
Southern California to rethink the way it rationed water. In response to the
drought, Southern California devised an integrated resource plan for meeting
reliability needs of the region. The plan focused on agricultural to urban transfers and augmenting the dry year water supply with storage. According to Hasencamp, the plan was effective, but maintaining the water supply has been a
challenge for several reasons.
One challenge has been the geography of the delta between Northern and
Southern California. According to Hasencamp, the state water project receives
water from the Sacramento River that comes into the delta from the North.
The pumps for both the state water and central valley project are both in the
South. Therefore, in order for the water to move between Northern and Southern California, it must move through the delta. Unfortunately, fish swim too
close to the pump and, in order to protect them, state and federal environmental regulations have forced Southern California to reduce pumping with increasing frequency. Hasencamp explained that this year alone, during the worst
drought in California's history, California lost nearly a million acre-feet of water
because fish were swimming too close to the intake. In addition to fisheries,
other long-term risks on the delta include seismic concerns with the bay area
fault, as well as rising sea levels. Hasencamp warned that if catastrophe hit, the
delta could become an inland sea, and that this might prohibit the pumping of
water for years.
Hasencamp then asserted that the focus needs to be on getting the delta
functioning again in a way that will protect the environment and meet the water
needs of the state. Hasencamp explained that MWD believes the way to do
that is through tunnels under the delta. With tunnels, if a catastrophe occurred
and the delta failed, Southern California would not lose pumping as the state
could still receive water from the river upstream. Tunnels would also ensure
that Southern California could obtain water in a way that protects fish from
pumps. The plan is currently up for approval and Hasencamp is hopeful that
it will pass.
Another challenge for California has been the apportionment on the Colorado River. Hasencamnp explained that a series of compacts and agreements
give each state a certain allocation of the Colorado River. After fifty years, California saw a dramatic reduction in its apportionments under the Colorado
River Compact. As a result, the state had to develop a plan to limit water intake
in order to live within the reduced allocation. In response, California developed
a plan with other states to keep the Colorado River Aqueduct full until the year
2016. Through the combination of special surplus water and agricultural to
urban transfers, the aqueduct would theoretically have stayed full until 2016.
However, Hasencamnp described a catch in the plan: Lake Mead had to remain
at least two-thirds full. Unfortunately, as he explained, MWD did not anticipate
the worst drought in the history of the Colorado Basin. As a result, Southern
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California did not receive the anticipated water from the river and instead had
to shift its focus locally toward developing recycling, desalination, groundwater
recovery, and conservation plans. Hasencamp briefly discussed some of these
plans including implementing agricultural conservation measures with Imperial
Irngation District ("liD") to grow the same crops with less water; lining the
American and Coachella canals; developing programs to incentivize farmers not
to grow crops; entering a water sharing agreement with Nevada; and developing
the Lake Mead Storage Program. Hasencamp explained that even as the
drought in California continues, extra water does exist. Unfortunately, California cannot pump the water so they are still receiving drought allocations. In
conclusion, he suggested that fixing the delta would help to alleviate this tension.
The second speaker was Chuck Cullom, Manager of Colorado River Programs, Central Arizona Project ("CAP"). He represented an agricultural and
urban perspective. To begin, Cullom gave a brief overview of the Colorado
River System, describing it as "the engine of the west." While not even in the
top twenty largest rivers in North America, the Colorado has four times the
annual run-off storage capacity. CAP delivers water to four million people in
Arizona, provides water for cities and irrigation, and has the most diverse customer classes in the Colorado River system, serving eleven tribes, ten irrigation
districts, and ten cities.
Like Hasencamp, Cullom emphasized the steady decline in Lake Mead
and the implications it had for CAP. Currently, the Lower Basin runs at a deficit
of about 1.2 million acre-feet every year. In accordance with the compact,
MVD and California have invested billions to reduce their water use from 5.1
to 4.4 million acre-feet, and, still, Lake Mead is declining. The decline undermines the effectiveness of these cooperative agreements. Cullom explained that
from CAP's perspective, it must bear the burden of this shortage from what, it
believes, is a shared obligation. The Colorado River system is a linked system
of seven states in the Lower Basin. As the reservoir declines, the reductions
grow. When Lake Mead evaporates, apportionments do not factor in that reduction. But through cooperative agreements, states have been able to define
what shortages will look like in the Lower Basin.
During the first anticipated shortage, Cullom clarified that CAP's underground water storage will diminish and agriculture customers could be cut by
more than half. In light of the persistent long term risk of shortage, CAP has
developed several responses. First, it has invested millions into storing water
underground to protect users from shortages. Second, like MWD and HD
partners in California, CAP has begun storing water in Lake Mead to prop the
reservoir up in order to avoid immediate shortage issues and reduce the risk of
long-term shortage issues. CAP has reduced annual diversion by between
140,000-180,000 acre-feet. By the end of this year, CAP will have stored
345,000 acre-feet in Lake Mead.
Cullom concluded by emphasizing that the structural deficit creates a longterm risk to all Lower Basin Colorado River users and undermines the ability
to become cooperative and collaborative partners. CAP is attempting to follow
the lead of California in developing proactive steps to reduce its use, but also is
looking to collaborate and cooperate with Lower Basin partners to assist and
share in those additional reductions.
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The final speaker was Kevin Kelly, General Manager of IID. He represented the irrigation perspective in a district with the largest number of agricultural to urban transfers in the nation. According to Kelly, because California
has been exceeding its 4.4-million-acre-foot entitlement to the Colorado River,
IID entered into transfer agreements to bring California "back in line." As Kelly
explained though, "the only dangling question mark is the Salton Sea."
According to Kelly, Imperial Valley is an economically-challenged community with 450,000 acres in active cultivation. Because of the vast farmland and
economic nature of the community, the recession of the Salton Sea will have
devastating impact on the Imperial Valley. When the Salton Sea issue first
arose, the state of California took responsibility for handling it, focusing primarily on restoration. However, as Kelly explained, California failed to fulfill its
responsibility. In 2014, to bring this issue to the forefront, IID filed a petition
with its own state water board. It informed California of its failure to meet the
task of tackling the Salton Sea problem and requested the state board resolve
the Salton Seat question as a condition of the transfers.
By the year 2047, 74,000 acres of lakebed will lay exposed, and the water
elevation will be negative 249,090 feet. To address the issue, IID suggests filling
up the lakebed with habitat and renewable energy projects. Kelly argued that
renewable energy projects would be especially effective because the same exposed lakebed in the Salton Sea happens to correspond with this hemisphere's
largest untapped geothermal resource. Kelly asserted that this resource could
replace the lost generation at the San Onofre nuclear plant. Yet, unlike the
plant, the Salton Sea would have virtually no emissions.
Kelly noted that California has the most aggressive renewable portfolio
standard in the nation as well as the most ambitious greenhouse gas reduction
bills. But in the last four years since San Onofre went down, air in California
has become markedly more polluted. According to Kelly, geothermal energy
should be an integral part of the solution to filling up the exposed lakebed.
Kelly argued that IID could not enter another quantification settlement agreement when it is struggling to implement the first one. At the end of his speech,
he posed a rhetorical question: When you pit agriculture against all the other
uses in California, who decides whose economic project is more important?
Kelly answered: "In a diversified economy in the southwest, agriculture needs
to count for something."
Neilke Fields

COLORADO RIVER COMPACT ISSUES AFFECTING THE NAVAJO
WATER PROJECTS
Assistant Attorney General and member of the Water Rights Unit of the
Navajo Nation Department of justice ("NNDOJ"), Stanley Pollack, spoke over
the lunch hour about issues and challenges the Colorado River Compact pose
to the Navajo Nation's water projects. The mission of NNDOJ's Water Rights
Unit is to protect the water rights of the Navajo Nation. The NNDOJ, as the
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Navajo Nation's representative in state and federal litigation, is currently pursuing five general stream adjudications.
Pollack prefaced his presentation by focusing on various Colorado River
issues and how interstate compacts put different restraints on Navajo water development, particularly in the context of drinking water projects. Pollack emphasized the need to provide drinking water to the Navajo Nation. Pollack
pointed out that thirty to forty percent of the Navajo physically haul their drinking water in barrels. Pollack illustrated this point with a picture drawn by an
elementary school student from Lake Valley, New Mexico. The picture was
one of many drawings elementary school children submitted during the Navajo
Gallup Water Supply Project ("Supply Project") hearings. The drawings were
supposed to depict what water meant to the children and the importance of
water. The drawing Pollack showed was of a pick-up truck with two large barrels
with the word "water" written on them in the truck's bed. This drawing demonstrated that there were generations of children within the boundaries of the Navajo Nation that do not think drinking water is something that comes out of a
faucet, but from a barrel in the back of a truck.
Pollack then asked the audience to inagine themselves as members of the
Navajo before the explorative efforts of the Europeans. He showed aerial maps
of what the Navajo Nation used to be in contrast to what it became after European migration and the establishment of the United States. The Navajo called
their homeland Din~tah, and it encompasses the land between the Four Sacred
Mountains: Mount Blanca, in Southern Colorado; Mount Taylor, in New Mexico; San Francisco Peak, in Arizona; and Mount Hesperus, in Colorado. What
becomes evident, said Pollack, is that this is high desert country, subject to a dry
and arid climate with little development. He emphasized that the Navajo had
been thriving in this area for hundreds of years, until the day when foreign people came along and began drawing boundaries on the land.
The first boundary was the establishment of the Navajo Reservation. The
reservation greatly reduced the land that the Navajo called home. Next, state
boundaries began forming and the Navajo saw the U.S. government parcel up
its homeland, subjecting them to boundary lines the Navajo had no say in forming. Then, in 1922, the Navajo saw the U.S. government divide the Colorado
River Basin into an upper and lower basin. Pollack explained that, once again,
the United States subjected the Navajo to boundaries they had no say in forming, but must abide. Pollack noted that with each boundary line came new political constraints on the Navajo. The boundaries told the Navajo where they
could and could not live and what they could and could not do on the land.
These restrictions imposed limits on what the Navajo could do with their water,
and that, Pollack said, is what he wanted to discuss.
Pollack quoted the language of Article VII of the Colorado River Compact:
"nothing in this compact shall be construed as affecting the obligation of the
United States to the Indian tribes." He said that by this language, the rules and
boundaries on the map should not apply to the tribes. However, in reality, this
is not the case. The Navajo finds themselves almost entirely in the Colorado
River Basin - upper and lower - and within the three states of Arizona, New
Mexico, and Utah. The geography of the Navajo Nation, Pollack said, makes
it difficult to protect the water rights of the Navajo because there are so many
entities at play, each with its own rules, regulations, and characteristics.
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Pollack then rhetorically asked why, if the language of the compact really
meant what it said, is providing water to the Navajo such a problem. He answered this by saying that, as an attorney for the NNDOJ, he can litigate and
litigate, but at the end of the day, only Congress has the power to authorize a
water development plan for the tribes. Therefore, Congress will use that power
as it sees fit, and, ultimately, litigation is a "hollow exercise." Litigation yields
merely paper water rights, and the people Pollack represents cannot drink water
from the paper he might obtain in litigation. Consequently, when the Navajo
want to develop their water, they must go to Congress and request the funding
necessary for that project. In doing so, they have to make sure that what they
want to do fits within the political systems in place. Pollack explained that the
Colorado River Basin is not just about where the watersheds are on a map or
the water within the system, but rather the areas that can receive water because
of the Colorado River System.
Pollack next discussed how the upper basin is composed of the parts of the
upper-basin-states Lee Ferry serves. Lee Ferry is the dividing point between the
upper and lower basins. The lower basin is composed of those parts of the
states without the drainage of the Colorado River system. This means any part
of a state, whether in the upper or lower basin, is really part of the upper basin
if water from the upper basin can serve it.
The only parts of New Mexico considered part of the Colorado River Basin
are in the lower basin, Pollack said. He then displayed a map and pointed out
the Navajo Nation, the San Juan River Basin, and the New Mexico Water Rights
Settlement. The centerpiece of the New Mexico settlement, Pollack said, is the
Supply Project. He explained that there are two pipelines coming from the San
Juan River that serve communities in the upper basin and lower basin in New
Mexico, the Rio Grande area, and Arizona. Pollack noted that this creates four
different communities needing water delivery. Delivering water from the San
Juan River to communities in the upper basin of New Mexico requires little
transportation because the communities use water from the upper basin. Pollack further explained that the geographical location of the upper basin makes
sending water to the Rio Grande very simple, but sending water to the lower
basin more difficult because the lower basin has the drainage of the Colorado
River System.
It is as odd paradox, Pollack continued, that the rules essentially encourage
an out-of-basin use of water by sending water to the Rio Grande where there is
no return flow to the Colorado River. While, at the same time, the rules are set
up againstusingwater in the lower basin where there is the drainage of the Colorado River System because the waters below Lee Ferry can serve the lower
basin. However, in 2003, Pollack went to the Upper Colorado River Commission and persuaded the body to allow the Supply Project to deliver water from
the upper basin to the lower basin, provided that the Supply Project consider
the water use as an upper basin use. What is important about this, Pollack said,
is that the states can work together to find solutions to interstate problems even
though the laws of the river on their face do not allow for such actions.
Pollack concluded his speech by introducing a pipeline project that he said
is still "a pipe dream." The project, called the Western Navajo Pipeline, would
deliver water to the Western portion of the Navajo Nation. Pollack explained
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that the Western portion of the Navajo Nation is an area to which it is particularly difficult to get water because there are no sources of ground or surface
water apart from the Colorado River. This forces most Navajo to haul their
water. Pollack asserted that because it is so hard to get water from the Colorado
River in the Grand Canyon, the Navajo should get water from Lake Powell.
Therefore, he proposed to pump water from Lake Powell above the basin, and
then pump it down into the Western Navajo area. Pollack thinks that the precedent set from the New Mexico settlement, as well as the Upper Basin Resolution from 2003, should allow this pipeline pipe dreamr to become a reality.
Tucker Allen
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Patricia Mulroy's keynote address urged future generations of water law attorneys and policymakers to build upon the established partnerships that made
the Colorado River Basin community so effective over the past two decades.
Consistent with the theme of the conference, "Conflicts and Cooperation: The
Past, Present, and Future of Interstate Water Compacts," Mulroy emphasized
the importance of cooperation in the face of increased water challenges. She
further stressed the importance of shifting the conversation about water from a
discussion about water tights, to one about responsibilities. Throughout her
keynote address, Mulroy praised the Colorado River Basin participants for their
ability to forn partnerships and take responsibility for various challenges.
As part of her work as a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and
former General Manager of the Southern Nevada Water Authority, Mulroy
discussed opportunities to assess international water disputes and consult with
international communities. With this background in mind, she noted that the
Colorado River Basin is not without disputes, but asserted that it is the most
respected and functional river community throughout the world. While the
Colorado River Basin is a positive model for other water communities, it still
faces a number of obstacles in the future.
In highlighting the Colorado River Basin's accomplishments, Mulroy attributed its strength to the partnerships that the Basin has formed. Specifically,
Mulroy said that the Colorado River Basin community derives its strength from
its compact. When looking at the compact, Mulroy said she sees a document,
which in its most basic form, is a partnership. The compact emerged when the
parties recognized that the pillar of Colorado water law, "first in time is first in
right," cannot work between seven states. As a result, the Colorado River Basin,
as a community, created a compact to forge a path for seven equal partners.
Mulroy argued that this partnership and the parties' determination to find a
solution to issues gave the compact the strength to succeed.
Moreover, Mulroy noted that this partnership created a culture of cooperation and partnership that allowed the Colorado water community to flourish
where others have failed. Mulroy noted however, that this partnership has only
emerged in the past few decades. From the 1950s through the 1980s, the compact was least successful because the parties "jockeyed" to obtain preferrence.
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However, events such as the litigation between Arizona and California, reminded all of the parties that litigation does not result in a system of winners
and losers - only losers. This lesson sunk in during the 1990s and into this
century. Since this epiphany, the Colorado River Bain community has journeyed back to achieve the underlying purpose and reasoning that helped form
the compact initially-a partnership where all seven members are equal. Mulroy
said that the seven equal partners find opportunity where others find obstacles.
In recognizing some of the obstacles facing the local water community, Mulroy pointed to two issues that have catapulted water to an issue of national importance. She cited the Flint, Michigan water crisis as one triggering event. She
argued that it was not the mistake initially made, but the fact that the water utility
did not say anything to the community that will negatively impact Colorado
River Basin conversations about water. This betrayal eroded the inherent trust
Americans have with their water providers. This loss of trust will weave itself
into urban conversations and may hinder conversations regarding water resource management.
Next, Mulroy noted that the nation currently faces the immense task of determining how to replace the infrastructure that affects the nation's ability to
conserve, manage, and transport water. Replacing the infrastructure will invariably become an additional tax burden at a time when the general public is resistant to more taxes. Mulroy believes that these two issues, among others, will
elevate the subject of water to a larger national dialogue.
While the nation's focus is shifting toward water and water scarcity, Mulroy
noted the interplay between federal law and interstate compacts that could result
in a serious strain on the ability to form partnerships. Specifically, Mulroy
pointed to three laws Congress enacted in the 1970s - the Clean Water Act
("CWA"), Safe Water Drinking Act ("SWDA"), and the Endangered Species
Act ("ESA") (collectively "Acts") - that have the potential to impact the Colorado River Basin system and efforts to cooperate between the main participants.
While the Acts successfully accomplished Congress' initial goals, Mulroy suggested that it is unclear whether the Acts are flexible or adaptable enough to
meet the needs of a changing climate.
Mulroy strongly advocated for change, whether it is in administering the
Acts or through substantive changes to the provisions of the Acts. She urged
attendees to evaluate the Acts and ensure that each has the capacity to adapt to
changing environmental and political climates. In emphasizing the importance
of flexibility, Mulroy pointed to the success of the Habitat Conservation Plan in
the lower Colorado River Basin and the Species Program in the Upper Colorado River Basin as positive examples.
Mulroy cited the California Bay Delta as one example where the parties'
apparent inability to cooperate hindered water discussions. She asserted that
this inability to cooperate - something she referred to as the "just say no" syndrome - overlaid with the CWA, SDWA, or ESA, has the potential to create
a perfect storm which will result in the Acts completely crumbling. Mulroy
predicts that an attitude of "just say no" will impact every basin where the parties
do not form a partnership.
Having provided examples of successful and unsuccessful effective partnerships, Mulroy quoted California GovernorJerry Brown's statement that he was
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going to "get shit done" as the mentality parties must adopt as society enters
tough drought cycles. For the Western water community to continue to be
successful, Mulroy emphasized that conversations need to shift from a discussion about water rights, to one about responsibilities. In the face of a changing
environmental and political climate, it will only become more difficult to have
rational conversations about tough problems. The willingness to find solutions,
in the face of daunting challenges, must serve to unite the West. While every
community has its own culture, infrastructure, and laws to administer, Mulroy
argued that future generations must cooperate to confront common problems
and avoid litigation.
Mulroy concluded her remarks by stating that her generation is handing
down a legacy of partnership to the next generation. With that legacy comes
the responsibility to continue the partnership as we confront the new, more
extreme stresses that will strain the compact over the next few decades. She
reminded the next generation of lawyers that the guiding principle, which has
permeated conversations about water in the West, is that failure is not an option. We need to find a way to cooperate to find a solution that works for all
interested parties. She strongly urged the next generation to venture outside. its
immediate communities and go see what it is like in other areas of the world, to
tell a story about our journey back to being full partners, and to start thinking
about the laws in their flexible fashion rather than a rigid manner. Failure is not
an option.
Jennifer Naj'ar

ADDRESSING COMPETING OBLIGATIONS UNDER COMPACTS
AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
In this panel, Karen Kwon and James "Jay" Tutchton presented differing
sides of ongoing conflicts between the federal law and state water compacts concerning the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). Kwon, from the Office of the
Colorado Attorney General, works in water compact litigation and negotiations.
She has contributed to two amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court of
the United States regarding state compact issues. Tutchton has been a public
interest environmental attorney for over twenty years, and he is currently a Senior Staff Attorney with the Defenders of Wildlife. Federico Cheever, an environmental law professor at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law who
has written about the ESA, moderated the panel.
First, Kwon offered her approach to this conflict. She began with a brief
recitation of the implications the ESA has among interstate relations. For instance, the ESA affects water and wildlife management between states because
endangered species recovery in one state can affect water supplies in other areas. Additionally, the ESA implicates the allocation and use of compact water.
Recovery of underwater species under the ESA often requires reserving a steady
water supply for recuperation efforts.
Then, Kwon focused on the state perspective of this competition and described several values that Coloradans hold. First, Coloradans value their environment. Conserving and promoting species promotes that way of life. Second, that quality of life requires a certain availability in water supply. Attaining
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a reliable supply of water helps to preserve species and further Coloradans' way
of life. Finally, Coloradans seek to maintain their ability to manage the resources within their borders.
Kwon next analyzed the ESA and discussed its advantages and disadvantages. One of its advantages is that lawyers can use it as a tool to effectuate
change. Through litigation, lawyers can try to modify or stop projects that jeopardize endangered species. Another point in the law's favor, the ESA protections have proven successful in preventing extinction. On the other hand, the
ESA's disadvantages include the fact that very few species have recovered to the
point that they can leave the endangered species list. Also, some view the ESA
as a threat instead of a tool because the ESA threatens liability for those who do
not adhere to its guidelines. Finally, the ESA contains no long-term incentives
looking to the future. Instead, it focuses on present happenings and immediate
incentives.
Before posing her solution, Kwon presented two examples in Colorado of
conflicts between the ESA and compacts: the Delta Smelt in the Bay Delta and
the Silvery Minnow in the Rio Grande. The Delta Smelt conflict could dramatically cut the amount of water flowing to Southern California and directly affect
the Colorado River. The Silvery Minnow conflict involves a dwindling fish population in the Rio Grande River, which divides several states' waters.
Kwon's proposed solution to this problem: fit species conservation within
the existing structure of water allocation in and between states. Through this
framework, states can create long-term goals and accomplish them while working within the ESA's parameters. Additionally, states may find flexibilities under the ESA to allow compliance with water compacts while recovering species.
Kwon then offered several examples from Colorado that embody this solution.
First, a Colorado policy, the Colorado Parks and Wildlife and the Colorado
Water Conservation Board ("CWCB") work to "keep species common" and
to recover and de-list already-endangered species. To do this, the two entities
collaborate with public and private groups to collect, exchange, and analyze data
and resources on endangered species. Overall, they use this data to collaborate
and try to intervene before listing species as endangered.
Another example illustrating Kwon's proposed solution concerns the Upper Colorado Recovery Program. In this program, several public and private
entities collaborate to recover four endangered species of fish in the Upper Colorado River without interfering with water rights or compacts. The program
avoids this interference by implementing flow augmentation, monitoring nonnative fish, screening large diversions, and constructing fish ladders to help habitat access. Through these actions, the program maintains compliance with the
ESA while promoting the recovery of several endangered fish. Kwon also mentioned a third example: a water lease in the 15-Mile Reach in Colorado.
Through this action, the CWCB leases approxinately twelve thousand acre-feet
to preserve the natural environment flows in that area and maintain the goals of
the patties involved, such as water use and development.
Kwon summarized by re-emphasizing that the challenges facing species are
growing, such as a lack of both long-term solutions and scientific consensus. To
combat these challenges, she stressed that water advocates must collaborate and
utilize scientific methods.
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Tutchton took the podium next, and he started by explaining that the ESA's
process, like a play, consists of "acts." In the first "act," the ESA prescribes the
requirements for listing a species as endangered. Researchers utilize the best
available science to determine whether extinction poses a danger to a species or
a distinct population segment of vertebrate. The second "act" includes the consultation process, during which the government re-thinks its activities in light of
the listing. This portion prohibits the federal government from making the species' situation worse. Finally, the third "act" prohibits anyone from "taking" the
endangered species. In this context, both killing a member of the species and
destroying its habitat constitutes a "taking."
According to Tutchton, the ESA is a "paper tiger." That is, it looks tough,
but lawyers may easily disarm it. In practice, the ESA only removes or modifies
the worst-of-the-worst projects. In the water world, however, Tutchton concedes that the ESA commonly helps water species gain protection and escape
extinction. He attributes this characteristic to the fact-heavy situations and objective, scientific determination. An apparent advantage for water wildlife is that
researchers can collect data to calculate with scientific precision the results of a
particular action, and thus protect endangered water species from peril. For
example, Tutchton mentioned one case where the predicted extinction of a
three-inch fish overruled the construction of a dam. In that case, researchers
produced enough data to conclude the species would become extinct if developers built the dam and blocked its construction. (See Tennessee ValleyAuthority v. Hill,437 U.S. 153 (1978).)
Next, Tutchton briefly mentioned that one can comply with both of the
laws of the river, and then quickly turned to the success of the ESA. For instance, while the government has de-listed relatively few species, the ESA's regulations have seen success in perpetuating the survival of listed species. Going
against those that criticize the ESA for a lack of de-listing, Tutchton admitted
the ability of the species to recover depends on the means one wants to use.
Certainly more drastic measures can get faster results, but those drastic
measures may venture beyond one's comfort zone. In practice, the small
measures produce small effects, often resulting in maintenance or slow growth
of a species.
Additionally, while Tutchton understands the desire for local control, he
argued several counterpoints. First, all species, as national resources, are of
national interest. All people, no matter where they live, have an equal right to
enjoy the nation's wildlife. Furthermore, the need to list a species represents a
local failure of conservation. The federal government does not manage wildlife
until afterlisting occurs. Then, the federal government steps in to intervene for
the endangered species. Tutchton also admitted that handing control back to
the state, which often caused the endangered status, disappoints him.
Tutchton then touched on the issue of drought. He declared that Westerners routinely live in a drought. In fact, he hopes people in Colorado and the
West more generally remove the word "drought" from their vocabularies, as
these areas normally experience little or no precipitation. Furthermore, Westerners should consider rain or snow an abnormality, especially in states located
in a former dust bowl. Thus, organizations should expect drought-like weather
and act in accordance with the expected conditions.
Finally, Tutchton spoke about the future of the ESA. First, he pointed out
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the ESA underrepresents real life. The ESA currently protects fifteen-hundred
species, but scientists speculate that number should be around six or eight thousand. Next, he mentioned that species originally evolved before humans
changed the earth's landscape. Wildlife originally developed when rivers regularly flooded and followed their natural course. Now, humans use rivers for
transportation and for development. Creating and managing the workarounds
needed to protect the species will only present more difficulty as human development continues. Tutchton summarized by emphasizing that he favors ESA
litigation, as it helps to represent underrepresented points of view in critical ventures.
ConnorPace
WAR OVER THE RED RIVER: IMPLICATIONS OF THE TARRANT
REGIONAL WATER DIST. V HERRMANiVDECISION
Professor Tom Romero, a faculty member at Sturm College of Law and
faculty advisor for the Water Law Review, introduced the sixth panel of the
Symposim, which featured two attorneys arguing for each side of the Supreme
Court case TarrantRegional Water Dist. v. Herrmann.
Professor Romero began by outlining the case, which the United States Supreme Court ("Court") decided in 2013, and how it affected litigation over interstate water compacts. The water compact at issue, the Red River Compact
("the Compact"), includes Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Arkansas. This
case originated in the Compact area shared by Texas and Oklahoma. Before
introducing the attorneys, Professor Romero summarized the issues in the case,
including the Dormant Commerce Clause and water marketing issues that the
Supreme Court had not reviewed in many years.
The first attorney Professor Romero introduced was Kevin L. Patrick, a
shareholder at Patrick, Miller and Noto, P.C. Patrick was counsel for petitioner
Tarrant Regional Water District ("District") in the case. The District provides
water to north-central Texas. The second attorney on the panel was Star Waring, a shareholder-partner and member of the Natural Resources and Water
Law Practice Group of Dietze and Davis, PC. Waring is the Practitioner in
Residence for the Natural Resources and Environmental Law program at Sturm
College of Law. Waring spoke on behalf of Susan M. Ryan of Ryley, Carlock,
and Applewhite, who was counsel for two amicus parties for respondents in the
case, the Oklahoma Water Resources Board ("OWRB"), who presented in a
point-counterpoint style.
Patrick began first by explaining key historical points that led to this dispute.
The first negotiations surrounding the Red River occurred when the United
States signed the Treaty ofAirmty, Setiemen4 andLimits Between the United
States ofAmerica and His CatholicMajesty on behalfof the Republic of Mexico. Under this treaty, Mexico relinquished access, use, and ownership rights
to the Red River. Patrick next jumped to 1978, when Arkansas, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, and Texas divided the waters of the Red River, creating the Compact. Congress passed the Compact into federal law in 1980. Patrick made his
first argument in favor of the District by detailing that Southeastern Oklahoma
to the north of the Red River receives large amounts of rain annually, while
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North Texas just to the south of the Red River receives unusually small amounts
of rain annually. Patrick concluded this point stating that Oklahoma discharges
32.5 to 34 million acre-feet of unused stream water through the Red River annually.
Waring then presented her first coumterpoint and explained thai altholigh
southeastern Oklahoma is abundant in its annual precipitation, the southwestern portion of Oklahoma is very dry. Waring argued that area of Oklahoma
should be the focal point as it contains the largest metropolitan area in the state,
Oklahoma City.
Next, Patrick and Waring provided a visual of the Red River Compact, and
pointed out sub-basin five as the area of the Compact at issue in this case. Patrick and Waring provided a Compact excerpt, Section 5.05(b)(1). Section
5.05(b)(1) declares that the signatory states shall have equal rights to the use of
runoff originating in sub-lasii five and designated water flowing into sub-basi
five. Furthermore, anytime there are 3,000 cubic feet per second flowing at a
particular point, each of the four states has a right to take twenty-five percent of
the water in the river sub-basin. For reference, Patrick mentioned that ninetysix percent of the time, there is a flow of 3,000 cubic feet per second in subbasin five, so the four states have the right to take twenty-five percent of that
flow the majority of the time. Before moving into the procedural history leading
up to the Supreme Court appearance, Waring posed the major question surrounding this case asking "why did Tarrant try to buy water rights from the state
of Oklahoma if in fact it had the right to come and divert that water from the
Red River in the first place?" Both Patrick and Warng agreed that because the
case was appealed from a summary judgment in the district court, the parties
could have developed a better factual record had the dispute made it to trial.
Moving into the procedural history, Patrick and Waring explained that the
District initially filed the lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The District sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the OWRB's enforcement of Oklahoma statutes. Those statutes apply
stricter standards to applicants seeking to divert water within Oklahoma's borders for out-of-state use. The District sought to enjoin this enforcement on the
grounds that the Compact pre-empted the statutes and that the statutes violated
the Dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce.
The District Court denied OWRB's first motion for summary judgment motion on its claims of Eleventh Amendment Immunity. The court granted
OWRB's second motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the District's Dormant Commerce Clause claim. After appeals, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the Compact did not entitle a
Texas water district to take a share of water from a tributary located in Oklahoma, and affirmed the District Court's decisions.
Patrick and Waring then discussed the District's first Petition for Certiorari,
and Patrick discussed how the United States Solicitor General supported granting Cert and believed that the plain language of the Compact favored the District. The panelists discussed the fact that the Supreme Court looked to a number of other sections of the Compact, focusing more on states' rights instead of
previous legislative history in regard to the Compact.
Before getting to the Supreme Court decision, Patrick and Waring broke
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down the parties' arguments. First, Patrick listed the main points that the District would have made, including arguments on preemption and the Dormant
Commerce Clause. For pre-emption, the District interpreted the provision regarding sub-basin five as allowing it to divert water from a tributary in Oklahoma. In other words, the District sought to prove that the plain language of
the provision created a sub-basin defined by coordinates, not state boundaries,
in which each state could access its equal share of the shared pool water from
anywhere in the sub-basin. For the Dormant Commerce Clause, the District
argued that the language of the Oklahoma anti-diversion statute for out-of-state
entities was discriminatory. Additionally, it argued that there should be a rule
to look at legislative history instead of the states' rights.
Next, Waring discussed OWRB's arguments. The OWRB's main argument was that the District did not have the authority to enter into Oklahoma
physically to divert water for use in Texas. Furthermore, the OWRB argued
that the twenty-five percent allocation of sub-basin five in the Compact meant
twenty-five percent of the water within the state's own boundaries, not anywhere
in the sub-basin. The OWRB argued that states don't relinquish sovereignty
lightly and that whenever a state allows cross-border rights, they are always expressed with clear language. Finally, the OWRB argued that the donnant Commerce Clause does not apply to "allocated" water and that if anything, Texas's
past efforts to buy that water cut against the District's argument that it was entided to the water.
Next, Patrick and Waring dove into the Supreme Court case and Justice
Sotomayor's 2013 decision. The Court affinred the Tenth Circuit decision on
different grounds. The key rulings, according to Waring, were that the Court
agreed with the OWRB's argument that a state retains sovereignty over water
resources within its boundaries, that the District's past conduct in attempting to
purchase water from Oklahoma demonstrated no cross-border rights, and
therefore the District could divert up to twenty-five percent of water in sub-basin
five within Texas, but not from Oklahoma.
In their conclusion, Patrick and Waring reiterated that it would have been
interesting to see the factual record developed had the case gone to trial. Additionally, they shortly discussed how the lack of language on state boundaries and
border-crossings in the Compact played an important role throughout the case.
Finally, the attorneys closed by outlining the key takeaways from the case and
from their discussion before taking questions from the attendees.
Joshua Oden
WHAT'S AT STAKE IN THE NEGOTIATION AND LITIGATION OF
INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS?
The final panel of the Symposium reflected on all the concepts discussed
throughout the day, and provided great insight for the future of interstate water
compacts.
ProfessorJason Robinson of the University of Wyoming Law School, moderated the three-member panel through a series of pre-scripted questions and
insightful answers from each of the panelists. The panel included: David Robbins of Hill and Robbins, P.C.; Chad Wallace of the Office of the Colorado

Issue 2

IVA TER LA WREVIEW ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM

Attorney General; and Christine Klein of the University of Florida Levin College of Law.
Question 1: "Broadly speaking, what do you view as the most significant
shortcomings in the processes by which existing interstate water compacts were
negotiated?"
Klein, bringing her perspective from her current work in Florida, said that
past compact negotiators "ignored the hard stuff," and suggested that future negotiations should address those difficult issues while momentum driving the negotiations exists. Wallace next observed that existing compacts did not "leave
enough room" to address future water uses between the parties, such as groundwater use developments and hydrologic interactions. Robbins concluded by
reiterating Wallace's observations. He also addressed the fact that existing compacts do not generally include effective dispute resolution mechanisms or grievance processes.
Question 2: "How exactly have these shortcomings in the negotiations been
detrimental to the composition and achninistration of existing compacts?" "
Robbins answered first, continuing his line of thought from the last question. He stated that sovereigns do not want to "give up sovereignty unless they
do it intentionally and by their own control." With this understanding, Robbins
argued that earlier compact negotiations failed to establish dispute resolution
mechanisms because these mechanisms intrude on state sovereignty and are
outside that state's decision-making control. Wallace agreed with Robbins and
observed an unwillingness in party states to engage in dispute resolution in the
face of ambiguities or unforeseen challenges in the compact's administration.
Wallace reiterated the difficulties in finding mechanisms to address groundwater use on surface flow.
Klein furthered the conversation on dispute resolution mechanisms by using the Delaware River Basin Compact as an example: the commission implementing that compact has the authority to regulate withdrawal permits, rather
than the states. She then discussed the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes Compact that
creates "common minimum standards" and some adjudicatory authority of the
commission to address disputes. Using these more recent compacts, Klein suggested that eastern states that do not have a history of, nor existing, compacts,
can look to these unique approaches for problem-solving as.they craft new compacts. For example, Klein suggested new compacts could be "tailored" to the
"character and flavor and history of the states involved." Wallace again reminded the audience that compacts are voluntary concessions of state sovereignty, and those compacting states can engage in that process however best
meets their needs.
Question 3: "What is the most important lesson you believe can be gleaned
from interstate water compact litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court over the past
two decades?"
Wallace joked that "the justices don't really like to see us." He stressed
that, because litigation can lead to rigid imposed apportionments, the threat of
litigation is an effective tool to "get everyone's attention" and bring stakeholders
to the negotiating table. Klein emphasized the importance of personalities and
personal relationships in compact administration because "compacts are a marriage to death do us part." Robbins strongly agreed with Wallace's previous
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observation that courts interpret compacts as contracts. Robbins further argued

that such interpretations cannot account for issues of state sovereignty. Finally,
Robbins reminded the audience that there is no "right answer" in interstate water compacts and that compacts are "about making a deal" between sovereigns.
Question 4: "Do you anticipate an increase or decrease in interstate water
compact litigation in the future, and which factors do you consider most determinative?"
Wallace expressed optimism that compact administrators are learning to
work collaboratively and "keep their options open." He referred back to his
earlier point, that litigation will likely be a tool to induce negotiations between
parties. Robbins, without making an express prediction, remarked that "serious
litigation" on a compact "only happens once; after that, you risk contempt [of
court] for not complying" with the imposed judgment.
Question 5: "To what extent, if any, do you anticipate new interstate water
compacts will be forned in the future, and which considerations underpin your
prognosis?"
Klein addressed this question, discussing in detail her knowledge of current
negotiations over the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint ("ACF") system among
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. Klein suggested that these states could "learn
from the Western experience" because of the West's robust history with compact negotiation and litigation. Klein also suggested that the ACF states have
the opportunity to negotiate a compact or equitable apportionment that can
"fold in" contemporary concerns, such as the Endangered Species Act and
groundwater use, that plague western compacts negotiated before these concerns arose.
Question 6: "How likely is it existing interstate water compacts will be
amended or renegotiated in the future? Which factors do you consider most
significant to the initiation and success of such efforts?"
Wallace asserted that renegotiation of existing compacts "just won't happen." Existing compacts, for their shortfalls, are a significant foundation for
those resources; any negotiations or amendments would, Wallace posited, "fill
in the gaps." Robbins then said that, from the perspective of state sovereignty,
any renegotiation or significant amendment to existing compacts would require
states to "give up something." The states would have to change their existing
relationships vis--vis concessions of state sovereignty. Robbins also discussed
the ability of compact commissions to adopt regulations that govern the administration and implementation of the compacts, and he used the Rio Grande and
the Arkansas as two examples of such commission regulations. He suggested
that retaining these existing mechanisms is both more likely and more preferable to complete renegotiation. Wallace then reiterated the need for compact
administrators to build trust and respectful personal relationships amongst
themselves. Robbins concluded the scripted questions with a reminder that,
while not preferable, any negotiator must be ready and willing to litigate in the
event that negotiations fail.
The floor then opened for audience questions. One audience member
posed a hypothetical question and asked if severe drought, similar to the
drought in Australia, would force the renegotiation of the Colorado River Compact. Robbins assured the audience that the Colorado River Compact already
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addresses shortages, so renegotiation, even in the face of severe drought, would
be unnecessary. Wallace agreed, and further said that such an event would not
force compact parties to allocate water differently because all would already be
receiving less under the shortage allocations in the compact.
The next question from the audience inquired into the possibility of a compact specifically for the Ogallala Aquifer. Robbins believed such a compact
would be unlikely because of the very different uses of the aquifer by the three
overlaying states, and because the Supreme Court decisions on the Republican
and Arkansas litigation posited that existing compacts already address groundwater use. Klein expressed similar skepticism, and described a case between
Mississippi and Tennessee regarding different uses and contested ownership of
a common aquifer. Wallace then pointed to the Colorado Supreme Court case
of In Re: the Application for Water Rights of Paik County Sportsinen"5Ranch
as an example of the inclusion of groundwater aquifers in existing compacts and
use laws.
Robinson thanked the audience and the panel, and with the conclusion of
this panel came the end of the 2016 Symposium.
A ubrey Berram

